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The rise in negativity in media coverage and campaign messaging in U.S. political 
elections is of pressing concern for scholars of political communication. Negative information 
has not only been shown to be more attention-grabbing than positive information, but there is 
also evidence that citizens respond to that information in diverse and often counter-intuitive 
ways. I argue our degree of attachment to political party groups, operationalized using the Social 
Identity Theory framework, is a useful tool to predict and understand these heterogeneous media 
effects.  
Building on existing literature in psychology, I suggest that elections in the U.S. two-
party system are a “high group threat” context where biased processing and affective reactions 
are likely to be provoked for those who strongly identify with a political party group. Next, I 
review growing evidence in political science supporting the conceptualization of partisanship as 
psychological attachment to a group in contrast to competing ideology- or attitude-focused 
theories. Finally, I argue that although communication studies work frequently uses Social 
Identity Theory (SIT) as a tool for understanding the mechanisms driving various predominant 
media effects, little research has directly applied SIT to the study of partisanship as a predictor 
(and moderator) of outcomes. In sum, I connect theory and evidence across three disciplines to 
suggest an improved and more potent approach to exploring identity-based heterogeneous media 
effects in politics.  
I provide further substantiation of my approach using American National Election 
Studies data and tracking of media coverage tone over the course of five previous elections. 
 xvii 
Strength of partisanship proves to be an important moderator of the impact of media tone on 
voter attitudes. For evaluations of in-party candidates, increased negative tone of coverage 
increases in-party voter feelings of warmth towards those candidates, and the effect is amplified 
for the strongest partisans. Using these results as a springboard, I then present a novel measure of 
partisanship operationalized as the degree of psychological attachment to the political group. 
Subsequently, I field two surveys during the 2020 presidential election and find that the new 
measure (called PSIM) outperforms the most common existing measure of partisanship (PID) in 
predicting the hostile media effect, selective exposure behavior, and motivated reasoning among 
partisans. I also find evidence suggesting that PSIM is a useful tool for understanding 
heterogeneity in the impact of negative news on voter attitudes.  
  In sum, political partisans respond to negative media messages in diverse and biased 
ways depending on (a) the group dynamic at play and (b) the degree to which the partisan’s 
identity is “attached” to the political group. I believe the new PSIM measure, and the results of 
my analyses, are useful to scholars of political communication as they may help them better 
(more acutely) navigate studying the tense communication climate in today’s political elections. 
Although bias is deeply ingrained in human processing, I hope that continued research into 
patterns of bias and conditions where it becomes salient will, at a minimum, increase the public’s 
awareness and, optimally, inspire improved techniques in overcoming it.  
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Chapter 1 Revisiting the Definition of Partisan Identity 
 
Introduction 
The 2016 presidential race has been argued to be one of the most negative campaigns in 
the U.S. – from public opinion of the candidates to the mainstream press’s coverage to straight 
up political scandal. Yet, the effect of that negativity felt like it was asymmetrical. On the one 
hand, the Clinton campaign seemed unable to recover from the problems with her “emails” (see 
Newport et al., 2016). On the other hand, then-candidate Trump maintained support (even from 
the evangelical, conservative right wing) despite the publication of a recording of him explicitly 
discussing sexually assaulting women and media stories reporting he was paying an adult film 
actress to keep quiet about an affair. Many pundits were surprised that his campaign not only 
survived such explosive scandals during an election cycle, but he also went on to win the 
presidency. This begs the question: Why does a negative scandal in the press seem to hurt or 
even end some candidates’ chances for success1, while other candidates are perfectly able to 
survive them2? I believe this calls into question the impact of “bad press” in politics.  
 It has become widely accepted that at the heart of an ideal democracy is a free, well-
functioning press. The right to a press free of government control is outlined in the first 
 
 
1 E.g., Hillary Clinton’s emails – 2016; John Edwards’ affair – 2008; Gary Hart’s affair – 1984; Gerald Ford’s 
“tamale” incident – 1976 
2 E.g., Roy Moore’s sexual assault allegations – 2018; Donald Trump’s recording and affair – 2016; Bill Clinton’s 
affair with Flowers and Lewinsky – 1992, 1998 
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amendment of the U.S. Constitution, for example. And the freedom of press is one of the 
cornerstones by which we rate the quality of democracies world-wide. The press serves as a 
conduit of information between citizens and government, and vice versa. But most importantly, it 
primarily functions to “help guard against abuses of power by officeholders” (Gurevitch & 
Blumler, 1990, 269).  
Hence, media in modern democracy has taken up the mantle of being a “watchdog,” or 
critical of those in power. Reporting on wrong-doings, failures, corruption, scandal, and so on, 
that could be detrimental to citizens or society is a common goal among news media today. 
Ideally, as the public takes in this information they update or adjust their attitudes in line with 
their best interests. So, if the local press reports that a state senator is using tax-payer money to 
pay for family vacations, constituents might reconsider voting for him or her again.  
 In the abstract, this process seems simple enough. Yet, as is evident in the extensive 
literature on motivated reasoning and hostile media effects, the relationship between the press 
and citizens doesn’t necessarily work that way in practice. Recent polling shows that trust of 
media institutions has been at an all-time low, driven by citizens that fall on the right side of the 
political spectrum (Brenan, 2020). Scholars also find that in the face of damaging information 
about a political candidate or party, people often engage in biased information processing – 
either rejecting or counterarguing the information, or expressing defensiveness (e.g., Gunther & 
Liebhart, 2006). That is to say, attitude updating due to “watch dog” reporting doesn’t always 
work the way it is supposed to. What is the role of media in representative democracy, then, if 
critical stories about political leaders don’t achieve their intended impact on citizens’ attitudes? 
This is a pressing question for scholars of political media today.    
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In order to consider the long-term impact of biased processing of media messages on 
democracy, scholarship must first investigate the mechanisms and conditions that drive this 
phenomenon. Each of the chapters of this project attempt to do so, with the aim of advancing the 
study of political media effects with novel theoretical considerations and data. Overall, my 
argument rests on the idea that conceptualizing and properly measuring partisanship as a “social 
identity” attachment is a potent means of understanding media effects during elections in the 
U.S. I argue this approach provides an improved and more cohesive theoretical framework than 
currently exists in the literature – and one that better predicts heterogeneity in the impact of 
political media on voters.  
 
Chapter Outline 
This first chapter will briefly overview connected theories in psychology, political 
science and communication as they relate to understanding the nature of political party 
attachment in the U.S. In political science, there is a growing body of work that connects 
partisanship to Social Identity Theory (SIT) in psychology (Tajfel, 1978). In communication, 
there is a significant body of work that connects biased media processing and effects to SIT as 
well, potentially via cognitive dissonance and other psychological mechanisms. My objective is 
to bring all this literature into conversation, and thus demonstrate that an SIT approach to 
measuring partisanship, in line with motivated reasoning theory, is a useful tool for political 
communication scholarship. I then use this theory to develop some general hypotheses about the 
impact of strength of attachment to political groups on media effects, which then shape analyses 
explored in the following chapters. 
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In Chapter 2, I use existing data from the American National Elections Studies (ANES) 
to test the impact of partisanship as moderator of media effects over the course of five U.S. 
presidential elections. I combine ANES time series surveys with a robust dataset of newspaper 
coverage of the five elections to trace the effect of media tone about the front-running 
presidential candidates and parties on voter favorability towards candidates. My aim is to (a) 
demonstrate the influence of media coverage on citizens during real election contexts and (b) 
provide a “proof of concept” of the SIT approach to studying political media effects. I find that 
changes in media tone do shift voter attitudes over the course of these elections, even when 
controlling for a wealth of other variables such as demographics, media use, political interest and 
variation in individual election year. Furthermore, strength of partisanship proves to be an 
important moderator of the effects. I find that positive attitudes about a partisan’s in-party 
candidate increase as negative coverage of the in-party increases. Conversely, the effect for out-
party evaluations is in the direction one would expect – more negative coverage results in less 
positive attitudes towards the candidate. This is true for both Democrats and Republicans, in line 
with SIT and motivated reasoning, and the effect is amplified for the strongest identifying 
partisans. Although this chapter does not operationalize partisanship using SIT framework (as is 
the focus of the subsequent chapters), I present evidence that media mattered during real election 
contexts and that strength of identification with a political party influenced those effects in 
meaningful ways.  
The first necessary step towards successfully operationalizing partisanship as social 
identity attachment is to develop and test measures of partisan social identity. Chapter 3 thus 
starts with a review of the extensive and complex literature on the measurement of social identity 
attachment in psychology. I find that these measures fall into one of two categories – universally 
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applicable to any group attachment or group-type specific – and that the majority of scholars 
argue social identity attachment is a multi-dimensional concept to measure. There are about 13 
different conceptualizations of theory-driven underlying dimensions included across the body of 
work. I then review the few existing measures developed by Greene (2004), Huddy et al. (2015) 
and a few others that test SIT-focused measures of political partisanship specifically in the U.S.  
I conclude that there is no clear theoretical pathway to guide the selection of one of the 
many (at least more than 20) existing survey indices. I thus turn to a data-driven exploration of 
the measurement of partisanship as social identity attachment. Drawing off 12 of the reviewed 
measures, I field the first wave of a two-wave survey including 37 different questions (covering 
all 13 theoretical dimensions) targeted at measuring the degree of identity attachment to political 
parties. Using principal components analysis to explore the relationships among questions, I find 
that nearly all fall onto one dimension. Furthermore, it appears that using the top 10 (and even 
the top 4) are sufficient in capturing nearly as much variance as the entire 37-question battery.  
Finally, I demonstrate that this measure of partisan social identity attachment (called 
PSIM) is only partially correlated with the most commonly used measure of partisanship (called 
PID), and that within PID categories there is a good deal of variation in PSIM. The end result of 
this chapter is a novel measure of SIT-focused partisanship, that can be easily deployed in 
surveys, and that I hypothesize will outperform existing measures of partisanship in explaining 
political media effects. 
 Chapter 4 tackles this head on. I use data from the two-wave survey fielded during the 
2020 presidential election to explore the predictive power of the new SIT-partisanship measure, 
PSIM, compared to PID on three predominant effects studied in political communication: the 
hostile media effect, selective exposure, and trust of counter-attitudinal information (i.e., 
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motivated reasoning). I selected these three effects to showcase PSIM compared to PID, in part, 
because they all have historic theoretical ties to Social Identity Theory. Although, strikingly, 
much research in these sub-fields has not directly operationalized partisanship via SIT. I 
highlight a wealth of indirect evidence that points to the importance of the degree of 
psychological attachment to group identities in understanding these effects. My hypotheses for 
hostile media effects, selective exposure and motivated reasoning are all supported – PSIM 
offers, in almost every case, an improvement over PID. I then discuss future testing of the PSIM 
measure and potential applications in communication research going forward. My goal is that the 
work presented here can serve as a foundation for scholars to continue to explore the importance 
of psychological attachment to political group identities in understanding the unique ways in 
which citizens respond to group-threatening political contexts.   
Chapter 5 offers a brief review of findings in the preceding chapters and presents an 
example of how PSIM could be further tested using more complex media effects models. Using 
the survey data from Chapters 3 and 4, I look at the role of PSIM and PID in moderating the 
impact of exposure to a negative news story about the in-party candidate on voter attitudes 
towards those candidates. In other words, I revisit the dependent variable examined in Chapter 2. 
The model for the moderating effect of PSIM (and PID) fails to reach significance, however. 
That said, there is a significant direct effect of PSIM on the outcome (and none for PID), and the 
interaction coefficients are in the predicted direction. Limitations due to the sample, 
experimental method and multicollinearity of the predicting variables are discussed. Finally, I 
conclude by discussing how my findings can serve to help us predict, navigate and understand 




Social Identity Theory and Group Threat 
First introduced by Tajfel (1978) and further developed by Tajfel & Turner (1979), Social 
Identity Theory (SIT) at its most basic level describes the psychological phenomenon of an 
individual defining her or his sense of self through membership to social categories in society 
(e.g., gender, sports team, nationality…political party). The theory posits that when a group 
identification becomes salient in a given context, efforts to preserve positive feelings and 
perceptions of the group are evoked, particularly when the degree of self-conceptualization via 
the group is deep. In other words, a threat to the group literally – i.e., power and resources – or 
symbolically – i.e., reputation and status in society – thus also introduces potential damage to the 
individual on those levels as well.  
Tajfel, Turner and decades of subsequent scholarship find that psychological attachment 
to groups shape the way people process information, the attitudes people hold, and their 
behavior. Furthermore, Turner & Giles (1981) argue that via the process of group stereotyping, 
people with strong group attachment also come to define themselves in contrast to other (or 
opposing) groups as well. Hence, triggers of group threat are not limited to negativity solely 
directed at the in-group. They also occur as the result of perceived (or existing) competition 
between groups.  
For the purposes of this project, I will explore the importance of degree of psychological 
attachment to a group as a lens through which SIT can be usefully applied to studying political 
media effects. My hypotheses are situated within the taxonomy of the Self and Social Identity 
developed by Ellemers, Spears & Doosje (2002). These authors describe SIT as the “content” of 
identity and argue that the impact of SIT in academic research is contingent on the strength of 
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ties to that group: “When collective identities are concerned, the level of commitment to a 
particular group or category determines how group characteristics, norms or outcomes will 
influence the perceptual, affective and behavioral responses of individuals belonging to that 
group” (164). They create a framework for using SIT to predict outcomes by varying levels and 
types of threat combined with levels of commitment to a group identity.  
Ellemers et al. (2002) assert that effects of SIT are entirely contingent on context. “The 
basic assumption here is that the relevant social context determines which categorization seems 
most suitable to provide meaningful organization of social stimuli, and hence which identity 
aspects become salient as guidelines for the perceptions and behavior of those who operate 
within that context” (165). In other words, identities must be triggered in the environment for 
them to become salient enough to influence people. These contexts are also critically important 
in that contexts eliciting positive group perceptions create a sense of security, and while contexts 
eliciting negative group perceptions create a sense of threat. The response of the individual is 
therefore shaped by the valence of these perceptions. 
The impact of the signals from social contexts on identifiers, however, is not universal. 
Ellemers and authors further theorize that the degree of commitment to the identity interacts with 
the nature of the context, leading to heterogeneous outcomes. Thus, they propose that three 
contexts – no threat, individual-directed threat and group-directed threat – processed by 
identifiers with low versus high commitment levels lead to six unique outcomes (see full 
taxonomy in Ellemers et al., 2002, Table 1, 167) ranging from non-involvement or non-response 
to intensely biased information processing and behavior. To summarize: “…responses should not 
be considered in isolation…Consideration of the different underlying goals and motives 
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associated with combinations of self and contextual conditions is essential to explain why 
superficially similar as well as different response patterns emerge” (179-180).  
I believe the third type of threat category in Ellemers et al.’s (2002) taxonomy, “group-
directed threat” is most applicable to the context of media coverage during U.S. political 
elections. The authors characterize group-directed threat as a context in which the group’s value, 
via status, resources, power, morality or reputation, is put in question. In every election cycle in 
the U.S., the country has two competing and deeply entrenched political groups vying for 
positions of power and influence, and access to resources. This competition plays out in a very 
public way, through 24/7 news coverage. One group is fighting to maintain their position of 
influence while the other is working to convince the public to choose their group to lead, instead. 
Much of John Geer’s work shows that as time has gone on, the content of U.S. political 
campaign communications has become more focused on attacking a candidate’s opponent (or the 
competing party), and media tone is growing more negative (see e.g., Geer, 2012). Thus, I 
believe this to be a context ripe with opportunities for the perception of the political group’s 
value, status and positive reputation to be put at risk. 
Within the group-directed category, Ellemers et al. (2002) predict that low-commitment 
and high-commitment identifiers respond differently to threatening stimuli. They argue that low-
commitment identifiers will attempt to emphasize the heterogeneity of the group or even “hide” 
their identification with the group in an effort to prevent the negative perception of the group 
affecting perceptions of themselves. In some extreme cases, low-commitment identifiers may 
even abandon the group altogether. On the other hand, the authors suggest that high-commitment 
identifiers will challenge the source of the threat or attempt to change the status configuration. It 
will likely draw out further expressions of loyalty to the group and increased anger or contempt 
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feelings towards the out-group (or weaker groups). Those highly attached to the group will be 
more inclined to “defensive reactions” (Ellemers et al., 2002, 177).  
These predictions can be directly applied to the group-directed threat context of a 
political election. I believe the media – both news coverage and campaign communication – is 
the essential medium through which the “threat” (bringing into question positive perceptions of 
the in-group) is delivered. Accordingly, one could predict that low-commitment versus high-
commitment identifiers will respond very differently to those messages. Low identifiers may 
simply ignore the information, down-play their identification with others or even be more open 
to updating their perceptions of the group in the direction of the tone of coverage. High 
identifiers, on the other hand, are likely to engage in biased processing and behaviors, or work to 
resist and discredit the information.  
What is described here is a succinct framework for understanding the very common 
heterogeneities already evident in current research on political communication effects. 
Throughout the rest of this project, I highlight this existing literature and present my own 
original findings, that map on well to Ellemers and authors’ taxonomy.  
Partisanship as Social Identity 
The mechanisms underlying political partisanship in the United States have been long 
debated in political science research. On the one hand, The American Voter sparked a body of 
work which conceptualizes partisanship as a stable, psychological attachment; a lens through 
which citizens act and think politically (Campbell et al., 1960). On the other hand, work such as 
Fiorina's (1981) dynamic model of retrospective evaluation argues that partisanship is a 
summation of attitudes, where preferences are constantly being updated with new information 
and experiences. Recent scholarship has attempted to blend these two perspectives - suggesting 
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that Republicans approach politics ideologically and Democrats do so through social group 
dynamics (Grossmann & Hopkins, 2016). Huddy & Bankert (2017) distinguish these approaches 
using the terms “expressive partisanship” (for social identity attachment) and “instrumental 
partisanship” (for attitude updating), to demonstrate that this distinction can lead to different 
motivations for political behaviors. Much existing literature (which continues to grow) falls in 
line with the Social Identity Theory-approach, however – including the compelling evidence 
presented by Green et al. (2002) in Partisan Hearts and Minds, Huddy et al.’s (2015) social 
identity model of expressive partisanship, Iyengar et al.’s (2012) “affect” not ideology, and 
Mason’s (2018) recent work, Uncivil Agreement: how politics became our identity. The 
empirical data at the core of these projects demonstrate that attachment to a political party as a 
group identity not only withstands variability in evaluations of political leaders and conditions 
(Green et al., 2002), but also has more power than partisanship as ideology or a collection of 
attitudes in predicting political behaviors (e.g., Huddy et al., 2015; Mason, 2018). 
In response to the concept of voter learning theory, Green et al. (2002) compare the 
stability of partisan attachment to both general party and presidential evaluations over multiple 
decades. They find that while the public quite visibly adjusts its evaluations of their party’s 
competence and the performance of the party’s leader in response to the political and economic 
conditions of the time, partisan identification is substantially more stable than these attitude 
fluctuations (Ch. 5). This, they argue, is in direct contradiction to work by Achen (1992), who 
finds partisan attachment is connected to a collection of evaluations of political conditions and 
actions of representatives as they benefit or hurt the interests of the citizen. Furthermore, Green 
et al. (2002) conclude that “when opinion is tracked over time to control for preexisting tastes 
and beliefs, different partisan groups seem to be similarly influenced by information” (136) when 
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evaluating political performance. Yet, the fact that partisan identification remains consistent over 
this period indicates that there is some rooted, stable party attachment that weathers outside 
influence.  
There are many other compelling projects in political science that indirectly point to a 
connection between SIT and the nature of political partisanship. Groenendyk (2012), for 
example, finds that “partisans rely on their attitudes towards the opposition party to justify their 
identity when their attitudes towards their own party would otherwise conflict with it” (454). 
Clifford (2017) shows that variation in strength of partisanship was strongly predicted by “group 
loyalty,” even when controlling for other factors such as demographics, patriotism and 
ideological extremity. Barber & Pope (2019) further report that loyalty to the political parties 
predicted acceptance of cues from party leadership in both conservative and liberal-leaning 
directions. They assess that for some people, loyalty to the group trumped ideological attitudes. 
Mason (2018) provides compelling evidence that partisan identity is becoming more strongly 
connected to and predicted by other identities (such as religion and gender), resulting in a deep 
“homogenization” of the parties beyond ideological beliefs. And finally, Arieli et al. (2019) find 
that people evaluated the actions of the in-group political candidate as more trustworthy and as 
intended to benefit the country while they interpreted those same actions by out-group candidates 
as self-serving. In sum, recent data is pointing towards partisanship as more than just a 
summation of what you think, but rather a deeply affective connection to the group.  
A smaller, but equally compelling, group of research has taken up the SIT framework to 
measuring and exploring political partisanship more directly. Greene (2004) was one of the first 
scholars to adopt a social identity group attachment measure from work in psychology (Mael & 
Tetrick, 1992) and apply it to partisanship. He finds that this 10-item measure significantly 
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predicted various political outcomes better than previous measures of partisan strength. Huddy et 
al. (2015) build off Greene’s work and developed their own abbreviated SIT-focused 
partisanship measure, finding that it outperformed ideological affiliation and traditional measures 
of partisanship in predicting past electoral activity and current/future campaign participation 
across three different samples of data. Similarly, Devine (2015) adopts Mael and Tetrick’s IDPG 
scale to measure psychological attachment to ideology (conservative/liberal) calling the measure 
Ideological Social Identity (ISI). He finds overall that both self-identified conservatives and 
liberals score higher on the ISI scale than moderates, and that exposure to stimulus about election 
results increased conservative and moderate’s ISI – which the authors suggest may be related to 
perceptions of threat. And on an aggregate, international scale, Westwood et al. (2018) 
demonstrate using data from the U.S. and other European democracies (i.e., Great Britain, 
Belgium and Spain) that citizens are more strongly attached to political party identities than they 
are to other social groups that may be represented by the parities; specifically, religion, language, 
ethnicity and region. Partisan ties also predicted greater distrust of the outgroup than these other 
identities, resulting in more polarization. The results were consistent across the four 
democracies. 
A social identity-attachment approach to studying partisanship, which allows for degrees 
of attachment to vary, clearly predicts variation in the effects of partisanship on voter attitudes 
and behaviors. Leeper & Slothuus (2014) argue that partisanship’s role in public opinion may at 
times be an emotional, “effortless” attachment in guiding citizen thoughts and actions, or it can 
function more along the lines of Downs (1957) work as simply a heuristic used to make more 
efficient political decisions. This kind of variation, fits well with the SIT context/commitment 
conditions outlined in work in psychology. A core motivation of this project, in fact, stems from 
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the idea that partisanship can take many forms for different people, and that those differences are 
meaningful when trying to predict how media in particular affect voters.  
Political Party Identity and Information Bias 
When studying politics in the U.S., the use of partisanship as a predictor of outcomes is 
entrenched in the political science literature. It has similarly become a pervasive variable 
examined across communication subfields. I highlight a brief review of that literature here, 
followed by more in-depth reviews in Chapters 2 and 4. My objective here is two-fold. First, I 
aim to demonstrate that Social Identity Theory and partisanship have already converged 
theoretically in political communication scholarship over the past few decades. That said, there 
has been little work which operationalizes the measure of partisanship directly in line with this 
theory in communication. Second, and despite this fact, I highlight that much of this existing 
work provides indirect evidence of the group identity attachment nature of partisanship. 
Together, these set the stage for my novel testing of the impact of partisan social identity 
attachment on media effects outcomes. 
Festinger’s (1957) theory of cognitive dissonance has become a common framework for 
studying the relationship between information exposure and attitudes in communication 
scholarship. He argues that people feel psychological (and physiological) discomfort when faced 
with information (or situations) that are inconsistent with or opposing to existing beliefs. This 
motivates people to engage in mental processes and behaviors that aim to reduce these feelings 
of discomfort. Subsequent scholarship studies related patterns of behavior like the preference for 
positive hypothesis testing – our natural inclination to confirm rather than disconfirm a 
hypothesis – and similarly, confirmation bias – the motivation people have to confirm, through 
information seeking or information interpretation, what they already believe to be true (Klayman, 
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1995). Furthermore, Kunda (1990) explains, “There is considerable evidence that people are 
more likely to arrive at conclusions that they want to arrive at, but their ability to do so is 
constrained by their ability to construct seemingly reasonable justification for these conclusions” 
(480).  
In line with the theory of cognitive dissonance, previous research has also demonstrated 
that people are drawn to select information that affirms existing beliefs. Stroud (2008) finds that 
political identities and strength of prior political attitudes, specifically, are a consistent and 
powerful predictor of media selection behavior across many media platforms (what’s referred to 
as selective exposure). As Slater (2015) further explains, people seek out attitude congruent 
information in order to reinforce political identities and attitudes, creating a “positive feedback 
loop.” This behavior can be especially activated when a social identity is threated (like during a 
political election, for example). Slothuus & de Vreese (2010) find that “citizens respond more 
favorably to an issue frame if sponsored by a party they vote for than if the frame was promoted 
by another party” (642), demonstrating that this kind of information preference may have 
important effects on attitudes as well.  
That doesn’t mean, however, that partisans are only surrounded by attitude-affirming 
information. Most research on this topic makes clear that even in the face of selective 
preferences, people are frequently exposed to cross-cutting or contradictory information that may 
bring about cognitive dissonance. Frimer et al. (2017) find that both strong Democrats and 
Republicans are equally as likely to report feelings of discomfort or frustration in the face of 
conflicting political views. So, how would one expect partisans to react to counter-attitudinal 
information? There’s strong evidence to suggest that this brings about biased processing called 
motivated reasoning, where citizens develop rationalizations designed to reach the desired 
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conclusion of confirming a pre-existing attitude. This can both be driven by an “illusion of 
objectivity,” i.e., an attempt to rationally “muster up the evidence necessary to support it” 
(Kunda, 1990, 482 – 483), or through more affective processing, or by discrediting and 
distrusting any uncongenial information. Lodge & Taber (2013) describe this as people wanting 
to think what they feel, allowing passions and emotions to drive cognitive justification for 
attitudes.      
Motivated reasoning has been well-studied in the context of politics. Redlawsk (2002) 
finds that when people are exposed to information about their own party’s candidate that is 
incongruent with their attitudes, they take longer to process it and may actually result in 
supporting that candidate more than previously. This could be attributed to threat-provoked 
identity defensiveness of the in-group or simply rejection of the information altogether. Taber & 
Lodge (2006) demonstrate that people tend to evaluate attitudinally congruent arguments as 
stronger, counterargue in the face of disconfirming information, and uncritically accept 
confirmatory information. Herrmann (2017) also finds that the more strongly people attach to the 
United States as a “social identity” the more likely they are to warp and rationalize information 
about globalization to support their existing beliefs about the subject.   
It is evident that voters prefer information in line with their beliefs and “operate as 
motivated reasoners, attempting to hold to their existing positive evaluation by using any one of 
a number of processes to explain away new incongruent information” (Redlawsk et al., 2010, 
564). These biases may even fuel skepticism and distrust of the media broadly. As Gunther & 
Liebhart (2006) explain, partisans are much more likely to report information that is contrary to 
their opinions as inaccurate. Even when exposed to neutral information, seeing the source of a 
story can evoke resistance and perceptions of biased reporting among partisans (Gunther & 
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Schmitt, 2004). This is often described as hostile media effect, or “the tendency for people who 
are highly involved in an issue to see [any] news coverage of that issue as biased, particularly as 
biased against their own point of view” (Gunther et al., 2001, 296). And often, it is just the 
simple perception, through a partisan identity lens, that evokes this kind of negative reaction to 
media content, regardless of the nature of the content (Perloff, 2015).  
The very apparent biases in people’s information processing of media content, as directly 
influenced by partisanship, fits well into the idea of party attachment operating as an identity. As 
Cooper & Stone (1999), point out, however, most research on cognitive dissonance and biased 
reasoning focuses on individual-level effects. The authors posit that group social identity may 
better help scholars understand the conditions when dissonance takes place and serve as a means 
of predicting how people overcome it. They suggest, “One advantage of Social Identity Theory is 
that it makes clear the notion that people constantly negotiate their identity and that their identity 
is inextricably intertwined with the multiplicity of their social groups. Thus, group membership 
is a consistently available cognitive category that may come into play as a person prepares to act 
in a variety of [potentially dissonant] situations” (151 – 152).  In the realm of politics where 
party group attachment and attitudes about policies tend to be established rather early in life, 
(e.g., Sears & Valentino, 1997; Jennings et al., 2009; Thorson et al., 2016) and remain relatively 
stable over time (Green et al., 2002), the biases provoked by dissonance may thus pose a clear 
threat to the rational attitude updating one would hope voters experience when exposed to 
“watchdog” media content, for example. 
The intersection of SIT, partisanship and media effects rests on the idea that people are 
attached to political groups at a psychological level, and that the degree of attachment influences 
how people react to media messages about their group – particularly when that message brings 
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about a group-directed threat context. Turner & Giles (1981) present a helpful visualization of 
this idea when they say, “individuals internalize group products [i.e., media] such as slogans, 
norms, values and stereotypes…and so achieve shared frames of reference which regulate and 
coordinate their actions and attitudes” (35). I believe conceptualizing partisanship as identity-
based fits nicely with the theory and data on biased information processing in communication 
reviewed above. I intend to expand the literature by applying this framework more directly to 
explore heterogenous media effects.  
 
 
A Social Identity Approach to the Study of Media Effects 
The identity-driven theory of media effects presented here establishes that when there is 
strong identity attachment to a group (in this case, a party), we should expect the effect of media 
on attitudes to be influenced by the degree of this attachment. If one perceives the Democratic 
party or Republican party as one’s “group,” then, in-group members will have (a) strong prior 
attitudes in line with that group’s beliefs and (b) motivation to advance the status, power and 
resources of the in-group, (c) particularly in the face of threating information or contexts. I ague 
that this dynamic is particularly potent during political elections in the U.S. when the two 
political parties have either the risk of losing current power, or the opportunity to gain it, with the 
entire competition played out via media messages easily accessible to the public. For identity-
based partisans, then, this would be a high-threat environment where biases are likely to be 
especially prevalent. 
However, it is worth considering that not everyone adopts a political party group as a 
form of “identity.” Huddy & Bankert (2017), for example, note that while there is clear evidence 
of growing affective or emotion-driven politics in America, that does not mean it’s universal. 
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Therefore, the application of SIT to partisanship must capture a continuum of identification – 
using degree of attachment as a means of distinguishing how people are identifying with these 
groups. This kind of measure of variation of group attachment may be a better tool to explore 
variation in effects. I hypothesize broadly that this is very likely the case for studying the often 
heterogeneous impact of political media on citizens’ attitudes, which I outline in more detail 
below. 
For those who have pre-existing strong identity-based attachments to political parties, I 
predict that it is unlikely that group-threatening media coverage of candidates will fundamentally 
change vote preferences (see e.g., Phillips et al., 2008). Yet, information reported by the media 
that evokes a group threat (such as a scandal, losing in the polls, public blunders, etc.), that may 
be intended to check those in power, could backfire for this group of citizens. Strong identifiers 
are more likely to resist that information or even distrust it, rather than think critically about the 
candidate or adjust their attitudes. Along those lines, I also predict exposure to positive 
information about in-group candidates has little influence on attitudes due to a “ceiling” effect – 
where the strength of the prior attitude is already at too high a threshold. Conversely, and in line 
with the framework proposed by Ellemers et al. (2002), in a group-threat situation, I predict that 
people with low-attachment to political groups who are exposed to media attacking their in-
group may be more likely to shift their attitudes in line with the direction of the coverage. This 
still may not fundamentally change their overall attitudes towards the party or candidate, 
however, unless an “affective threshold” is reached (see, Redlawsk et al., 2010). To summarize, 
I hypothesize that partisan social identity attachment will not only be a better predictor of 
media effects, but it will also be an important moderator of heterogeneous outcomes.  
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It is important to note that political “identity” in the U.S. is not strictly limited to the 
Republican and Democratic parties. As of April 2021, Gallup estimates that about 44% of voters 
report themselves as an “Independent” compared to 25% Republican and 30% Democrat (Jones, 
2021). Recent scholarship has been challenged by what it means when a respondent considers 
her or himself an Independent, however. Keith et al. (1992), for example, argue that 
independents are really closet partisans or “undercover partisans” (as does Abramowitz, 2014). 
Hawkins & Nosek (2012) find that Independents have implicit partisan leanings, and those 
leanings significantly predict their attitudes. More recently, Klar & Krupnikov (2016) argue that 
to identify as Independent is more complex, and that the motivations for rejecting partisan 
identification or “hiding” one’s political leaning may have to do with negative public perceptions 
of the parties – i.e., impression management. Independents are often presented positively in the 
media, the authors explain, as free thinkers, anti-establishment and critical players in determining 
elections, compared to the bickering and biased personas portrayed of Democrats and 
Republicans. Therefore, Independents may be (a) people who tend to vote towards one party – 
leaners – but view the parties themselves in a negative way or (b) people who actively identify as 
“anti-party” (Klar and Krupnikov, 2016). For the former, about three in four Independents report 
leaning towards the Democrat or Republican party, and their voting behavior is not all that 
different from consistent partisans (Skelley, 2021). For the latter, Klar (2014), finds 
“Independent” as an identity on its own can be a motivating factor for political engagement (or 
lack thereof).  
These discrepancies between Independents’ identification and attitudes/behaviors fall 
nicely into Ellemers et al.’s (2020) group-directed threat, low-commitment identity condition. 
Thus, I would expect that the impact of the tone of coverage of the two front-running presidential 
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candidates on Independents during an election to be in line with weak partisan identifiers: their 
attitudes would be shifted in the direction of the valence of the coverage. This expectation is only 
explored (briefly) in Chapter 2. Chapters 3 and 4 focus more narrowly on the differences 
between partisan social identity attachment and traditional measures of partisanship for actual 
political group identifiers (Republicans and Democrats). This limitation is discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 3. That said, I believe that the new measure of partisan identity attachment has 
the potential give clearer meaning to identifying as “Independent.” In traditional measures, 
Independents are simply forced to pick a “lean.” The measure proposed in Chapter 3, however, 
would capture any variation in that lean in relationship to affective and psychological attachment 
to partisan groups. This could be very useful for future research in the growing scholarship on 
political Independents in the U.S.  
Given the literature reviewed above, I believe there is a strong theoretical argument for 
the study of partisanship through the framework of SIT in political communication. As 
Arceneaux and Vander Wielen (2017) nicely summarize, “People’s group attachments shape the 
intuitions people form” (38). Our biases, strength of attitudes, structures of knowledge and 
interests are often rooted in our social identities. And that bias strongly influences how we 
process information. The social identity-approach I’m proposing stakes the claim that it is in 
accounting for the variation in attachment to and strength of group identities that all these 
components can be better synthesized, and help scholars better predict the heterogeneous effects 
of political media on citizens. Attitude strength and psychological information processing help us 
answer questions like “how?” whereas an identity-focused approach improves our ability to 
establish “what” the effects will look like to begin with and “why” they occur.  
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I recognize that studying the impact of our psychological attachment to groups is 
complex and challenging. The subsequent chapters presented here provide sufficient preliminary 
evidence to support the theory describe and, I hope, to inspire future research using this 
framework. 
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Chapter 2 Identity-Based Heterogeneity in Media Effects During U.S. Elections (2000 – 
2016) 
 
In the United States, and around the world, an entire industry has been built to ensure that 
political candidates get “good press.” The public relations professional and political consultant’s 
idea of “good press” often applies basic logic to public and media communication strategy: if 
people hear bad things about you, they’ll think less of you. Applied in politics: if people think 
less of you, they might not vote for you. There are also concerns about the tone of media 
coverage among political leaders themselves. For decades, conservative candidates and 
leadership have been deploying the “liberal media bias” complaint to rally their base when 
polling numbers drop or media coverage of them or the party is negative (Domke et al., 1999; 
McChesney, 2004). This strategy has been reinvigorated with President Trump’s frequent public 
call out of “fake news” to describe media outlets that do not report on him or his policy in a 
manner in which he likes.  
In fact, the 2016 presidential election brought back to the forefront the idea that the tone 
of coverage of a particular candidate may have a real impact on voters. Bode et al. (2020), for 
example, find that “the 2016 campaign appears to have been one of the most negative 
presidential campaigns in recent history” (83) – not just in news coverage but also in social 
media content and in voter attitudes towards the candidates. They also find that the news media’s 
“unrelenting” and often negative focus on the investigation into Clinton’s personal email use had 
a very memorable impact on voters (see also Newport et al., 2016). Did the impact of media in 
the 2016 election hinge solely on whose coverage was “less negative”? Ultimately, no data can 
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say with complete certainty what determined voters’ choices at the ballot box. But this and other 
research coming out of the 2016 election indicates that the relationship between tone of media 
coverage of presidential candidates and voters’ attitudes towards those candidates is much more 
complicated than “good press is good” and “bad press is bad.”   
It is clear that negative information may matter more than positive. A significant body of 
work in political communication has examined the importance of valence in understanding 
people’s interest in and reaction to news. Specifically, people seem to have stronger 
physiological reactions to negative news (Soroka & McAdams, 2015) and are more likely to 
select negative stories even when they report preference for positive ones (Trussler & Soroka, 
2014). The effect of negative news compared to positive news may also vary. Soroka (2006) 
finds that negative information about the economy had a stronger impact on people’s attitudes 
towards the economy than positive information. This could be driven by heightened awareness of 
and reaction to a perceived threat, or that negative information is simply “outlying” to our 
expectations (Lamberson & Soroka, 2018). In the context of an election, negative campaigning 
tends to be successful at increasing voter engagement and is more memorable than positive 
messaging; although, attacking your opponent doesn’t necessarily win votes (Lau et al., 2007; 
see also, Phillips et al., 2008). That’s not to say that positive coverage doesn’t matter at all. 
There’s evidence that positive media coverage of a political party results in more positive 
attitudes towards that party (Norris et al., 1999) and preferences to vote for that party (Hopmann 
et al., 2010). 
Previous work thus highlights that negative political information is attention grabbing – 
which is why extensive time and resources are often devoted to channeling negative media 
attention towards an opponent and away from oneself. Does this increased attention actually 
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translate to attitudes, though? Kepplinger et al. (1989) study the influence of media sentiment on 
evaluations of the German Chancellor for over a decade, concluding that shifts in media tone 
preceded (predicted) shifts in public opinion from months prior. Fournier et al. (2013) 
successfully connect trends in media coverage to the unexpected surge in popularity of the New 
Democratic Party during the 2011 Canadian federal election. Wlezien & Soroka (2019) similarly 
use sentiment analysis of mainstream media coverage during the 2016 U.S. presidential election 
and commercial polling to explore media’s impact on attitudes and find the two are correlated.  
Most interestingly, and potentially relevant for viewing these effects through the lens of 
Social Identity Theory (SIT), there’s evidence that the direction of the relationship between 
negative coverage and attitudes is not always positive. Redlawsk et al. (2010) create an 
experimental simulation of a political election and find that voters’ support for an in-party 
candidate actually grew in the face of negative information – but only to what the authors call an 
“affective tipping point.” In other words, for most of the exposure the effect of negative 
information was in the opposing direction of the tone. But when negative information about a 
candidate reached a particular mass, people were unable (or unwilling) to resist updating their 
attitudes. This is not only a useful showcase of the heterogeneity in effects, but also suggests a 
form of biased processing in line with expectations of Ellemers et al. (2002) high-commitment, 
group-directed threat where identifiers resist and further defend the positive perception of the 
group (also highly suggestive of motivated reasoning).  
There is, in sum, evidence that voter preferences shift in response to changes in the tone 
of media coverage of political candidates, but the effects are diverse. I believe SIT and political 
party attachment, as outlined in Chapter 1, can help scholars better interpret and predict this 
variation in media effects. The tone of media’s coverage of a particular party’s candidate may 
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serve as a trigger of group identity-biased processing. Positive press reinforces people’s positive 
perceptions of the in-group, and thus of the self. Negative press, on the other hand, will likely 
evoke a perception of threat to the group’s status or reputation. In this group-directed threat 
context, people will likely process the negative press in biased ways. Indeed, it may be that 
strong identifiers are likely to resist, discount or respond defensively to this information in 
updating (or not updating) attitudes whereas weak identifiers’ attitudes are likely to respond in 
line with the tone of the coverage.   
The goal of this chapter is to examine the relationship between media sentiment and 
partisan attitudes using the SIT framework. I use data collected during the past five presidential 
election cycles in the U.S. (2000 – 2016) to test my hypotheses. Advancements in automated 
content analysis in combination with the meticulous tracking of voter attitudes during elections 
conducted by the American National Elections Studies (ANES) allow me to track fluctuations in 
media sentiment and the favorability of candidates on a rolling daily basis. Over this time period 
the ANES data only consistently use the traditional measure of partisanship. Thus, the analysis in 
this chapter serves as a starting point for testing my theoretical argument. I use existing data and 
measurement of partisanship as to test the idea: if partisanship operates as psychological 
attachment to a group, I predict that it will be a meaningful moderator of the effect of changes in 
media tone on voter attitudes. Specifically: 
Hypothesis 1a: The effect of negative news will be moderated by partisanship. Further, I 
expected a “backlash” effect among those exposed to negative news about their in-party.  
Hypothesis 1b: The variation in effects will be more pronounced for stronger partisans 
(i.e., stronger attachment to the in-group).  
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Hypothesis 2: The impact of media tone on attitudes about the candidates for 
Independents (non-identifiers) will be in the direction of the tone. Negative coverage will 
decrease favorability and positive tone will increase favorability.  
 
I test these hypothesis below as follows. First, I calculate daily fluctuations in positive 
and negative sentiment in the coverage of presidential candidates during the 2000 – 2016 
elections from mainstream national and regional newspapers in the U.S. using the Lexicoder 
Sentiment Dictionary (Young & Soroka, 2012). Next, I compile the time-series datasets from the 
ANES for those same presidential elections. The tone of coverage is then used to predict 
individuals’ attitudes towards the front-running candidates over the course of the election 
(September – election day of the election year). Results indicate that media sentiment matters, 
although only marginally given strong preexisting attitudes fueled by partisanship. However, I 
find that my hypotheses are supported overall. The impact of media sentiment on attitudes is 
indeed moderated by political identities. I believe these results provide at least preliminary 
evidence of a social identity group dynamic at play in media effects during election contexts. The 
subsequent chapters more narrowly focus on improving the measure of partisanship in line with 




The database used to calculate sentiment of candidate coverage was drawn from the 
Lexis Nexis database using the Web Services Kit. The corpus spans from September 1 to 
election day for each presidential election from 2000 to 2016. Every article – including opinions 
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and op-eds – that mentions one of major parties or their nominated presidential candidates, 
published by eighteen different newspapers during the five election periods, make up the starting 
sample – from national publications like The New York Times and USA Today to large-scale 
regional papers like The LA Times and Chicago Sun Times (see Table 2-1). From this larger 
corpus, every individual sentence mentioning the name of the parties (Democrat* and 
Republican*) and/or the parties’ front-running candidates (e.g., Gore* and Bush* in 2000) was 
isolated to create a new corpus of “candidate only” sentence-level coverage.  
Why focus on sentence-level coverage? Narrowing down allows for a more precise 
measure of the sentiment of coverage of the parties and candidates specifically. For example, a 
newspaper could produce negative coverage about a particular policy area but highlight 
positively how a given candidate plans to address it. In this case the article-level negativity is not 
directed at the candidate and may outweigh what would otherwise be positive reporting on the 
candidate. There are many, many more scenarios one could imagine where the sentiment of the 
article overall doesn’t necessarily indicate the sentiment of the coverage of the given candidate.  
Narrowing to sentence-level coverage does potentially limit the quantity of positive or 
negative coverage being measured, however. In this case, for example, there could be a sentence 
about President Bush with no sentiment at all, followed by a sentence such as “He’s down in the 
polls among women.” The sentence-level analysis would only capture the non-sentiment first 
sentence and miss the negative coverage that follows. Therefore, this work errs on the side of 
type II rather than type I errors, favoring precision over validity. Although the results that follow 
may at times under-estimate the tone of coverage, the sentence-level analysis at least cuts 
through some of the messiness and more narrowly targets the variable of interest: tone of 
coverage, specifically of the party and candidate. 
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The resulting dataset includes nearly 250,000 sentences about the parties and/or front-
running candidates during the past five elections. The sentences were coded for tone using the 
Lexicoder Sentiment Dictionary (LSD) (Young & Soroka, 2012), by counting the number of 
positive and negative words, expressed as a proportion of total words in the sentence. The LSD 
uses a “bag-of-words” approach where it simply counts the presence of positive and negative 
words based on a pre-determined list of words in each category. Unlike other sentiment 
dictionaries, the words included in LSD are designed to clearly distinguish between negative and 
positive sentiment (i.e., it has no overlapping terms). It is also worth mentioning the words are 
generically negative and positive, rather than specific to a domain like politics. It includes, for 
example, positive words like “cheerfulness,” “optimistic,” and “respect” and negative words like 
“aggression,” “chaos,” or “anxiety”(Young & Soroka, 2012). Yet again, the resulting measure 
prioritizes precision. (It is also much more time and cost effective to use such a tool as the LSD 
over human coding, for example, given the sheer quantity of text in the corpus.)  
Arizona Republic 4,485 
Arkansas Democrat-Gazette 6,673 
Atlanta Journal Constitution 10,327 
Boston Globe 14,801 
Chicago Sun-Times 11,058 
Chicago Tribune 19,033 
Denver Post 5,341 
Houston Chronicle 11,675 
LA Times 19,584 
Minneapolis Star-Tribune 3,982 
New York Times 37,154 
Orange County Register 4,077 
Philadelphia Inquirer 6,747 
Seattle Times 5,912 
St. Louis Post-Dispatch 11,377 
Tampa Bay Tribune 10,446 
USA Today 10,039 
Washington Post 33,078 
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The final media corpus includes a measurement of the percent positive and negative tone, 
and net tone, of coverage for each front-running candidate every day during the set time period. 
Being able to calculate the sentiment of coverage in a way that matches up exactly with the 
individual date on which the American National Election Studies (ANES) respondents were 
interviewed allows for a direct testing of the relationship between fluctuations in media 
sentiment and voter attitudes, on a daily basis.  
American National Elections Studies Data 
Using data from the ANES to track voter attitudes has many advantages. First, it is one of 
the few data collection projects that consistently measures people’s feelings about candidates 
during every election cycle (and includes pre-election measurement). Second, I chose to use the 
time-series datasets from ANES for this analysis because it distributes interviews over the course 
of the campaign period; as a result, it captures attitudes leading up to the election, and these 
attitudes can be matched to over-time changes in the media sentiment corpus. To reiterate, the 
central objective of this project is to examine if media tone truly influences people’s attitudes 
during elections. Therefore, it’s critical to measure media sentiment at time (t-x) where (t) is the 
date the attitude was measured, as that fluctuates throughout the election.  
ANES time-series datasets were combined and the measures re-coded for uniformity 
across the five elections (explained in more detail below). Overall, the ANES uses face-to-face 
interviewing, and in 2012 and 2016 digital questionnaires were also used. The time-series 
datasets begin between September 2 and September 9, depending on the year, and run through 
election day. The number of time-series respondents fluctuates between the five election years 
used in this analysis (see Table 2-2) and on a daily basis within the pre-election window (Figure 
2-1). During the elections 2000 – 2008, daily respondents regularly fluctuated between five or 
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ten a day to upwards of about 80 per day. In 2012 and 2016, the total number of respondents in 
the survey significantly increased due to the expansion into internet-based surveying. Note in 
Figure 2-1 that in 2012, there were more than 1000 respondents collected in mid-October and in 
2016, about 300 – 400 were collected at high points in mid-September and again in mid-October. 
With the exception of these high points, the distribution of respondents every day over the time 
period is relatively consistent. Overall, there are more than 15,500 total respondents included in 
the dataset over the five-election period. 























Figure 2-1: Daily Distribution of ANES Respondents in Time-Series Surveys, 2000 – 2016 
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Dependent Variable: Voter Attitudes 
The most consistent measure deployed by the ANES over the five-election time period in 
capturing voter attitudes towards the major presidential parties’ candidates is the feeling 
thermometer. Respondents are asked to rate the current presidential candidates along a scale 
from 0 – 100, where 0 is the most cold or unfavorable feeling towards the candidate, and 100 is 
the most warmth or favorability towards the candidate. The scale allows for small fluctuations in 
attitudes to be captured more accurately than in categorical or Likert-scale measures of attitudes. 
This variable was measured daily for every respondent in the ANES time-series data from early 
September up to election day for every election period.  
Independent Variable: Media Sentiment 
As outlined above, automated content analysis of the media corpus using the LSD 
allowed for a daily measure of positive, negative and net tone of coverage of the major parties 
and their nominated presidential candidates for the period of September through election day in 
each election year (2000 – 2016). The focus of this chapter is to examine what, if any, impact 
changes in media tone have on voter attitudes. Therefore, the independent variable media 
sentiment used in subsequent analyses is the tone of coverage prior to the date of the 
respondents’ interviews (when the dependent variable, voter attitude, is measured). There is very 
little prior research indicating a time lag for such a measure – particularly when investigating 
aggregated trends as opposed to individual-level effects measured in a controlled experiment. I 
accordingly ran my initial analyses using the following time frames for the independent variable: 
tone of media one day prior to measurement of attitude, the average tone of 1 – 3 days prior, 2 – 
4 days prior, 3 – 5 days prior, 4 – 6 days prior, 5 – 7 days prior, and finally, the average tone for 
the week prior. There were nearly no effects for the single day prior, but very present effects for 
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the various multi-day averages and weekly average. This seems reasonable, as any change in 
media tone only one day prior may be altogether missed by the respondent or potentially too 
insignificant to have any kind of impact on attitudes. A multi-day change is more indicative of a 
noticeable trend. Most importantly, there were only marginal differences in the estimated effects 
across the different combinations of day ranges. Hence, all the models presented in this chapter 
focus on measures of media tone averaged and lagged the week prior to daily measures of voter 
attitudes.  
Moderator: Political Partisanship 
The main objective of this project is to examine the role of political party identification in 
understanding and predicting media effects in political contexts. Specifically, I predict in 
hypothesis 1a that we should expect different kinds of effects contingent on the in-group/out-
group dynamic at play. Note, I argue that partisanship operationalized as a “social identity 
attachment” is a critical component of this exploration, but the data used for this chapter are 
limited in that regard. The ANES data over this extended time period most consistently measures 
partisanship by asking: “Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, 
Democrat, an Independent, or what?” followed by “Would you call yourself a strong 
[Democrat/Republican] or a not very strong [Democrat/Republican]?”. Independents are asked 
“Do you think of yourself closer to the Republican Party or the Democratic Party?” The result is 
a seven-point scale of partisanship (from strong to leaner) to qualify the “level of attachment” to 
either of the two parties. I refer to this measure, the traditional and most commonly used measure 
of partisanship across political science and communication disciplines, as PID throughout this 
project.  
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This ANES measure of partisan identity (PID) has been argued to fall short in measuring 
partisanship as a social identity attachment (see summary in Huddy, Davies & Sandor, 2020). 
For example, Huddy et al. (2020) highlight that the phrasing “think of yourself” indicates more 
of a cognitive evaluation, rather than an affective one. Improving on measurement of partisan 
identity in surveys, and its impact on evaluating media effects, is the primary focus of the 
subsequent chapters. Thus, I will simply use PID here because it is the only measure available 
across all the elections of study. I will first collapse PID into three categories using the first part 
of the question (Democrat, Republican and Independent) for the initial analyses, and then use the 
full seven-point scale for the following analyses. These variables will be used as moderators in 
examining the impact media tone has on voter attitudes. 
Control Variables 
The analyses conducted in this chapter test the connection between sentiment of coverage 
of candidates on voters’ attitudes toward those candidates, accounting for a wealth of controls. 
On average, the ANES shoots for roughly a nationally representative sample in terms of 
demographics. That appears to be the case in the sub-sample used in this analysis. Gender and 
education were simplified into binary variables (male/female, some university/no university 
attendance). Race was measured categorically as white, black or Hispanic. Ideology (i.e., 
liberalism/conservatism) was accounted for using a five-point scale and general interest in the 
presidential campaign was binary (interested/not interested). The comparative simplicity of the 
coding of control variables reflects an effort to maintain consistency between datasets collected 
by the ANES every four years spanning 16 total years, where there were considerable variations 
in how these concepts were measured. These factors are likely highly correlated with the 
moderators used in the analyses. Hence, the exercise of including them in the models should, at 
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least, put media’s predictive power to the test above and beyond a wealth of pre-existing 
conditions that may influence attitudes.  
There are two additional variables that are included in some models as control variables, 
and in other models integrated directly into the analysis. First, most of the models presented 
below control for variation in candidate popularity across years (accounting for any kind of 
exceptionalism in a given year) by including the election years as a factor variable. The results 
thus capture the impact of media tone on the within-campaign variation in attitudes, purged of 
across campaign differences. Second, it is possible that the quantity of media respondents 
consume may influence the effect it has on their attitudes. The ANES asks respondents how 
many days per week, on average, they consume news via the internet, television, newspaper or 
radio. I combined and averaged these measures into a single measure of total news consumption 
(days per week), where 0 is no news consumption on any medium and 7 is consumption of news 
every day on at least one of the four mediums. It’s unclear, however, if this kind of measure of 
media exposure does in fact capture media consumption. Instead, it’s likely it indicates a 
respondents’ interest in news or politics or the election. Nonetheless, I include Daily News 
Consumption as a control in the models. Then, to examine the possibility that media effects are 
contingent on media consumption, I model the effects dividing the sample into high and low 
media consumers. 
A Model to Test the Hypotheses 
Previous work in both communication and political science has emphasized the role 
political party identification plays in consuming news and interpreting information. As 
mentioned above, Redlawsk et al. (2010) find in an experimental setting that negative 
information presented to strong party identifiers may have the opposite effect one might think – 
 37 
driving more support toward the party or candidate. The following analysis puts this finding to 
the test for the first time in multiple, real election settings. The analysis can be articulated 
mathematically as follows, where A is voter attitudes, MS is average media sentiment over the 
week prior to the attitude measured at time (t) and PID is political party identity (representing 
both the three-category and seven-point iterations): 
At = f(MS(t-1,7) x PID) 
Results of this model are tested below. Note that I ran the models using two different 
estimators: standard OLS regression and a panel data model that relies on clustered standard 
errors in order to account for correlated errors across respondents interviewed on the same day. 
Panel data models are included in Appendix A, Tables A1 and A2. I rely on the simple OLS 
models below because standard errors differ only marginally – a product of the large number of 
days on which respondents are interviewed (see Figure 2-1, above).   
 
Results 
Impact of Media Sentiment on Voter Attitudes 
Table 2-3 shows estimates from a baseline model in which the Republican party 
candidate feeling thermometer is regressed on media tone and a set of demographic and election 
year control variables. Table 2-4 shows the same models for the Democratic party candidate 
feeling thermometer. I have no strong expectations for these results, but they provide useful 
baselines with which to compare results in the subsequent models that allow for media effects to 
vary across partisan groups. Recall that respondents’ attitudes are measured at time (t), the date 
of the interview, and the proportion of positive/negative coverage for each candidate is averaged 
over the time (t-1) to (t-7).  
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In Tables 2-3 and 2-4, three different versions of sentiment are explored: Negative and 
positive separately, ‘net sentiment’ for each candidate, and the difference in ‘net sentiment’ 
between the two candidates. Results in the first column suggest that positive tone is more 
strongly correlated with attitudes than negative tone, and the relationship is positive (as 
expected). This pattern holds for evaluations of both Republican and Democratic candidates. The 
measure of net sentiment (in column 2 of the tables) is positively related to attitudes about 
Democratic candidates (Table 2-4), but not Republican candidates (Table 2-3). The net 
difference measures (in column 3) are not significant. It thus appears that variation in the 
proportion of positive words is more strongly associated with attitudes than variation in negative 
words when considered separately. This is captured in the net sentiment measure as well, 
although more apparent for the Democratic than for the Republican party candidate 
thermometers. As expected, nearly all of the control variables significantly predict attitudes 
towards the candidate including election year.  
 As mentioned above, these preliminary models look at patterns of correlations for the 
entire ANES respondent sample as one group. That is to say, the results describe the overall 
effect of media tone on attitudes towards the major parties’ candidates for all respondents. It is 
my hypothesis that the consideration of political party identities should have an influence on the 































  Republican Candidate Feeling Thermometer 
Negative Coverage of Republican Cand. 0.637   
 (0.971)   
Positive Coverage of Republican Cand.    3.740**   
 (1.652)   
Net Sent. of Coverage of Republican Cand.   0.763  
  (0.660)  
Net Difference in Sentiment   0.364 
   (0.776) 
Female -0.642  -0.631 -0.630 
 (0.406) (0.406) (0.406) 
Black -8.222***  -8.184*** -8.181*** 
 (0.611) (0.610)  (0.611) 
Hispanic -2.830*** -2.816*** -2.830***  
 (0.623) (0.623) (0.623) 
Independent PID 14.700*** 14.708*** 14.702*** 
 (0.507)   (0.507) (0.507)  
Republican PID 33.303***  33.306***  33.300*** 
 (0.632) (0.632)  (0.632) 
University Attendance  -2.880*** -2.897*** -2.902*** 
 (0.438) (0.438) (0.438)  
Ideology (Liberal to Conservative) 6.002*** 5.997***  5.997*** 
 (0.168)  (0.168) (0.168) 
Daily News Consumption 0.409*** 0.404*** 0.405*** 
 (0.129) (0.129) (0.129) 
Campaign Interest 1.617*** 1.613*** 1.612***  
 (0.322) (0.322)  (0.322) 
2004 Election Year (as factor) -2.469* -0.945 -1.672* 
 (1.414)  (1.182)  (0.999) 
2008 Election Year (as factor) -2.703***   -2.350*** -2.467*** 
 (0.865)   (0.846) (0.842)  
2012 Election Year (as factor) -8.217*** -8.450*** -8.635*** 
 (0.728) (0.719) (0.731) 
2016 Election Year (as factor) -20.123*** -18.864*** -19.379***    
 (1.159)   (0.966) (0.837) 
Constant 26.477*** 39.645*** 39.760***  
  (6.764) (0.920) (0.913)  
Observations 13,838  13,838  13,838  
R2 0.450 0.450 0.450 
                           *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Interaction of Media Sentiment and Political Identity 
Recall that the main objective of this project is to consider the possibility that media 
effects are moderated by political identity. Table 2-5 shows the predictive power of net media 
sentiment on attitudes about candidates (i.e., predicting average change in attitudes) moderated 
  Democratic Candidate Feeling Thermometer 
Negative Coverage of Democratic Cand. -0.758   
 (0.973)   
Positive Coverage of Democratic Cand. 6.025***   
 (1.653)   
Net Sent. of Coverage of Democratic Cand.  2.385***  
  (0.708)  
Net Difference in Sentiment   -0.519 
   (0.748) 
Female 2.061*** 2.070*** 2.076*** 
 (0.391)   (0.391)   (0.391)   
Black 18.951***   19.004*** 19.025*** 
 (0.588) (0.587) (0.588) 
Hispanic 9.777*** 9.776*** 9.753*** 
 (0.599) (0.599) (0.600) 
Independent PID -18.751*** -18.730*** -18.742*** 
 (0.488)   (0.488) (0.488) 
Republican PID -34.778*** -34.787***   -34.800*** 
 (0.609) (0.609)  (0.609) 
University Attendance  0.404 0.379 0.362 
 (0.422) (0.422) (0.422) 
Ideology (Liberal to Conservative) -5.886*** -5.888***   -5.890*** 
 (0.162) (0.162) (0.163) 
Daily News Consumption 0.493*** 0.490*** 0.493*** 
 (0.124) (0.124) (0.124) 
Campaign Interest 1.349*** 1.347*** 1.343*** 
 (0.309) (0.310) (0.310) 
2004 Election Year (as factor) -4.356*** -3.201*** -5.466*** 
 (1.267)   (1.176)   (0.966) 
2008 Election Year (as factor) -1.630** -2.023** -2.268*** 
 (0.818)   (0.802) (0.811) 
2012 Election Year (as factor) -3.009*** -3.436*** -4.168*** 
 (0.750) (0.729) (0.703) 
2016 Election Year (as factor) -16.650*** -16.629*** -17.966*** 
 (0.828) (0.828) (0.805) 
Constant 52.681*** 69.003*** 69.301*** 
  (6.752) (0.880) (0.879) 
Observations 13,864 13,864 13,864 
R2 0.536 0.535 0.535 
 *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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by the respondents’ own party identification, over the five elections. This analysis, and those 
following, use net sentiment as the independent variable for two reasons. First, as I introduce 
moderators and continue to increase the complexity of the models, it is more efficient 
computationally to use only one measure of media sentiment. Second, even though the impact of 
net sentiment was not significant across all the models above, those models do not examine 
partisan heterogeneity. Preliminary analyses suggested consistent effects of net sentiment in the 
context of heterogeneity, however; and no substantive difference from models that include 
positive and negative sentiment separately. 
From the start, it is important to note that Democrats, Independents and Republicans are 
so far apart in their feelings of warmth towards a particular candidate that fluctuation in the tone 
of media coverage about a candidate has little overall effect on people’s feelings about that 
candidate. The direct effect of PID on voter attitudes in Table 2-5 has near symmetric effects for 
evaluations of Republican versus Democratic candidates. The coefficient for Democratic 
respondents evaluating Republican candidates is -18.21 (p<0.01) and for Republican respondents 
evaluating Democratic candidates is -23.132 (p<0.01). For in-party evaluations, the coefficients 
for Republicans and Democrats are 25.336 (p<0.01) and 21.502 (p<0.01), respectively. To be 
clear: no variation in media sentiment will swing an Independent towards as warm of feelings 
about the Democratic/Republican candidate as Democrats/Republicans already feel about their 
own candidate – the threshold is just too high (or low). The important inference here is that 
partisanship is so overwhelmingly influential on people’s attitudes about a candidate that positive 
or negative coverage of that candidate will fail to fundamentally change those attitudes, only 
slightly sway it.  
 
 42 
Table 2-5: Effect of Net Sentiment of Media Coverage on Attitudes Towards Candidates, Moderated by 
Partisanship 
  Republican Therm. Democrat Therm. 
Net Sentiment of Rep. Cand. 
Coverage 0.020  
 (0.927)  
Net Sentiment of Dem. Cand. 
Coverage  4.596*** 
  (1.051) 
Democrat PID -18.120*** 21.502*** 
 (0.553) (0.583) 
Republican PID 25.336*** -23.132***  
  (0.611) (0.651) 
Net Sent. Rep. x Dem. PID 4.435***  
 (1.058)  
Net Sent. Rep. x Rep. PID -3.406***  
 (1.139)  
Net Sent. Dem. x Dem. PID  -6.115*** 
  (1.313) 
Net Sent. Dem x Rep. PID  0.718 
  (1.427) 
Female -1.094*** 2.626*** 
 (0.421) (0.406) 
Black -6.702*** 17.633*** 
 (0.630) (0.607) 
Hispanic -2.584*** 9.517*** 
 (0.647) (0.623) 
University Attendance  -3.899*** 1.421*** 
 (0.453) (0.437) 
Daily News Consumption 0.563*** 0.337***  
 (0.134) (0.129) 
Campaign Interest 1.485*** 1.491*** 
 (0.333) (0.321) 
2004 Election Year (as factor) -2.534** -1.419 
 (1.219)  (1.216) 
2008 Election Year (as factor) -3.458*** -0.828 
 (0.863) (0.818) 
2012 Election Year (as factor) -9.558*** -2.310*** 
 (0.728)  (0.742) 
2016 Election Year (as factor) -20.937*** -14.525*** 
 (0.990) (0.846) 
Constant 56.329*** 48.429*** 
  (0.905)  (0.877) 
Observations 14,023 14,051 
R2  0.399 0.490 
Residual Std. Error 24.628 (df = 14007) 
23.783 (df = 
14035) 
F Statistic 
20.413*** (df = 15; 
14007) 
899.825*** (df = 
15; 14035) 
                      *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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That is not to say that the tone of coverage about a candidate has no influence on people’s 
attitudes, nor that this slight sway couldn’t have a significant impact, however. It is entirely 
possible that a swing from neutral on the feeling thermometer (50) to slightly more warmth (55 – 
60) may be just enough to influence someone’s decision to vote. And regardless of a shift in 
vote, the extent that there is a shift at all in attitudes helps us better understand media effects in 
political contexts.  
In Table 2-5, the direct effect of net sentiment is only significant in predicting changes in 
attitudes about the Democratic candidates. Most importantly, however, the results of the 
moderating variables in Table 2-5 suggest that media tone may be affecting different people in 
different ways. Note that for the interaction term (net sentiment x PID), the sign of the 
coefficient – which is significant for both Republicans and Democrats – is negative for 
respondents evaluating their own party’s candidate. There clearly is an interplay of media tone 
and partisan group affiliation, as the literature suggested, and supporting my hypotheses.  
These results are more easily interpreted in Figures 2-2 and 2-3, which illustrate the 
estimated effect of media negativity on thermometer scores, conditional on party identification 
for Republican respondents (in red), Democratic respondents (in blue) and Independent 
respondents (in grey). When the tone of media coverage of a respondent’s own party’s candidate 
is more negative, they report feeling more warmth towards their candidate, rather than less. This 
is true for both Democrats (in Figure 2-3) and Republicans (in Figure 2-2). Conversely, when the 
tone of media coverage of the opposing party’s candidate is negative, respondent attitudes 
change in the same direction as coverage (i.e., the coefficient is positive, rather than negative). In 
this instance attitudes are updated as we would traditionally expect – more negative tone leads to 
less warmth towards the candidate. Thus, hypothesis 1a is supported.  
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Note that the relationship between media tone and attitudes for Independents evaluating 
Democratic candidates follows the direction of the media tone as well, although media seem to 
have no impact on Independents evaluating Republican candidates (partially supporting 
hypothesis 2).  See this illustrated in Figure 2-2 where more negative the coverage of the 
Republican candidate is correlated with increasing feelings of warmth for Republican 
respondents. The same is true for Democrats evaluating their own candidate (Figure 2-3), 

































When respondents are separated by their party identification, the media effects observed 
shift rather significantly. In Tables 2-3 and 2-4 we see that the relationship between media 
sentiment and attitudes is positive and may in fact be mostly driven by positive tone specifically. 
The results in Table 2-5, however, demonstrate that analyzing media effects from the perspective 
of group identities alters the direction and magnitude of media effects in meaningful ways. This 
is a promising result to have drawn from real attitudes captured during past presidential elections 
(and especially given the limitations of the data), which will be addressed further in the 


























Figure 2-3: The Average Impact of Negative Press on Attitudes for Democrat Candidates 
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I argue that it may also be the case that the degree to which one identifies with a political 
party matters for media effects. I consequently utilize the full seven-point PID scale to re-
estimate the models above. The results are illustrated in Figure 2-4 and Figure 2-5; for the sake 
of parsimony, the full results are included in Appendix A, Table A3. As above, in Figures 2-4 
and 2-5 Republican respondents are represented in red, Democrats are represented in blue, and 
Independents are represented in grey. The density of the three red and three blue lines 
corresponds with the “strength” of attachment to that party (denser is more strongly attached).  
In both Figures 2-4 and 2-5, the strongest in-party identifiers are most influenced by 
media tone when evaluating their own party’s candidate. The direction of the results is as we 
have already seen, in that the more negative the tone of media coverage of one’s own party’s 
candidate, the more one feels warmth towards that candidate. Furthermore, the strongest in-party 
identifiers report the most increase in positive attitudes towards the in-party candidate as 
coverage of that candidate is more negative. This is an initial indication that the degree to which 
someone identifies with a party group (represented as “strength” here) does matter in terms of 






It is worth noting that the moderated effects may be slightly stronger for Republican 
respondents than for Democrat respondents. For Republicans, as the tone of media coverage of 
Figure 2-4: The Average Impact of Negative Press on Attitudes for Republican Candidates, Seven-point 
Partisan Measure 
Figure 2-5: The Average Impact of Negative Press on Attitudes for Democrat Candidates, Seven-point 
Partisan Measure 
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their party’s candidate becomes more negative, the fluctuation in the feeling thermometer on 
average can increase up to about five points. Going from a 75% warm feeling to 80% could be 
potentially meaningful. On the other hand, even as media coverage of their own party’s 
candidate grows negative, the effect on Democrats’ attitudes is slimmer – increasing their 
feelings of warmth by about one or two points (although statistically significant). The constraints 
of the data in this chapter do not allow for us to expand in this idea further, but it serves as a 
potential starting point to hypothesize that the “diverging” of effects may not just be in-party vs. 
out, but also between the two parties as well.    
 To what extent are the results driven by any single election? Running each election on its 
own leads to a precipitous drop in sample size, so I instead opt for a different approach: I run the 
models in Table 2-5 removing one year at a time in order to assess whether the results are driven 
by one particular election year. These analyses are in Table 2-6 (Republican candidates) and 
Table 2-7 (Democrat candidates). The first columns of the tables are the results of the model 
removing the data from election year 2000, in column two data from 2004 is removed, in column 
three 2008 is removed, and so on. Note first that all the interaction terms both for Democrat 
respondents and Republican respondents are replicated – as in the sign is positive for out-party 
evaluations and negative for in-party evaluations. For attitudes towards Republican candidates, it 
appears that no removal of any of the five election years impact the results. The removal of the 
2000 election is the only case where the interaction coefficient loses some significance. Overall, 





Table 2-6: Effect of Net Sentiment of Media Coverage on Attitudes Towards Republican Candidates, 
Moderated by Partisanship, Years Removed 
 Dependent variable: 
 Republican Candidate Feeling Thermometer 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Net Sentiment of Rep. 
Cand. Coverage 5.119
*** 9.925*** 7.953*** 7.196*** 0.594 
 (1.113) (1.063) (1.138) (1.119) (1.380) 
Democrat PID -18.078*** -16.879*** -17.838*** -14.717*** -16.153*** 
 (0.782) (0.682) (0.792) (0.903) (0.688) 
Republican PID 25.978*** 24.359*** 25.335*** 23.985*** 24.037*** 
 (0.894) (0.765) (0.870) (0.998) (0.785) 
Female -1.664*** -1.276*** -1.494*** -1.373** -0.088 
 (0.461) (0.443) (0.473) (0.570) (0.475) 
Black -6.198*** -6.504*** -6.816*** -5.761*** -5.985*** 
 (0.683) (0.660) (0.732) (0.868) (0.671) 
Hispanic -2.897*** -2.974*** -5.151*** -4.918*** -1.460** 
 (0.685) (0.665) (0.739) (0.933) (0.702) 
University Attendance  -4.588*** -4.259*** -5.400*** -6.796*** -2.715*** 
 (0.496) (0.477) (0.513) (0.616) (0.497) 
Daily News 
Consumption -1.246
*** -0.774*** -0.955*** -1.745*** 0.679*** 
 (0.125) (0.123) (0.125) (0.141) (0.157) 
Campaign Interest 3.441*** 2.689*** 2.661*** 2.716*** 1.110*** 
 (0.358) (0.345) (0.370) (0.435) (0.368) 
Net Sent. Rep. x Dem. 
PID 4.670
*** 6.156*** 6.390*** 7.669*** 8.627*** 
 (1.509) (1.430) (1.560) (1.523) (1.858) 
Net Sent. Rep. x Rep. 
PID -2.247 -3.453
** -3.966** -4.870*** -6.310*** 
 (1.670) (1.564) (1.661) (1.650) (2.113) 
Constant 51.693*** 52.360*** 53.755*** 57.800*** 48.709*** 
 (0.835) (0.764) (0.849) (0.998) (0.815) 
Observations 12,494 13,060 11,932 8,529 10,077 
R2 0.375 0.365 0.384 0.356 0.372 
Adjusted R2 0.374 0.364 0.384 0.355 0.372 
Residual Std. Error 25.483 (df = 12482) 
25.080 (df = 
13048) 
25.593 (df = 
11920) 
25.992 (df = 
8517) 
23.607 (df = 
10065) 
F Statistic 680.452
*** (df = 
11; 12482) 
681.207*** (df = 
11; 13048) 
676.089*** (df = 
11; 11920) 
427.209*** (df = 
11; 8517) 
542.707*** (df = 
11; 10065) 
Note:                      *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Table 2-7: Effect of Net Sentiment of Media Coverage on Attitudes Towards Democratic Candidates, 
Moderated by Partisanship, Years Removed 
 Dependent variable: 
 Democratic Candidate Feeling Thermometer 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Net Sentiment of Dem. 
Cand. Coverage 8.951
*** 16.011*** 7.886*** 9.688*** 4.234*** 
 (1.155) (1.278) (1.194) (1.128) (1.188) 
Democrat PID 22.205*** 21.230*** 25.052*** 20.945*** 19.746*** 
 (0.670) (0.598) (0.695) (0.743) (0.614) 
Republican PID -25.834*** -22.887*** -22.965*** -20.799*** -23.764*** 
 (0.761) (0.673) (0.760) (0.820) (0.696) 
Female 2.227*** 2.307*** 2.307*** 2.709*** 2.632*** 
 (0.440) (0.428) (0.451) (0.530) (0.469) 
Black 19.687*** 19.204*** 17.938*** 15.276*** 17.931*** 
 (0.651) (0.635) (0.697) (0.806) (0.661) 
Hispanic 10.094*** 9.808*** 9.413*** 8.317*** 8.380*** 
 (0.654) (0.640) (0.703) (0.865) (0.692) 
University Attendance  0.891* 1.012** 0.696 0.529 1.273*** 
 (0.473) (0.460) (0.489) (0.572) (0.490) 
Daily News 
Consumption -1.399
*** -0.976*** -1.248*** -1.411*** 0.273* 
 (0.116) (0.116) (0.116) (0.129) (0.154) 
Campaign Interest 3.143*** 2.336*** 2.477*** 3.954*** 1.011*** 
 (0.341) (0.332) (0.353) (0.404) (0.362) 
Net Sent. Dem. x Dem. 
PID -4.933
*** -13.580*** -1.258 -6.132*** -2.649 
 (1.614) (1.735) (1.680) (1.575) (1.652) 
Net Sent. Dem x Rep. 
PID -4.434
** 3.133 0.124 0.904 2.438 
 (1.774) (1.944) (1.783) (1.698) (1.799) 
Constant 48.312*** 48.663*** 47.730*** 47.141*** 48.893*** 
 (0.763) (0.712) (0.785) (0.890) (0.771) 
Observations 12,511 13,101 11,957 8,529 10,106 
R2 0.490 0.485 0.477 0.437 0.459 
Adjusted R2 0.489 0.484 0.477 0.436 0.458 
Residual Std. Error 24.343 (df = 12499) 
24.213 (df = 
13089) 
24.414 (df = 
11945) 
24.139 (df = 
8517) 
23.309 (df = 
10094) 
F Statistic 1,091.013
*** (df = 
11; 12499) 
1,118.687*** (df = 
11; 13089) 
990.906*** (df = 
11; 11945) 
600.810*** (df = 
11; 8517) 
777.270*** (df = 
11; 10094) 
Note:                      *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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The results of re-running the model for evaluations of Democratic candidates are a bit 
more complex, but overall yield a replication of the initial results (see Table 2-7). For 
Democratic respondents evaluating their own candidate, all the interaction coefficients are 
negative. However, the coefficients lose significance when the 2008 and 2016 elections are 
removed. It is possible that something about the nature of coverage in those particular elections 
(President Obama’s first run in 2008 and Clinton’s run in 2016) may have had a particularly 
strong impact on the relationship between media and attitudes towards the candidates. But 
overall, again, the sign is correct and most of the models hold significance. For Republicans 
evaluating Democratic candidates, the positive sign of the coefficient is replicated across all 
elections except when 2000 is removed, although none reach significance. When the 2000 
election is removed, the coefficient for Republican respondents is negative and significant. It is 
possible, again, that there is something unique about the media coverage and/or Republicans 
evaluating the Democratic candidate (Al Gore) in 2000. The most important takeaway here, 
though, is that the in-party evaluations generally withstand this test. 
The Impact of Media Consumption 
Results thus far have suggested that (a) changes in the sentiment of coverage of 
presidential candidates does, in fact, predict changes in voter attitudes above and beyond a 
wealth of control variables (even though the impact is small) and (b) that relationship is greatly 
influenced by the respondents’ partisan identities. If it were the case that media is truly the driver 
of these results, one might also predict that the effects above will be more evident for those 
respondents who consume more media (or for those with more interest in news/politics). This is 
the object of the final analysis, the results of which are illustrated in Figures 2-6 through 2-9 
below (and Appendix A, Tables A4 and A5). Using the Daily News Consumption variable, the 
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respondents are split into two groups: high media consumers and low media consumers. High 
media consumers are those who consume some kind of news 5 – 7 days a week and low 
consumers are those who consume some kind of news 0 – 4 days a week. The models are run 
separately for these groups, rather than including it as an additional moderator, in order to avoid 
too much collinearity from a three-way interaction.   
 For attitudes toward the Democratic candidates, the results are in line with expectations. 
The attitudes of the low media consumption respondents seem to be less affected by changes in 
the tone of media coverage than high media consumers. Strong party identifiers who are also 
high consumers of media replicate the results above (see Figure 2-7) – as media coverage 
becomes more negative, strong, high-consumption Democrats report increased feelings of 
warmth towards their own candidate compared to strong, low-consumption Democrats (See 
Figure 2-6). The results are even more pronounced for Republican respondents, where the impact 
of negative coverage of Democratic candidates leading to more negative feelings about that 
candidate is stronger for high media consuming Republicans, compared to low.  
Figure 2-6: The Average Impact of Negative Press on Attitudes for Democrat Candidates, 
Low Media Consumers 
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 The results for evaluations of Republican candidates are much less moderated by low or 
high media consumption. For both groups of respondents, the divergent impact of media tone on 
voter attitudes holds. Figure 2-8 shows low media consumption respondents, and it’s very clear 
that there is a positive relationship between media sentiment and the attitudes of Democratic 
respondents and a negative relationship between Republican respondents’ evaluations and 
negative press of their own party’s candidate. For high media consumers the overall result is the 
same, but surprisingly a little less pronounced for the strongest Republican identifiers (Figure 2-
9). Regardless of how much news is consumed, Republican respondents clearly feel more 
favorable towards their own party’s candidate as media coverage is more negative of that 
candidate. This could potentially help us understand why there is a difference in magnitude of 
the effect between Democrats and Republicans – for Democrats it may be contingent on how 
Figure 2-7: The Average Impact of Negative Press on Attitudes for Democrat Candidates, 
High Media Consumers 
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much news they actually consume, whereas Republicans’ reactions are consistent regardless of 
the quantity of news they consume.  
 
Figure 2-8: The Average Impact of Negative Press on Attitudes for Republican Candidates, 
Low Media Consumers 
Figure 2-9: The Average Impact of Negative Press on Attitudes for Republican Candidates, 
High Media Consumers 
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In sum, in dividing respondents into high and low media consumption groups suggests 
that the amount of news consumed might matter, in that more consumption seems to amplify the 
effects, for Democrats at least. For evaluations of Republican candidates, however, media 
consumption does not appear to influence the magnitude of the effect. It’s possible that there are 
simply confounding effects between the measure of media consumption and strength of 
partisanship. This addressed further in the discussion at the end of this chapter. 
Independents 
 Regardless of whether Independents are attached to that political term as a “group” or 
not, the front-running presidential candidates (and their media coverage) during the 2000 through 
2016 elections considered here did not identify as Independent. For Independent respondents, 
then, then “in-group” would be whatever party they lean towards while the “out-group” would 
be whatever party they lean away from – or, perhaps, both parties. In the analyses above, self-
identified “leaners” were included as such in the Democratic and Republican categories. Thus, 
Independents in this case are only those who did not self-identify as “leaning” (represented in 
grey in the graphs). In support of hypothesis 2, the results consistently show a positive 
relationship between media sentiment and changes in Independent respondents’ attitudes. That 
is, they update their attitudes in line with the direction of media tone. The only instance where 
this is not the case is illustrated in Figure 2-2 (Table 2-5), where I examined the impact of tone 
on attitudes using partisanship as a categorical variable. Independents appear to be very little 
affected by the tone of coverage of Republican candidates. In all subsequent analyses, the 
relationship is positive. There’s not much to be gleaned from this data regarding the nature of 
Independents. However, the fact that Independents respond in contrast to in-group partisans’ 
evaluations of their candidates is in line with my expectations. 
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Discussion 
Although the effect of media tone on candidate evaluations may be relatively small, there 
is some movement while controlling for a wealth of other variables, such as demographics, 
interest in the campaign and individual election years. And strikingly, the shift in attitudes may 
be negatively associated with media tone, contingent on partisan identification. As media 
coverage is more negative, in-group respondents evaluated their own candidate more favorably, 
while out-party evaluations were updated in the direction of the tone of coverage. These results 
appear to be even more pronounced for Democrats who are high news consumers, yet the 
interaction effect appears to hold for Republican identifiers regardless of the amount of news 
they consume. While I do not have further data to explore this particularity in the results, there 
are possible explanations worth exploring in future work. For example, not all information 
comes through media, of course. Perhaps trends in tone of coverage are also a reflection of the 
general “tone” of the campaigns or public opinion, reaching people conversationally. What looks 
like responsiveness to media here may, in some instances, be responsiveness to broader 
sentiment. Thus, the effects are present even for Republicans who are not high consumers of 
traditional news media because they get the information in other mediated ways. The results 
could also be affected by asymmetry in trust of media, where Republicans have continued to 
grow in distrusting media over time (compared to Democrats, who have increased trust in the 
past decade or so). It may simply not be useful, then, to separate Republicans into high and low 
consumption categories when considering the impact of exposure of negative information about 
the in-party candidate given the universal distrust of the information.  
Regardless, it is clear that variation in tone of media matters and that partisans respond to 
that information in different ways. It is also encouraging that the results are mostly robust to the 
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exclusion of any single election year. Thus, the evidence supports the hypotheses that (a) the 
effects of media coverage tone on attitudes are heterogeneous, (b) those effects are moderated by 
partisanship and (c) they grow in potency as strength in identification increases. As outlined in 
Chapter 1, if partisanship is operationalized as a group identity, then a presidential election 
would be an environment of high identity threat. Either your group has the position of power and 
you are working to maintain it, or your group has the opportunity to take that power away from 
the opposing group. In this context, and in line with SIT, we predict that negative information 
about the in-group or the representative of the in-group (the current President/contending 
presidential candidate) will inspire protective instincts to defend the group and/or reject 
threatening information. The data presented here shows that ANES respondents evaluated their 
own candidates more favorably when that candidate’s coverage was more negative, fitting within 
this framework.  
Unfortunately, this data has some significant limitations. First, “tone” of coverage was 
limited to mainstream national and regional newspapers. Television coverage, more partisan-
focused media and social media content would likely expand the quantity of sentiment I would 
be able to track over the campaign period. Second, the data does not directly measure exposure 
of election coverage for the individual respondents. The results are based on aggregate trends. 
Finally, the only measure of partisanship that was consistent across the five elections in the 
ANES time-series data was the traditional measure of PID. Although its seven-point variation 
proved to be a useful moderator, I argue that it falls short in distinguishing partisans’ strength of 
psychological attachment to political parties. Thus, the focus of the next chapter is to review 
existing literature on the measure of social identity attachment and improve upon PID. The fact 
that there are significant and hypothesis-proving results despite these limitations is promising, 
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though. The following chapters will attempt to fill in the gaps of these limitations by examining 
the nature of partisan social identity measurement as it relates to predicting media effects more 
directly by running survey experiments on partisans during the 2020 presidential election. 
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Chapter 3 Measuring Partisan Social Identity 
 
The measurement of psychological attachment to a group, grounded in the theoretical 
framework of Tajfel (1978)’s Social Identity Theory (SIT), has been deeply and extensively 
examined in work in psychology and is growing in political science. Social identity is the 
psychological process by which people define themselves in relation to social groups, where one 
works to maintain a positive perception of the “in-group” compared to an “out-group” in a way 
that shapes that person’s thoughts, emotions and behaviors (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). 
Measuring this phenomenon has been a priority for decades, and past work has shown it to be an 
important predictor (or mediator/moderator) of a range of outcomes, such as, job satisfaction, 
consumer behaviors, intergroup conflict, and emotions.  
Approaches to measurement in the literature have taken many shapes and forms. Indeed, 
there have already been several extensive theoretical reviews of the multiple dimensions of 
social/collective identity (e.g., Sellers et al., 1998; Jackson, 2002; Ashmore et al., 2004; Leach et 
al., 2008). There has also been rigorous methodological testing of different indices and 
explorations of their predictive power (e.g., Heere and James, 2007; Bankert et al., 2017). Some 
measures of social identity are rooted in more universal underpinnings of SIT, designed to be 
applied to any type of group attachment (e.g., Brown and Williams, 1984; Mael and Tetrick, 
1992; Kashima 2000; Cameron, 2004). Others have been designed with a specific group in mind 
and tailored to the unique experience of that kind of group affiliation, such as identifying as an 
athlete (Martin et al., 1997), as African American (Sellers et al., 1998), as American (Schwartz et 
al., 2012; Vinney et al., 2019) or as a “fan” of something (Vinney et al., 2019), to name a few.  
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When it comes to the focus of this project – political party social identity attachment in 
the U.S. – most of the work has adopted measures from the former approach (universal indices) 
rather than theorizing the concept via experiences unique to political partisanship. The most 
current applications, for example, apply Mael and Tetrick’s (1992) Identifying with a 
Psychological Group or Organization (IDPG) ten-item scale to partisanship directly (e.g., 
Greene, 2004) or then abbreviate it into a four-item scale (e.g., Huddy et al., 2015). Kelly (1988) 
also adapted the qualitative work done by Brown and Williams (1984) into a ten-item scale of 
political party group attachment, which she subsequently truncated to five items.  
The sheer quantity of work in this area in psychology points to its potential importance 
and relevance in understanding how humans think and behave. Political science scholarship on 
partisanship has grown in this area as well, and, as will be discussed in further detail below, has 
already presented initial evidence that social identity attachment to political parties is (a) distinct 
from ideological beliefs or traditional measures of strength of partisanship and (b) is often a 
stronger predictor of political behavior (e.g., Huddy et al., 2015; Bankert et al., 2017).  
It is my hypothesis that social identity attachment measures of partisanship are a worthy 
exploration for research of political communication effects. Much communication scholarship 
finds political partisanship strength, as traditionally measured, to be an impactful moderator of 
media effects. I believe that measuring partisanship as a group identity attachment could lead to 
additional insight into the depth and nature of this moderation, and perhaps help researchers 
better understand heterogeneity in people’s processing of and reactions to media messages.   
The sheer quantity of work in this area has led to a lot of messiness in methodology and 
measurement, however. While I have identified two patterns of approaches generally – a theory-
driven universal indices approach and a specific-to-group experiences approach – there are many 
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cases of complex overlapping ideas and arbitrary decision making that make it challenging to 
know what the right measure or theory(ies) are. The objective of this chapter is therefore to (1) 
sort through some of these complexities and (2) offer a more simplified approach in adapting SIT 
to the measurement of partisanship. I believe this is a necessary precursor to exploring 
partisanship as social identity in media effects.  
To be clear, I will not be simply replicating that which has already been done. I start with 
a much broader sample of survey questions, focusing on the empirical performance of those 
measures rather than re-theorizing existing work. And I explore the extent to which these 
different theoretical constructs are indeed different empirically in the context of American 
partisan social identity. My work is motivated by observation, not criticism. The choices that 
previous scholar have made are clearly dependent on the scope and outcome of interest of 
individual projects. In that vein, the choices I make in this chapter are constructed to both respect 
previous work and move that work towards the easy application of partisan social identity 
measurement in survey research.  
Note that I do not describe in detail the entire literature on the measurement of social 
identity here. In part, I have selected projects that explore the existing literature and then attempt 
to build on that work. I also have selected research that I believe exemplify the breadth and 
variety of existing work. This strategy is applied to my selection of the survey questions as well, 
given the repetitive nature of the various applications of these measures. I begin with a review of 
the universal measures of social identity. Then, I turn to measures that are designed for specific 
types of group attachment and conclude with a review of the rather limited application of SIT to 
measurement of partisan attachment in the U.S. My subsequent analysis focuses on the first wave 
of a two-wave survey where I fielded 37 different questions measuring about 13 theoretical 
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concepts of social identity attachment. Even as much theoretical work argues for the 
multidimensionality of social identity, the data suggest that these dimensions are highly 
correlated. I accordingly proceed to make recommendations for ten- and four-item indices that 
can efficiently measure partisan social identity in time- and space-limited survey research. 
 
“Universal” Measures of Group Identity Attachment 
Many scholars have developed social identity attachment measures rooted in the original 
ideas of SIT. The shared assumptions of this work are (a) SIT is a multi-dimensional concept, 
thus requiring a multi-dimensional measure, (b) those dimensions are universal regardless of the 
specific group that is being measured and (c) those distinct dimensions matter in predicting 
various outcomes. While some of these measures were developed via one particular kind of 
group, such as attachment to an employer or university, the group functions more as a showcase 
of the measure. These kinds of measures are essentially “plug-and-play” by changing a single 
word in a survey question. For example, “Being a Michigan Wolverine is important to me” can 
easily become “Being a Republican is important to me.”  
Academic attention to the measurement of social group attachment took off in the 1980’s 
and 1990’s. Many of the existing indices can be traced back to work done by Brown & Williams 
(1984), Mael & Tetrick (1992) and Luhtanen & Crocker (1992). Brown & Williams (1984) 
conduct a qualitative analysis using semi-structured interviews with a group of factory bakers in 
southern England. There had been recent unrest and conflict at the factory, and the authors were 
investigating the impact of employees’ emotional/collective attachment to their professional 
identity and factory “sub-groups” in terms of group differentiation. While they find strong 
evidence that perceptions of group differentiation predicted conflict, they pointedly observed: 
“An important objective for further work here, we believe, will be to develop a reliable multi-
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item scale of group identification which is short and simple enough to be administered in a 
variety of research contexts…” (561). This project went on to inform one of the few applications 
of social identity theory to partisanship by Kelly (1988), which will be discussed in further detail 
below. 
Mael and Tetrick (1992) respond to Brown and Williams’ call with the ten-item 
Identifying with a Psychological Group or organization (IDPG) measure. The measure was 
initially tested on student attachment to university identity (1988) and subsequently refined as a 
measure of employee attachment to their employing organization (1992). IDPG is defined in two 
parts: first, the perception of shared experiences with a focal group and second, shared 
characteristics among the group’s members. Those two theoretical components thus shape the 
measure. Shared experiences are “the perception that one shares the experiences, successes and 
failures of the focal organization, and that these successes and failures apply to and reflect upon 
the self just as they reflect upon the organization” (816). Shared characteristics are “the 
perception that one shares the attributes and characteristics of prototypical group members” 
(816).  
The questions used in Mael and Tetrick’s work are designed to attend to the measurement 
of both cognitive and affective group attachment. The questions can be traced to different 
theoretical components of SIT, such as “feeling of oneness,” “perception of shared prototypical 
characteristics, virtues and flaws,” “vicariously partake in accomplishments beyond individual 
powers,” and so on (Mael & Tetrick, 1992, 814). The ten questions were then analyzed using 
factor analysis with six of the items falling onto the shared experiences dimension and four 
grouping as shared characteristics. 
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Luhtanen & Crocker’s (1992) work, widely used throughout psychology research, is 
more focused on collective identity in terms of its impact on one’s self-esteem (a sub-category of 
general self-esteem, if you will). The objective was not designed to measure the extent of one’s 
strength of attachment to a group as much as how one feels about such attachment in terms of 
positive or negative self-conceptualization. Similar to the work above, Luhtanen and Crocker 
focus on several key theoretical dimensions and design questions worded to capture such 
dimensions: (1) evaluation of the membership, (2) private regard, (3) public regard and (4) 
identity definition. Many of the questions used to construct Luhtanen & Crocker’s (1992) 
Collective Self-Esteem Scale are used in the other social identity attachment measures reviewed 
here. Note that even as their measure does not focus on quantifying the degree of identification, 
then, questions from the Collective Self-Esteem Scale have informed past work on social identity 
and they are considered in the forthcoming analyses accordingly.  
The universal theory-driven measurement construction used by Mael & Tetrick (1992) 
and Luhtanen & Crocker (1992) is a method that continues to be repeated over time. Much effort 
has been devoted to describing the theoretical dimensions of SIT and then converting those ideas 
into survey or interview questions. This work frequently uses constrained factor analysis to test 
the validity of the components based on the authors’ different conceptions of the relevant 
subcategories. It is often argued that different subcategories or concepts have the potential to 
predict meaningful variations in outcomes.  
Kashima et al. (2000) nevertheless argue that despite the wide consensus on the multi-
dimensionality of social group identification, there is a lack of investigation into the relationship 
between these components and other variables. These authors focus on distinguishing between 
cognitive and affective components of social identity and hypothesize that each component 
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predicts different outcomes when it comes to group threat. Kashima et al. (2000)’s work mostly 
builds on Spears et al. (1997) which focuses on group differentiation (like Brown & Williams, 
1984) and perceived group threat. The affective component, group identification is an “affective-
evaluative reaction to one’s group membership” (98) and the cognitive component, self-
typicality, is “perceived similarity between the self and in-group” (98). To test these hypotheses, 
Kashima et al. study student identification with a university, using both novel survey items and 
survey items drawn from Spears et al. (1997) and Brown & Williams (1984). They find that most 
items load on two factors, corresponding to group identification and self-typicality, and initial 
analyses indicate the two components are distinct. 
Jackson (2002) does an even deeper dive into the theory of SIT. Similar to work above, 
the study “…investigates the multidimensional nature of group identity and how different 
dimensions are uniquely related to in-group and out-group evaluations, intergroup bias and 
perceived intergroup conflict” (11). Jackson notes that the original definition of SIT included 
three dimensions: cognitive (“knowledge of group membership”), evaluative (“value of group 
membership”) and affective (“emotional significance of group membership”) (Tajfel, 1978). 
Most existing work actually includes these dimensions, Jackson argues, but has organized it in 
diverse ways. Jackson then constructs a measure by drawing questions from existing work and 
allowing respondents to select their own group identity of choice. Using constrained factor 
analysis, he finds that the questions load onto the three theoretical dimensions as hypothesized.  
Cameron (2004) and Leach et al. (2008) apply nearly identical methodologies in their 
research. Both start with a theoretical argument presenting what they believe to be the most 
important and potent dimensions of social identity attachment. They then use this theory to shape 
the questions they select (and edit) to measure attachment. Cameron (2004) argues that there are 
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three essential dimensions: in-group ties, centrality, and in-group affect. Using constrained factor 
analysis, the results indicate that three separate dimensions fit the data better than one or two 
forced factor loadings. Leach et al. (2008) argue for what they call a hierarchical model, with 
two general categories and five sub-dimensions within each category. The first category, “self-
investment,” includes solidarity, satisfaction and centrality; the second, “self-definition,” 
includes individual stereotyping and in-group homogeny. Similarly, Leach and authors compare 
multiple forced-factor loadings and find that the five by two structured model fits the data best. 
Both projects apply these methods on a variety of sample group attachment types including 
university, gender, nationality and continent-focused identities. 
The most extensive theoretical work I have found to date, however, is the tremendously 
thorough literature review on (what they call) collective group attachment measurement 
conducted by Ashmore et al. (2004). The authors confirm that this phenomenon has been 
measured with many overlapping theoretical concepts. An important distinction they make is 
between the extent of an attachment and the outcome of an attachment, such as well-being or 
attitudes and behaviors. They then focus on the extent of attachment; in a way, they argue, that 
can be universally applied to collective identities. 
Ashmore et al. (2004) note that there is no clear consensus on what dimensions matter 
most nor what has been most accurately measured. Some work gives the same exact construct 
completely different labels, even. (For a full review of all the theoretical constructs and their 
definitions, refer to Table 1 on page 83 of their work.) Their effort underscores the complexity of 
the existing literature and attempts to clear up some discrepancies by narrowing in on the 
elements that appear most relevant and replicated. From both a theoretical perspective and a 
measurement perspective, they focus on the following nine constructs (out of 17 total reviewed) 
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in theoretically conceptualizing collective identity: self-categorization, evaluation, importance, 
attachment/interdependence, social embeddedness, behavioral involvement, self-attributed 
characteristics, ideology and narrative/knowledge (Ashmore et al., 2004).  
While Ashmore et al. (2004) list the questions associated with the categories, they do not 
engage in any empirical testing. Heere & James (2007) take on this task, adapting the questions 
from Ashmore et al. (2004)’s work to the measurement of sports team identity. After running an 
exploratory factor analysis, they find that “all constructs had only one factor with a eigenvalue 
larger than 1.00, indicating uni-dimensionality…all factor loadings were above 0.70 except for 
two items” (Heere & James, 2007, 78). This is one of the few unconstrained factor analyses in 
this body of work. They next use confirmatory factor analysis to evaluate Ashmore and author’s 
constructs and report evidence of six categories instead of nine but note that there is quite a lot of 
messiness in overlapping factors and the correlations between factors. Heere et al. (2011) and 
Heere, James, et al. (2011) then edit this six-dimension measure to create even more specific 
questions related to the measurement of the collective identity of interest: local sport affiliations 
– city, state and university-specific.  
This is just a small sample of the work that falls in the “universal” approach bucket. 
Other related work includes Smith et al. (1999)’s group attachment avoidance/anxiety measure, 
Schubert & Otten (2002)’s Overlap of Self, Ingroup and Outgroup measure, and Gómez et al. 
(2011)’s Identify Fusion/Identification. Even this relatively brief review makes clear that, 
however, at both the theoretical and methodological level there is a good deal of complexity and 




“Group-Specific” Measures of Group Identity Attachment 
Phinney (1992)’s Multigroup Measure of Ethnic Identity (MEIM) is a good place to start 
in reviewing the “group-specific” approach to measuring social identity attachment, as it is a 
blend of the universal and specific approaches. Phinney set out to create a universal measure of 
ethnic identity, motivated by the fact that there were more than five different individual measures 
used to capture specific ethnic identities, e.g., Mexican American or Jewish American. Phinney 
both theorized universal components of ethnic identification that could be applied to any “ethnic 
group,” while also shaping the measure to ethnic group attachment specifically. Universal 
components of the MEIM include self-identification, affirmation and belonging and attitudes 
towards other groups, while other components of MEIM are rooted in the social and historical 
contexts of ethnicity in America. (In the literature reviewed above, there are authors that selected 
various questions from the universal aspects of Phinney’s work.)  
Some argue further, however, that universality should not be the primary objective in 
measuring attachment to a group identity at all. For example, as highlighted by Sellers et al. 
(1998), “Although many ethnic groups have experienced discrimination and oppression in the 
United States, the form of oppression that African Americans have faced is unique” (18). The 
authors thus create the Multidimensional Model of Racial Identity (MMRI) that is specific to the 
experiences, history and group characteristics of being African American, and focus on “a micro 
view…important information about the depth” of this identity (34). Similar to MEIM, there are 
still some commonalities in the measure that are less African American-specific, such as 
salience, centrality, and public and private regard. The questions within these components are 
similar to and frequently appear in the measures reviewed above. Specific to the African 
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American experiences is the “racial ideology” category which includes nationalism, oppression, 
assimilation and humanist (Sellers et al., 1998, p. 24).  
Martin et al. (1997) similarly root their Athletic Identity Measurement Scale (AIMS) in 
the unique experience of being an athlete. Athlete-specific questions in the measure include, for 
example, “I would be very depressed in I were injured and could not compete in sport” (77). The 
measure is also more broadly shaped by Social Identity Theory and related work, though, 
including questions like “Sport is the most important part of my life” and “Other people see me 
mainly as an athlete” (77), which are very similar in wording to questions included in more 
general social identity attachment measures.  
Other examples of this kind of group-specific approach include Cross & Vandiver (2001) 
Cross Racial Identity Scale (CRIS), Huddy & Khatib's (2007) National identity and patriotism 
measure, Schwartz et al.’s (2012) American Identity Measure (AIM), Riggle et al.’s (2014) 
Lesbian, Gay and Bisexual Positive Identity Measure (LBG_PIM) and Vinney et al.’s (2019) Fan 
Identity Scale. As with the work highlighted above, there is a blend of general underlying theory 
about psychological group attachment in combination with specific theoretical categories and 
question wording designed to capture the experiences distinct to these particular group 
experiences. Thus, the measures partially repeat the work done via the universal approach while 
also adding a multitude of questions to the field that can be useful in very specific research 
contexts.  
The existing literature on partisanship as social identity, as well as the analysis that 
follows, adopts the “universal” approach. That said, my work will include many of the 
universally focused questions from the group-specific measures reviewed above (…not 
surprisingly, there’s lots of overlap). As designed, the group-specific questions do not always 
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translate well to application of a different kind of group. There may be an opportunity for a more 
group-specific approach to the measurement of partisanship as social identity in the future. I 
consider this further in the concluding section.  
 
Measurement of Political Partisanship as Social Identity 
As mentioned, there are thus far only a limited number of applications of social identity 
attachment measures to political partisanship. Those that exist mostly draw off previous 
measures designed with the universal approach, rooted in Mael & Tetrick (1992) or Brown & 
Williams (1984)’s work. Kelly (1988) was one of the first to apply social identity theory to the 
measurement of partisanship, converting the concepts outlined in Brown and William’s 
qualitative interviews into efficient survey questions. Kelly focuses on not just in-group 
identification as it relates to self-concept and self-esteem, but also intergroup differentiation in 
political contexts. Kelly’s paper doesn’t attempt to define any particular component of social 
identity attachment specific to partisanship, per say. Instead, it uses the existing research to 
create ten survey questions, and then runs a principal component analysis finding that half of the 
questions load onto one dimension, while the other half load onto another. Kelly termed these 
dimensions as positive affect and negative affect. After examining the distribution (skewness) of 
the two factors, Kelly finds that the “best measure for discriminating between strong and weak 
party identifiers would be the extent of their agreement with positive items in the scale” (323). 
For the rest of the analysis in that paper, the five negative questions are dropped. And as with 
most existing work, the in-group identification proved to be a significant predictor of the 
outcome of interest – perceptions of group differentiation. 
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More recent work on measuring partisanship as social identity attachment is Greene 
(2004), adopted from Mael & Tetrick (1992). Greene makes the case that “Social identity theory 
yields important insights into the nature of partisan-related attitudes and partisanship itself… 
[and] can help us to better understand the role of partisanship in political attitudes and behavior 
as well as lead to more complete measures of partisanship” (137). To test this, Greene replicates 
the IDPG ten-item scale directly, only changing the group of focus to Democrat or Republican. 
The IDPG measure is compared to “partisan strength,” which is the seven-point measure of 
partisanship most commonly used in survey research (such as on the American National Election 
Studies) where respondents are asked whether they consider themselves a Democrat, Republican 
or what, followed by whether they consider themselves a strong or weak partisan. Greene first 
re-confirms the two components of shared experiences and shared characteristics via forced 
factor analysis and then finds that IDPG partisanship is only partially correlated with partisan 
strength (r=0.48). Furthermore, Greene reports that IDPG partisanship strongly predicted 
ideology, partisan activity and party voting above beyond the traditional measure of partisan 
strength (which was only significant for ideology and voting).  
Thus, initial evidence shows that partisanship measured as group attachment is distinct 
from measuring “partisan strength” and has different, potentially even more potent, power in 
predicting political outcomes. Building off this work, Huddy et al. (2015) conceptualize an SIT-
focused measure of partisanship as expressive partisanship compared to instrumental 
partisanship. Instrumental partisanship is a “running tally of party performance, ideological 
beliefs, and proximity to the party in terms of one’s preferred policies” (1). While expressive 
partisanship is more of an emotional or psychological attachment to political parties as a group 
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identity. Huddy and coauthors aim to further test the idea that this distinction is critical in 
predicting different kinds of political outcomes.  
Methodologically, Huddy and coauthors adopt the IDPG questions from Greene’s (and 
Mael and Tetrick’s) work, but only select four out of the ten items. There is little reasoning 
offered as to why they abbreviate the scale, nor why those four questions in particular were 
chosen instead of others. That said, they replicate Greene’s method of pitting expressive 
partisanship against partisan strength (instrumental partisanship) on multiple samples. They find 
that partisanship as social identity is a better predictor of past and current/future political activity. 
They also find that respondents with stronger affective partisanship scores react more 
emotionally to political events (such as winning or losing an election). In summary, “We come 
down firmly on the side of expressive partisanship as a primary driver of campaign involvement, 
especially in close elections when the threat of electoral loss looms large” (Huddy et al., 2015, 
15).  
Bankert et al. (2017) then apply a version of the Huddy et al. (2015) measure to political 
party attachments in democratic, European multi-party countries (Netherlands, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom). The authors select five items from Mael and Tetrick (1992)’s IDPG and then 
add three new items for an eight-question partisan identity measure. There is, again, little 
explanation of why those five questions were selected over others, nor what decision-making 
process went into the inclusion or wording of the three additional questions (other than they were 
more specific to the European multi-party systems being investigated). Using Item Response 
Theory (IRT) the items in the measure proved to be relatively reliable, meaning that they nicely 
capture a wide variety of “information” relevant to the latent variable. In other words, the eight 
items are good at capturing the variation both at the high and low levels of party social identity. 
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In terms of whether this measure was consistent across the three different countries, the 
results were messier. Generally, though, it appears to measure similar enough concepts in all 
three. In terms of the predictive power of the identity scale compared to traditional measures, 
again Bankert et al. (2017) find it to be stronger in predicting political behaviors (such as 
likelihood of voting) and participation. The authors then re-run the IRT analysis and find that 
confining the measure to four items gets relatively the same results as the full eight-item scale, 
which is useful when thinking about the efficiency of applying these measures in survey work. 
It is also worth noting that Devine (2015) adopts the IDPG 10-item measure to test 
Ideological Social Identity (ISI) as well. Thus, instead of political party identity, the authors 
tested psychological attachment to conservative or liberal identities. While they report that self-
placed conservatives and liberals both scored higher on ISI, they only find significant results for 
conservatives and moderates in testing group-threat perceptions. Specifically, when these two 
groups are exposed to information about a hypothetical election, they score higher on ISI. This 
does indicate that election material is group-triggering, to some degree, but since ideology does 
not take shape as a physical group as much as the Republican and Democratic parties, I believe 
this project may be an under-representation of the effects of SIT application in U.S. politics. 
In sum, the state of the “partisanship as social identity” field includes some variation of 
ten to four-item measures adopted from the universal approach to measuring psychological 
attachment to a group originally designed by Mael & Tetrick (1992). It appears the methodology 
mostly focused on replicating previous work. However, there is much ambiguity as to what went 
into the decisions to deviate from the original ten-item IDPG measure. Despite this ambiguity, 
the results further emphasize the value of a measure of this kind when it comes to predicting 
political behavior and attitudes.  
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Huddy and others have presented evidence that partisanship as social identity is an 
important moderator of outcomes in political science research, and thus worthy of deeper 
consideration. In fact, Huddy et al. (2020) reviewed partisanship measures in the political science 
field across the world and find that measures with more variation in the degree of strength and 
direction are useful in predicting outcomes, arguing: “that there is considerable value in 
measuring partisan identity with a multi-item scale” (119). This is in line with decades of 
previous work on SIT in psychology.  
In the field of communication, partisanship as traditionally measured has proven to be a 
strong predictor of media effects as well. This is especially evident in work on selective exposure 
(e.g., Stroud, 2008), hostile media effect (e.g., Gunther et al., 2001; Perloff, 2015), information 
credibility perceptions (e.g., Metzger et al., 2020) and general motivated reasoning (e.g., Bolsen 
et al., 2014), and misinformation belief (e.g., Thorson, 2016), to name a few. But little work in 
communication has expanded to examine the impact of the social identity attachment 
operationalization of partisanship. I hypothesize that measuring group attachment to political 
parties in this way matters and could lead to, at best, stronger predictions of political media 
effects, or, at least, reveal interesting heterogeneity in media effects outcomes. This will be the 
focus of Chapter 4. As outlined above, the objective of this chapter is to develop an efficient 
measure of partisan social identity attachment, which is an essential first step towards testing this 
broader hypothesis.  
 
A Data-Driven Approach 
The preceding review of the group attachment literature suggests the following. First, 
there is no single, agreed-upon theory of multiple dimensions of social identity attachment, and 
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there is no agreed-upon method of measuring it. Well-reasoned and well-researched work on the 
very same topic has led to quite different areas of theoretical focus and completely different 
labeling or categorizing of ideas. This highlights the potentially arbitrary nature of past 
measurement decisions. Readers are often left wondering why one author chose to focus on 
“centrality” while another focused on “salience” – two theoretically overlapping ideas yet 
worded quite differently in survey questions. With about 17 different theoretical constructs of 
collective identity reviewed by Ashmore et al. (2004) and at least two, or even three or four, 
different survey questions designed to measure those elements across other work, it’s no surprise 
the field has yet to land on a universally accepted and efficient measure. My intention is not to 
advocate that measures be constructed absent of theory; but rather that going forward it’s most 
useful to explore the empirical evidence of subdomains rather than assume them.  
Second, I believe there are potential methodological issues with validity of measures 
where the wording of the questions is designed to fit the theoretical priors, and the authors 
subsequently report confirmatory factor analysis results supporting the pre-designed model. Take 
Cameron (2004) and Leach et al. (2008) who both make compelling arguments for adopting their 
particular perspective on how the dimensions of social group attachment should be organized 
and operationalized in measurement. In each case, once the authors laid the theoretical 
groundwork, they selected questions (and created their own questions) that they believed most 
directly captured those constructs. Leach et al. (2008) explains this process: “Through group 
discussion, the authors reached a consensus about what items adequately indicated each 
component. Items deemed overly general, vague or indicating multiple components were 
excluded from consideration” (150). And Cameron (2004), for example, uses the entire 10-item 
measure from Brown et al. (1986), but then selects only specific subscales from Luthanen & 
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Crocker (1992), Bollen and Hoyle (1990) and Aron et al. (1992) that best adapt to his model, 
rather than testing those entire measures (247). They then use confirmatory factor analysis and 
report that the model of best fit matches the number of dimensions outlined in the theoretical 
argument, which is not surprising. This method of crafting measurement around theory is not 
only logical, but also expected within the standard practices of survey research. It also proves 
that the questions hand-selected are, in fact, measuring concepts distinct from each other in the 
exact pattern they are desired to (internal validity, if you will). My concern is that by using this 
method, the authors are not able to properly externally validate their measures (and the theory 
underlying the measures) against the other existing measures of social identity attachment. 
Readers are still left having to simply buy-in to one particular scholar’s theoretical argument 
over another. The analysis presented in this chapter is my attempt to address this limitation. 
Although these observations may seem critical in nature, I want to make clear, again, that 
the methods used in previous work are well within the expectations of social science research. 
Without theory, the idea of social identity attachment itself wouldn’t exist. Measurement must be 
grounded in a basic understanding of what the object being studied is. The messiness in 
measurement, I believe, has developed from the challenge of trying to articulate a deeply 
complex phenomenon that has both universal properties and characteristics, while also 
potentially shifts depending on the context. On the one hand, Brown & Williams’ (1984) call for 
an easy to apply measure of group attachment was rooted in their (and subsequently many, many 
others) observation of the importance and centrality of group attachment in understanding human 
behavior. On the other hand, scholars such as Sellers et al. (1998) and Martin et al. (1997) 
suggest that adopting a “one-size-fits-all” approach severely limits our ability to measure the 
depth of impact social identity attachment has on specific groups of people. Martin et al. explain, 
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for example, “…athletes with an exclusive athletic identity may have emotional difficulty 
adjusting to non-sport participation” which has been proven to be directly related to the mental 
health of those athletes (75).  
This line of argument has merit. As do the repeated efforts by scholars to articulate and 
demonstrate the multidimensional nature of psychological attachment to a group. For the 
purposes of investigating the impact of partisan social identity attachment on media effects 
outcomes, however, I believe the first step is to develop an efficient and potent measure that can 
be easily deployed in survey work and be tested against the status quo measure: partisan strength. 
From there, the groundwork will be laid for others to explore political party group-specific 
dimensions and better theorize the underpinnings of this particular kind of attachment.     
The analysis conducted in this chapter attempts to address the potential pre-selection bias 
found in past work by including as many theoretical constructs as possible that seem relevant and 
present in the literature (though there are cases where there is overlap). By selecting a wide 
variety of questions from various sources to measure those concepts, all dimensions are allowed 
to compete with one another. My choices are not motivated by any one particular theory then; 
rather, they are strictly empirical – aiming for full coverage of dimensions and breadth in 
questions – with the intention of letting the data indicate its own “best fit.”  
 
Methodology 
A two-wave survey was designed with the objective of exploring the measurement of 
political partisanship in the U.S. as a psychological group attachment and of testing its impact on 
political communication effects. The survey was conducted using the online panel respondent 
database maintained by the data and insights service, Dynata. The respondents were paid a small 
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fee to participate in the survey, contacted digitally and completed the survey online. From this 
online panel, Dynata restricted the sample to self-identified political partisans in the U.S., then 
focused on approximately nationally representative sampling in terms of basic demographics 
(age, gender, race, etc.) within those targets.  
Because the primary focus of this project is to compare partisanship as social identity 
(which I’ll refer to as PSIM) to traditional measures of partisan strength (which I’ll refer to as 
PID), the survey specifically targets those who identify as a member of one of the two major 
political parties in the U.S.: Democrats and Republicans. This decision was made given the focus 
of the next chapter of this project, which builds on the current chapter to explore how strength of 
identification (i.e., the degree of social group identification) with a political group predicts media 
effects compared to PID. I recognize that by pre-selecting respondents who identify with the 
groups of interest the results reported in this chapter may not be easily generalized to a sample 
including non-identifiers. Re-testing PSIM on a broader sample (which would simply include 
more independents or non-identifiers) could reveal additional insights into the measure. 
However, given the large variation in partisan social identity found in the current sample I 
anticipate that results presented here (and in the next chapter) would not fundamentally change. 
This is discussed further in the conclusion. 
 The first wave of the survey was distributed online from August 31, 2020 – September 
15, 2020, the final push in the 2020 U.S. presidential election, to just over 2,300 respondents 
(dropping incompletes). The second wave was distributed to the same respondents from October 
26, 2020 – November 6, 2020, leading up to Election Day, with about a 47% response rate. The 
analysis presented in this chapter focuses almost exclusively on data collected from the first 
wave as it is where the PSIM questions are administered. Below I will explore the results of the 
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PSIM measurement and how it relates to PID and other measures. The second wave includes a 
media exposure experiment, and thus is more focused on testing the impact of PSIM versus PID 
on media effects outcomes – which will be the focus of Chapter 4. 
Wave 1: Survey Sample 
As mentioned above, this survey specifically targeted people who identify, at least to 
some loose degree, as Democrat or Republican. By doing so, the number of cases is sufficient to 
explore variation in attachment within those identity categories. The sample includes 1143 
Democrats, 1082 Republicans and 133 independents.  
Because of this targeting, the sample is understandably more politically interested than 
what one would expect from a nationally representative sample. 79% of the sample reported 
being somewhat, very or extremely interested in politics. In terms of demographics, gender was 
about evenly split with 51% reporting as identifying as female, 48% male, and about 1% non-
binary or other. This holds relatively true within political party as well, especially for 
Republicans with 50.8% male and 49.2% female. Democrats lean slightly female with 54.3% 
compared to 45.7% male. Age was evenly distributed, starting with the voting age of 18 through 
85 or older. The sample skews slightly educated, with 60% of respondents reporting some sort of 
college experience and 40% reporting high-school diploma or less. A little less than 50% of the 
sample is employed full time, while most others report being retired, student or part-time 
employed. Finally, the distribution on racial identity for the sample maps relatively well onto 
national averages. The sample is about 14% Black, 70% white, 7% Hispanic, Latinx or Spanish 
origin (which is a bit low), 5% Asian and about 3% American Indian, Alaskan Native or Other.  
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Partisanship as Social Identity Attachment Measurement: PSIM  
The critical task at hand is exploring the measurement of partisan social identity with 
respect to the extensive existing literature on the subject. I started by documenting all the 
questions included in 12 of the social identity attachment measures from the work reviewed 
above, removing repeated questions. The resulting list included 112 questions covering 17 
different theoretical constructs or dimensions. From there, I narrowed the theoretical concepts 
down to 14 (ending up with 13, see Table 3-1) based on obvious instances of overlap and guided 
by the work of Ashmore et al. (2004). I then narrowed the questions down to 37 based on the 
following criteria.  
First, I selected questions that appeared in at least three or more distinct measures. By 
distinct I mean non-replicated. For example, Greene (2004) was a direct replication of Mael and 
Tetrick (1992), so a question from that measure would only count as one, rather than as 
appearing in two measures. But if a question from Greene (2004)/Mael and Tetrick (1992) also 
appeared in Sellers et al. (1998) and Jackson (2002) where no complete replication was done, I 
counted it as appearing in three distinct measures. Second, all 13 theoretical constructs were 
assigned at least two survey questions. To select the questions to cover all these constructs, I 
returned to the authors who had originally developed the constructs and selected from their 
measure(s) directly. Full tables reporting the original pool of survey questions and corresponding 
authors are included in Appendix B, Tables B1 and B2.  
As described above, my goal was to pull from as wide a variety of theoretical dimensions 
as possible and sample a broad variety of survey questions. The resulting social identity 
attachment questions are listed in Table 3-1, including the theoretical constructs they 
operationalize and the list of authors from where they appeared in the literature. Note that the 
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first theoretical construct, self-categorization, is described in the literature as being the conscious 
opting into the group and is measured using basic questions like “Do you identify as a member 
of X?” Because the respondents in the survey are already being asked this question in the 
traditional measure of partisan strength (PID), it was not additionally included in the partisan 
social identity measure (and is not included in the 37-question count, reducing the theoretical 
constructs to 13).   
Table 3-1:  Starting Social Identity Attachment Measure Questions 
Question Theoretical Construct Author(s) 
I am a () ? Self-categorization – captured by PID Jackson (2002) 
Do you identify as a member of ()? / I 
identify with (). Self-categorization – captured by PID 
Brown & Williams (1984)/Kelly 
(1988) 
Ashmore et al. (2004)/Heere & James 
(2007) 
   
In general, I am glad to be a (). Affect / Attachment 
Brown & Williams (1984)/Kelly 
(1988) 
Kashima et al. (2000) 
Jackson (2002) 
Ashmore et al. (2004)/Heere & James 
(2007) 
Cameron (2004) 
Leach et al. (2008) 
I feel good about being a member of (). Affect / Attachment 
Sellers et al. (1998) 
Jackson (2002) 
Ashmore et al. (2004)/Heere & James 
(2007) 
Cameron (2004) 
Leach et al. (2008) 
I'm proud to be a (). Affect / Attachment 
Sellers et al. (1998) 
Kashima et al. (2000) 
Jackson (2002) 
Ashmore et al. (2004)/Heere & James 
(2007) 
I often regret that I am a (). Affect / Attachment 
Sellers et al. (1998) 
Jackson (2002) 
Cameron (2004) 
   
Being a () is an important part of my self-
image.  Importance / Self-concept / Centrality 
Sellers et al. (1998) 
Kashima et al. (2000) 
Jackson (2002) 
Ashmore et al. (2004)/Heere & James 
(2007) 
Cameron (2004) 
Leach et al. (2008) 
Being a () is important to my sense of what 
kind of person I am. Importance / Self-concept / Centrality 
Sellers et al. (1998) 
Kashima et al. (2000) 
Jackson (2002) 
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Ashmore et al. (2004)/Heere & James 
(2007) 
Cameron (2004) 
Leach et al. (2008) 
Being a () is important to me.  Importance / Self-concept / Centrality Ashmore et al. (2004) 
   
When someone criticizes () it feels like a 
personal insult.  Interdependence / Common Fate 
Greene (2004) 
Ashmore et al. (2004)/Heere & James 
(2007) Huddy et al. (2015)  
()'s successes are my successes. Interdependence / Common Fate 
Jackson (2002) 
Greene (2004) 
When I talk about (), I usually say "we" 
rather than "they" Interdependence / Common Fate 
Jackson (2002) 
Greene (2004) 
Ashmore et al. (2004) 
Huddy et al. (2015) 
If a story in the media criticized (), I would 
feel embarrassed. Interdependence / Common Fate 
Mael and Tetrick (1991) 
Jackson (2002) 
Greene (2004)  
I would be depressed if () failed. Interdependence / Common Fate 
Martin et al. (1997) 
Jackson (2002) 
   
I have a number of qualities typical of (). Fit / Typicality  
Mael and Tetrick (1991) 
Kashima et al. (2000)  
Jackson (2002) 
Greene (2004) 
Ashmore et al. (2004) 
I have a lot in common with other (). Fit / Typicality  
Jackson (2002) 
Cameron (2004) 
Leach et al. (2008) 
Huddy et al. (2015) 
My background is similar to that of most (). Fit / Typicality  Kashima et al. (2000)   
   
I act like a () person to a great extent. Behavior 
Jackson (2002) 
Greene (2004) 
Ashmore et al. (2004) 
Huddy et al. (2015) 
I participate in activities supporting (). Behavior 
Ashmore et al. (2004)/Heere & James 
(2007) 
   
I feel strong ties with other people who 
support the () party. Solidarity / Connectedness 
Brown & Williams (1984)/Kelly 
(1988) 
Kashima et al. (2000) 
Cameron (2004) 
In a group of (), I really feel that I belong. Solidarity / Connectedness 
Sellers et al. (1998) 
Cameron (2004) 
I feel committed to (). Solidarity / Connectedness Leach et al. (2008) 
   
 I often think about the fact that I am ().  Cognitive  
Martin et al. (1997) 
Cameron (2004) 
Leach et al. (2008) 
I am not usually conscious of the fact that I 
am (). Cognitive  Cameron (2004)  
      
I'm very interested in what others think 




Huddy et al. (2015) 
Overall, () are viewed positively by others. Evaluation / Attitude 
Sellers et al. (1998) 
Ashmore et al. (2004)/Heere & James 
(2007) 
In general, others respect ().  Evaluation / Attitude 
Sellers et al. (1998) 
Ashmore et al. (2004)/Heere & James 
(2007) 
I feel that () have made major 
accomplishments and advancements. Evaluation / Attitude Sellers et al. (1998)  
   
I am aware of the tradition and history of (). Knowledge / Narrative 
Ashmore et al. (2004)/Heere & James 
(2007) 
I know the ins and outs of the () platform. Knowledge / Narrative 
Ashmore et al. (2004)/Heere & James 
(2007) 
I have knowledge of the successes and 
failures of ().  Knowledge / Narrative 
Ashmore et al. (2004)/Heere & James 
(2007) 
   
() have a lot in common with each other. Homogeneity  Leach et al. (2008) 
() act very similar to each other. Homogeneity  Leach et al. (2008) 
   
It is important to me that others identify me 
as (). External Perception In-group Jackson (2002) 
Other people mainly see me as a (). External Perception In-group 
Martin et al. (1997) 
Kashima et al. (2000)  
      
I prefer to see (ingroup) as distinct from 
(outgroup). Distinction from Out-group Jackson (2002) 
(outgroup) people are different from 
(ingroup) people. Distinction from Out-group Jackson (2002) 
      
Most of my friends are (). Social Embeddedness 
Martin et al. (1997) 
Ashmore et al. (2004) 
Being () is not a major factor in my social 
relationships. Social Embeddedness Sellers et al. (1998) 
 
Respondents were presented with the 37 questions separated into six “blocks,” with each 
block including a randomized pairing of theoretical concepts. For example, one block includes 
the questions from the affect/attachment and behavior dimensions. The questions that 
operationalize each theoretical concept are also kept together – which appeared to be a common 
practice of the group attachment measures reviewed in this chapter. Hence, all the affect 
questions are presented first, followed by all the behavior questions in that block. Each block had 
about six or seven questions total as to not overwhelm the respondents. The order of the six 
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blocks were also randomized for every respondent. Respondents were instructed at the beginning 
of each block to do the following: “When thinking about your political party, please rate how 
much you agree with the following statements.” They are then asked to rate the statements on a 
five-point scale from strongly agree to strongly disagree, with neither agree nor disagree as the 
middle category. The five point agree/disagree scale was selected, again, because of its 
commonness in the methodology of the existing group attachment measures. This approach 
introduces many layers and opportunities for variation in responses. Respondents can vary 
significantly in PSIM strength within an individual question, within individual theoretical 
dimensions, or within the entire measure overall.   
Traditional Measure of Partisanship: PID 
The measurement of partisanship most frequently used across political science and 
political communication research asks respondent to select the strength of their identification 
with a political party group categorically. This question can also be found in long-standing 
national survey projects such as the American National Election Studies (ANES), as was used in 
the analysis in Chapter 2. The question is structured as follows: (1) respondents are asked, 
“Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an 
Independent, or what?”; (2) based on their choice the respondents are then asked, “Would you 
call yourself a strong Republican/Democrat or a not very strong Republican/Democrat?”; and (3) 
if respondents selected Independent, they are asked, “Do you think of yourself as closer to the 
Republican or Democratic party?” In this survey, PID is then converted to a seven-point scale 
with 0 in the middle representing those who are Independents or do not identify with a party. The 
numbers (-1) through (-3) represent Democrat leaners, weak Democrats and strong Democrats, 
 85 
respectively, and the numbers 1 through 3 represent Republican leaners, weak Republicans and 
strong Republicans, respectively.     
 
Results 
The Dimensions of Partisanship as Social Identity Attachment  
I started by running an unconstrained principal components analysis of the 37 PSIM 
questions. As described in detail above, my objective is to not introduce any theoretical priors 
into my analysis, thus I will initially not constrain the analysis. This allows the data to dictate the 
dimensions. The results produce a possible 37-dimension model (as many dimensions as there 
are questions). However, based on the eigenvalues represented in Figure 3-1, an overwhelming 
proportion of the variance is captured by the first dimension. 
 
This result is in line with the findings of a similar analysis conducted by Heere & James 
(2007). They included all the questions from Ashmore et al. (2004)’s theoretical constructs in an 
Figure 3-1: Eigenvalues for the unconstrained PCA of PSIM (top 10 dimensions only) 
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unconstrained factor analysis and find that the questions naturally fall on one dimension. My 
analysis similarly shows that about 92% of the questions load onto dimension one with loadings 
above 0.57. The only questions that do not fall on this dimension are the questions that are 
negative or reverse in language. For example, “I am not usually conscious of the fact that I am 
Republican” (emphasis added) is a question in which the respondent must respond to a negation 
rather than affirmation of the group identity attachment. The difference between dimensions 
appears to not be substantive, but rather due to question form. 
Figure 3-2 illustrates variable loadings on each of the first two dimensions. Social2, cog2 
and affect4 are the only three negative questions in 37-item battery; each fall on dimension two, 
which accounts for just 6.7% of the variance. Dimension one, in contrast, accounts for about 
45.6% of the variance in the 37 variables. Although not shown here, note that the results are the 
same when the analysis is restricted to just Democrat or just Republican respondents.  
 
Figure 3-2: Unconstrained PCA analysis of PSIM, Dimensions 1 and 2 
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The factor loadings themselves are reported in Table 3-2, for the first two dimensions. 
The top ten questions that load onto dimension one are bolded. Again, in line with previous work 
done by Bankert et al. (2017), I find that an index based on these top ten questions (PSIM10) is 
highly correlated with an index based on all 37, at r = 0.949. Further, the top four questions that 
load onto dimension one are italicized in Table 3-2; and the index based on these four questions 
is also highly correlated with the full 37-item index, at r = 0.912. These results suggest that using 
the top ten questions – or if a project is even more constrained by time and money, using the top 
four – produces a measure of PSIM that is very similar to what is obtained with a much longer 
37-item battery. It’s important to note that the high correlation between the top 10 and top four 
questions with the whole battery may be, in part, due to respondent fatigue and response set bias. 
In facing so many similarly structured questions the respondents may have been very consistent 
in their answers as a matter of ease in getting through a rather long survey. Further, this is a non-
representative sample where I expect high levels of political interest across the board. This may 
also have inflated the high correlation, and is a limitation addressed in the discussion section.  
Table 3-2: Unconstrained PCA Factor Loadings of PSIM, Dimensions 1 and 2 
Theoretical Construct Dimension 1 Dimension 2 
affect / attachment 1 0.738 0.372 
affect / attachment 2 0.717 0.413 
affect / attachment 3 0.735 0.384 
affect / attachment 4 -0.128 0.822 
behavior 1 0.746 0.017 
behavior 2 0.696 -0.256 
importance / centrality 1 0.806 0.162 
importance / centrality 2 0.8 -0.006 
importance / centrality 3 0.784 0.097 
solidarity / connectedness 1 0.798 0.095 
solidarity / connectedness 2 0.794 0.137 
solidarity / connectedness 3 0.79 0.226 
typicality / fit 1 0.715 0.124 
typicality / fit 2 0.737 0.213 
typicality / fit 3 0.68 -0.039 
knowledge / narrative 1 0.638 -0.026 
knowledge / narrative 2 0.687 -0.121 
knowledge / narrative 3 0.669 -0.051 
common fate 1 0.693 -0.197 
common fate 2 0.773 -0.009 
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common fate 3 0.747 -0.117 
common fate 4 0.526 -0.537 
common fate 5 0.634 -0.104 
homogeneity 1 0.718 0.069 
homogeneity 2 0.687 -0.091 
cognitive 1 0.68 -0.289 
cognitive 2 -0.078 0.452 
attitude / evaluation 1 0.611 -0.398 
attitude / evaluation 2 0.644 -0.208 
attitude / evaluation 3 0.624 -0.211 
attitude / evaluation 4 0.653 0.299 
external perception, in-group 1 0.705 -0.061 
external perception, in-group 2 0.76 -0.138 
distinction from outgroup 1 0.674 0.106 
distinction from outgroup 2 0.578 0.046 
social embeddedness 1 0.607 -0.017 
social embeddedness 2 -0.141 0.242 
 
An important part of this analysis was the decision to not restrict questions based on a set 
of theoretical priors. It is interesting to note, however, that the questions which most strongly 
load onto the first dimension are from a very limited number of theoretical constructs. The top 
six questions are exclusively representative of two theoretical dimensions: importance/centrality 
and solidarity/connectedness. In contrast, none of the attitude/evaluation questions make the top 
25. This could indicate that something about those questions in particular or the theoretical 
constructs they represent is especially potent at capturing this phenomenon, which may be a 
starting point for interesting future work.  
Do the same results remain when using a more constrained approach to factor analysis? 
In short, yes. Appendix B Tables B3 – B5 show the results testing various numbers of factors, 
restricted to three factors, and varimax rotated and not. The results hint at some small differences 
across questions, but mainly support this one-factor solution.  
Comparing PSIM and PID  
 The next analysis focuses on exploring the relationship between PSIM, PID and previous 
measures of group attachment. Distributions of PSIM10 and PID are represented in Figures 3-3 
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and 3-4, respectively. For PSIM10, the 10 questions are measured using a five-point scale 
(strongly agree/agree/neither/disagree/strongly disagree) which was converted to a numeric scale 
(2 representing strongly agree and -2 representing strongly disagree). The responses for the 10 
questions were then added resulting in -20 representing no psychological attachment to the group 
while 20 indicates extremely strong attachment to the group. Given the survey sample targeted 
self-identifying Republicans and Democrats, most of the distribution of PSIM10 is above zero as 
expected. And the distributions looking at Democrats and Republicans separately are both very 
similar to Figure 3-3. There is quite a bit of variation above 0, however, and some below 0 as 
well indicating there is potentially meaningful variation in PSIM10, which will be discussed in 
more detail below. Figure 3-4 shows the distribution for PID and highlights the degree to which 
partisans were targeted in this sample. The majority of respondents report being strong 

















Figure 3-3: Distribution of Partisan Social Identity Measure, Top 10 Questions 
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Table 3-3 shows the correlation coefficients of PSIM to PID and other measures. PID is 
collapsed into a four-category numeric scale (0 – 3) for this analysis where 0 represents not 
identifying with Democrats nor Republicans, and 3 represents both Democrat and Republican 
respondents who consider themselves “strong” identifiers. Thus, PID here is simply a measure of 
strength that does not distinguish between the two parties allowing for more direct comparison 
with PSIM. I also draw from a random sample of measures from the literature reviewed above. 
Note, of course, the correlations to previous measures are limited by the fact that not all the 
questions from previous measures are included. For example, there are only seven out of the ten 
questions from Greene (2004) included in the survey. And from here on, I also almost 
exclusively use the top 10 loaded questions, referred to as PSIM10 in this table, but then calling 
it simply PSIM in all further analyses. PSIM ALL (all 37 questions) is included only in the 
comparison to PID.  
 
−3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3
Distribution of PID










Figure 3-4: Distribution of Partisan Strength Measure 
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Table 3-3: PSIM correlations to PID and other SIT measures 
Measure Comparison Coefficient 
PSIM10 / PID 0.490 
PSIM ALL / PID  0.463   
PSIM 10 / Mael & Tetrick, Greene IDPG 0.840 
PSIM 10 / Bankert et al.  0.877 
PSIM 10 / Kashima et al.  0.969 
PSIM 10 / Sellers et al. 0.905 
PSIM 10 / Ashmore et al., Heere & James 0.915 
  
First note that the correlations between PSIM and measures from previous literature are 
highly correlated. This is not surprising since the questions in PSIM are directly pulled from 
these measures. It also indicates that the top 10 questions from dimension one are likely 
questions that commonly appear across the previous work.  
In line with the findings of Greene (2004), I find that the PSIM measure is only 
moderately correlated with PID. Only about a quarter of the variance of one is explained by the 
other. This indicates that while the measures may be related, they are likely measuring two 
distinct concepts. I explore this in more detail in Figure 3-5. Remember, along the PSIM x-axis, 
a “20” results from extremely strong agreement with the statements of identity attachment with 
the party group, while “-20” results from strong disagreement with the statements, or little to no 
identification with the party group. Within the PID categories there appears to be quite a lot of 
variation in PSIM. For moderates, PSIM appears to be mostly evenly distributed and for weak 
identifiers, the majority clusters around 0 in PSIM. The variation in the strong PID categories, 
however, is rather striking. Many people who opted into the “strong” partisan category score 
only moderately (between 0 and 10, for example) on PSIM.  
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It is possible, of course, that the variation within PID categories is simply noise resulting 
from a complex, multi-item battery. On the other hand, this could also indicate that PSIM and 
PID are connected, but distinct measures, and that the variation in PSIM captures important 
information missed by PID. These possibilities can be explored, and potentially resolved, by 
further testing of PSIM and PID in predicting meaningful outcomes. This is the focus of the next 
chapter of this project. 
 
Figure 3-5: Variation in PSIM within PID categories 
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Discussion 
Much scholarship has been devoted to the theorizing and measurement of psychological 
attachment to a group over the past four or five decades. There is widespread agreement that this 
phenomenon is complex, multidimensional, and essential to understanding how humans think 
and behave. Humans are, after all, a social group-focused species. This complexity, though, has 
also led to a wide variety of theoretical and methodological approaches to measuring it. The 
central objective of this chapter has been to highlight the often conflicting and ambiguous 
decision making that has made it challenging for the fields of psychology and political science to 
land on one, universal and easy to apply measure.  
The data I present here is not necessarily an attempt to completely resolve this challenge 
as much as being a demonstration of an alternative, more efficient approach. My goal was to 
respect the wealth of existing work by not re-theorizing the social group attachment for 
partisanship, but instead eliminating theoretical priors or biases on the analysis. I furthered this 
effort by pulling from as wide a variety of theories and questions as possible to test a partisan 
social identity measure. This method is also completely transparent with the reader in outlining 
the decision-making process behind which questions are selected. Namely, the selection is based 
on the results of the analysis rather than the other way around.  
 The initial results presented in this chapter are promising where the concise measure of 
partisan social identity is concerned. First, although 37 questions were included in the survey, it 
appears that only ten (or even four) are sufficient for capturing psychological attachment to a 
political group. Along those lines, the questions overwhelming load onto one dimension leading 
to less measurement complexity as well. In other words, a win for efficiency. Second, PSIM is 
only partially correlated with the traditional measure of partisan strength. And as demonstrated in 
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Figure 3-5, there is quite a wide variety of social identity attachment strength within the PID 
measure. This evidence confirms work done by Greene (2004), Huddy et al. (2015) and Bankert 
et al. (2017) that social identity attachment is, in fact, a distinct concept from what is measured 
by traditional partisan strength.  
 It has been clearly stated throughout this chapter that the objective was to remove bias 
from the measure and focus on application in surveys. Therefore, the one-dimension, data-driven 
measure presented here unfortunately ignores an essential agreed-upon characteristic of SIT: that 
it is multidimension in nature. Looking at the top ten questions that loaded onto the first 
dimension in the analysis qualitatively, there is clearly something about the 
importance/centrality and solidarity/connectedness theoretical constructs that drives the 
measure. This is an interesting starting point for future work. The approach presented here also 
sets aside the important arguments made by Sellers et al. (1998) and others who have approached 
the measurement of group attachment starting from the unique experience of a group. I have not, 
nor will I in the confines of this project, consider the particular thoughts, experiences and 
behaviors that may define political party group attachment in the U.S. distinctly from other types 
of group attachments. But there’s plenty of anecdotal evidence that this kind of project is worth 
pursuing. For example, it is rare to find an entire socio-political system, backed by billions of 
dollars of marketing efforts, that pits groups against each other on a regular basis as is done 
between the political parties in U.S. elections. The nature of an election-based political system 
that, for better or worse, forces people into one group or another is an especially exceptional 
experience that could (maybe, should) be considered in understanding the psychological 
attachment citizens have to these groups.  
 95 
 Furthermore, the choice to limit the survey sample to respondents who pre-identify with a 
political group may bias the results reported in this chapter. As explained above, this choice was 
made in an effort to lay the groundwork for the next chapter, which will focus on how 
differences in the degree to which one identifies with a political party may impact media effects 
outcomes distinctly from traditional measures of partisanship. That being said, it may well be 
critical to re-run the analyses presented here on a broader sample which includes more variety of 
political identification – particularly non-identifiers or independents.  
 Finally, and importantly going into the next two chapters, the ten-item measure of PSIM 
is going to have much less noise than a single-item measure such as PID. This will need to be 
considered when comparing the two measures against each other in predicting outcomes. Ten 
items are also a lot more costly in terms of time and resources than deploying a single-item 
question. It is the objective of the next analyses to consider the potential benefit – or in which 
research contexts there is benefit – of using the more complex measure. 
 Given these limitations, though, my goal is to build the foundation from which political 
communication scholars specifically can explore such complexities in the future. The objective 
of the next chapter is to further establish that partisanship operationalized as a group attachment 
is distinct from the previous status quo of partisan strength. Using PSIM, Chapter 4 will also test 
the hypothesis that this difference matters in predicting and moderating political communication 






Chapter 4 A Social Identity Approach to Partisan Media Effects 
 
Scholars of political communication have established that media have the power to 
influence voter emotions, attitudes about policies or candidates and behaviors, such as 
participation in political campaigns and elections. That said, the literature also makes clear that 
media do not affect every voter in the same way. In fact, voters can be influenced by media 
messages in strikingly diverse ways. One of the central and most compelling bodies of work in 
this field uses political partisanship as means of predicting (and moderating) these 
heterogeneous media effects.  
A common theme throughout the partisanship-focused political media effects literature is 
the use of Social Identity Theory (SIT) as a framework to understand the deeper, psychological 
mechanisms that may be driving the impact of partisanship. This is particularly true for effects 
hypothesized to be activated through cognitive dissonance, such as hostile media perceptions and 
motivated reasoning. Despite the fact that growing work in political science continues to build a 
case for partisanship operating as a social group identity attachment (and thus calling for 
improved measurement, i.e., Greene, 2004; Huddy et al., 2015; Bankert et al., 2017), however, 
there is very political communication scholarship that applies this notion to our understanding of 
media effects directly. Even for work that argues strength of partisanship matters for media 
effects, the degree of strength is most often three self-reported categorizations: strong, 
moderate/weak or leaner. I argue that if SIT is the foundation of the theory driving the study of 
these effects, it should be properly actualized in measurement of the effects as well. This gap in 
the methodology of political communication scholarship is what I explore here.  
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As reviewed in the previous chapter, there is a large body of work in psychology that 
suggests there are aspects of attachment to a political group that may not be well captured by 
traditional measures. I have synthesized the complexities of that literature and arrived at a 
measure that incorporates multiple theoretical dimensions yet is simple enough to be deployed in 
time- and space-limited survey research. The partisan social identity measure (PSIM) developed 
in Chapter 3 is a 10-item battery of questions that aims to capture variation in psychological 
attachment to a group, operationalizing concepts such as centrality of the group identity, 
solidarity with other members of the group, affect and perceptions of tied fate with the group, for 
example. The traditional measure of partisan identity (PID) – used nearly universally in political 
communication effects research – asks subjects to simply identify if they consider themselves a 
member of a political party and then rate whether that identity is “strong” or “weak,” and for 
Independents, “leaning” towards one party or the other. The objective of this chapter is to 
directly test the effectiveness of the PSIM compared to PID in media effects. The questions that 
inform my hypotheses are: Is PSIM distinct from PID in predicting and/or moderating media 
effects? Does PSIM outperform PID? And what are the nature of effects associated with PSIM? 
 Based on my review of the literature in psychology, political science, and 
communication, combined with the results reported in Chapter 2, it is my belief that strength of 
partisanship operationalized in line with SIT will be a stronger predictor of media effects and 
attitudes about the media, and stronger moderator of effects, than the traditional measure of PID. 
I test this prediction using the data from a two-wave survey collected during the 2020 U.S. 
presidential election on three media effects outcomes prevalent in political communication 
research. In short, I will examine the impact of PSIM compared to PID on three highly salient 
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phenomena in the study of current political communication: hostile media effect, selective 
exposure behavior, and motivated reasoning. 
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. First, I review relevant literature and 
existing evidence of these three media effects as predicted or moderated by partisanship. I then 
review additional work that I believe add indirect evidence of deeper group-identity dynamics at 
play. To test the hostile media effect, I estimate straightforward OLS regression to evaluate the 
predictive power of PSIM versus PID. For selective exposure, I estimate models using PSIM and 
PID to predict the outcome of a simple selective exposure experiment in which respondents are 
asked to choose between positive and negative news headlines about the two front-running 
presidential candidates. To examine motivated reasoning, I measure trust in a negative compared 
to a neutral news story about respondents’ in-party candidates, using a simple media story 
exposure experiment. As will be discussed further below, perceptions of credibility of counter-
attitudinal information have been a useful indication of motivated information processing in past 
work. In this final analysis, PSIM and PID are tested as moderators of the impact of the exposure 
condition on trust.  
 Overall, I find evidence that PSIM is more strongly predictive than PID of hostile media 
effects, selective exposure and motivated reasoning. I then discuss how this evidence not only 
justifies further testing of my proposed partisan social identity measure, but also suggests the 
advantages of using Social Identity Theory to improve our understanding of the effects of media 
content in political contexts where partisan identity comes under threat (i.e., elections, 
impeachment, scandal, and so on).   
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Partisanship in Political Media Effects Research 
Hostile Media Effect 
The “hostile media effect” (HME) occurs when people perceive information as biased 
against their beliefs. It is a unique phenomenon in communication studies because rather than 
being a direct effect of media on an attitude, it is an attitude about media that is predicted by 
systematic bias in human processing. Namely, the standard baseline human assumption that our 
own views or beliefs are correct compared to opposing views and beliefs. Thus, the effect is 
predicted by a combination of the subject matter triggering bias and the extent of the bias 
triggered. Subsequently, though, HME has the potential influence other communication effects 
as well: “hostile media perceptions can precipitate media effects by setting in motion a series of 
beliefs, attitudes and behaviors” (Perloff, 2015, 703). 
HME was originally introduced by measuring people’s perceptions of bias of information 
at the “story-level.” Early research found that when people with opposing beliefs about a topic or 
issue were exposed to the same exact piece of information about that topic, both groups reported 
the information as being biased against their point of view. Over time, it has evolved into various 
other forms, however. For example, scholars have examined hostile media effect in evaluations 
of entire media outlets (e.g., Coe et al., 2008; Kelly, 2019); scholars have examined general 
hostility towards the mainstream “media” as an institution (e.g., Weeks et al., 2019; Barnidge et 
al., 2020); and most relevant to this project, scholars have looked at political party identity as a 
predictor of hostile information perceptions (e.g., Reid, 2012; Lin et al., 2016). (There are also 
many meta-analyses and full literature reviews that trace the evolution of this effect and the 
various conditions under which it has been studied, see, Hansen & Kim, 2011; Feldman, 2014; 
Perloff, 2015; Gunther, 2017.) The test of hostile media effect I focus on in this chapter best 
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aligns Weeks et al. (2019) and Barnidge et al.’s (2020) variant, where PSIM and PID, 
specifically, are tested as predictors of the perception that the media in general is biased against 
a partisan’s political group.  
Social Identity Theory and cognitive dissonance are very present in the literature on 
HME. SIT is frequently used to explore the psychological mechanisms through which this biased 
information processing takes place. The theoretical arguments I laid out in Chapter 1 are almost 
perfectly aligned with this work. Hartmann & Tanis (2013), for example, highlight how SIT 
suggests that people are motivated to maintain a positive perception of the group they identify 
with. This positive perception of the group is critical to positive perception of the self, since the 
group identity and the self are psychologically tied. “In the context of the HME, group members 
may be motivated to see that their ingroup occupies a superior moral or ideological position in a 
conflict. However, arguments or information provided in the mass media may challenge the 
ingroup’s ideological or moral legitimacy, and, thus, the positive distinctiveness of the group” 
(Hartmann & Tanis, 2013, 536). In this sense, the media “may pose a symbolic threat to their 
ingroup” (537) that then can bring about feelings of discomfort and internal conflict in efforts to 
maintain a positive perception of the self. Thus, when a threat of this kind brings about cognitive 
dissonance, one might expect behavior such as questioning the bias of said media, (i.e., seeing 
the information as biased against your group) as way to cope. Hartmann & Tanis (2013) find that 
stronger group attachment predicts stronger perceptions of hostile media bias.  
Hartmann & Tanis (2013) are not the only scholars to connect hostile media effect and 
SIT. And although, as I argue at the end of this section, these scholars have not tested HME with 
political partisanship itself operationalized as a social group attachment, they present compelling 
evidence that biased perceptions of media and information are linked to identity threat. Hansen 
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& Kim (2011), for instance, review 34 different HME-related studies and find the strongest 
effects are those moderated by what they call “involvement” in the topic at hand. In most studies, 
involvement is conceived as having strongly held attitudes about a particular issue. The strength 
of those prior attitudes among participants is found to predict stronger perceptions of the 
information being biased against the participant. Both Gunther et al. (2016) and Lin et al. (2016) 
provide further evidence of the importance of degree of involvement by demonstrating that the 
more “attachment” respondents reported to the given political issue, the more hostile their 
perceptions of neutral or counter-attitudinal information and sources. Lin et al. (2016) dives into 
the SIT perspective even deeper, finding that other group-identity related factors – group status 
perception, intergroup bias perception and ideology – further amplified HME.  
A potential drawback of Hartmann & Tanis (2013), Gunther et al. (2016) and Lin et al.’s 
(2016) work as it relates to social identity theory, however, is that they all use strength of attitude 
about a specific issue as the measure of “group attachment” instead of attachment to an actual 
social group (i.e., political parties). For example, Hartmann and Tanis use pro-choice versus pro-
life attitudes, and Gunther et al. use strength of attitudes about pro-evolution teaching versus 
teaching alternatives to evolution as their measures. All of this compelling work is thus limited to 
very specific political issues; and tests of the theory hinge on measures that do not directly 
capture partisanship, or partisan social identity strength. 
That said, there are some scholars who explore HME and partisanship more directly, 
finding strong evidence of the connection between the two. Eveland & Shah (2003) demonstrate 
that the degree of strength of the categorical measure of PID predicted increased perceived bias 
of the news in general. Furthermore, Reid (2012) replicates Eveland and Shah’s results but 
further shows that when partisan identity was made salient (evoked experimentally) and when 
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the information came from an out-group affiliated source, HME was amplified. Finally, Ladd 
(2010) discovers that participants reported lower feelings of favorability towards the media when 
exposed to their political party leadership criticizing the coverage of the in-party presidential 
candidate, compared to exposure calling the media critical of all politicians. Hence, general 
perceptions of the media being “negative” did not elicit increased HME as much as an in-party 
cue from leadership (this notion is further supported by Arceneaux et al., 2012).  
Another way to get a sense of the relationship between hostile media effects, partisanship 
and social identity attachment (albeit indirectly) is through evidence of the affective nature of 
HME. One of the central features of social group attachment, after all, is its affective/emotional 
nature. Even when partisanship is measured via PID’s simple strength categories, there is 
evidence that affect, and emotion, are present in the hostile media effect process. Matthes (2013) 
finds that partisans’ emotional reactions to information – measured both as general emotional 
arousal and as the experience of concrete emotions like anger, enthusiasm and fear – predict 
HME above and beyond controls for cognitive involvement, such as attitude certainty, 
importance and need for cognition. Arpan & Nabi (2011) report that partisans who responded 
with anger to counter-attitudinal news formed more biased judgements of news, and that 
increased anger led to greater criticism of the reporter and additional pro-attitudinal information 
seeking behavior. Similarly, Weeks et al. (2019) look at hostile media perceptions on social 
media and show that “attention to politicians’ social feeds during the 2016 U.S. presidential 
election is indirectly related to perceptions of media bias through anger at the opposed 
presidential candidate and enthusiasm for the supported one [emphasis added]” (287). This 
evidence suggests that biased perceptions of media or information are not merely a cognitive 
evaluation, but rather the result of an emotionally eliciting process in line with SIT. 
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Much of this literature calls on SIT theory as the foundation for understanding the 
psychological processing that underpins hostile media effect. Strikingly, however, there appears 
to be very little work in which partisanship is measured that way. Hartmann & Tanis (2013) 
appear to be the closest, using 14 questions from Leach et al. (2008) adapted to measuring 
attachment to “pro-choice” or “pro-life” attitudes, though, as opposed to an actual social group. I 
believe Eveland & Shah (2003) and Reid (2012)’s results most clearly present an opportunity to 
examine hostile media effect via a measure of partisan social identity that more deeply considers 
the degree of attachment to those groups. In summary, I predict that: 
Hypothesis 1: PSIM will be a stronger predictor of hostile media effect than PID. 
Selective Exposure 
The idea that people tend to select information that aligns with their currently held beliefs 
was first explored in the 1960’s. At the time, there was only inconsistent support for the theory 
(e.g., see Freedman and Spear’s work in the period). Studying the phenomenon gained popularity 
again decades later as shifts in the media landscape offered audiences more choice and control 
over what they consumed. During this period, politics gained popularity as lens through which 
selective exposure was studied. After all, choosing information in line with a person’s “beliefs” 
was easy to test via politically related topics that people would likely have attitudes or opinions 
about. In Stroud's (2008) review of the field, she highlights that variety in the size and 
consistency of effects are what continued to fuel debate on the prevalence (or even existence: 
i.e., Kinder, 2003; Zaller, 1992) of selective exposure behavior. Stroud argues that this conflict, 
in part, is the result of the “diversity of topics that have been studied” and asserts that “Political 
topics…may be particularly likely to inspire selective exposure” (344).  
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The work done by Stroud (2008, 2010), Iyengar & Hahn (2009), and Garrett (2009) 
revitalized the theory of selective exposure in communication research, particularly as a 
phenomenon relevant to partisan politics in the U.S. Using the traditional measure of 
partisanship as a five-category scale (strong/not strong or leaning/neither), Stroud’s work 
demonstrates that stronger partisans were more likely to report selecting news from politically 
congenial media outlets or from outlets that more often supported their party’s candidate for 
president during the 2004 election. She further finds that partisan selective exposure behavior 
(i.e., consuming news from partisan congenial outlets) increased over the course of the 2004 
campaign, regardless of medium. Stroud (2010) follows with evidence showing that polarizing 
attitudes can both lead to selective exposure and be the consequence of selective exposure 
behaviors, but there was stronger evidence of the latter. Thus, partisans who engaged in more 
selective exposure behaviors were more likely to hold polarized attitudes. Iyengar & Hahn 
(2009) replicate these results, both for political issues that are highly controversial and for 
“softer” subjects (i.e., regardless of the nature of the content). Selective exposure behavior was 
amplified for partisans with strong political interest as well. And finally, Garrett (2009) finds 
strong evidence of partisan selective exposure at the story-level, where opinion-reinforcing 
stories better predicted selection than opinion-challenging stories.  
This work makes clear that the changed media landscape has introduced the opportunities 
needed for selective exposure behavior to (a) be more prevalent and (b) be better measured. 
Consumer-based selection of media source and content is now deeply baked into the structure of 
the media industry in a way it wasn’t before. This is especially so where politics is concerned, as 
now there are channels and shows intentionally devoted to a particular partisan point of view. 
Rodriguez et al. (2017), for example, find that selective exposure increased over the 2000 – 2012 
 105 
period, particularly for conservatives (most pronounced for “very conservative” identifiers). But 
that’s not to say that people are locked in “echo chambers;” particularly since the expansion of 
choice has also allowed citizens to opt out of political news altogether (Prior, 2007) and in the 
online environment where the quantity of choices expands even further, Facebook news sites’ 
audiences tend to be politically diverse (Nelson & Webster, 2017). Kim & Lu (2020) also 
simulate an iOS news app where participants could freely select news stories and find that while 
partisans preferred stories from pro-attitudinal sources, they also selected from counter-
attitudinal sources about 20% of the time. 
  In sum, although selective exposure may not be ubiquitous, the evidence to date does 
makes clear that selective exposure behaviors are present among political partisans. Furthermore, 
recent work has started to situate these behaviors more in line with Social Identity Theory. 
Indeed, SIT may be a useful tool in understanding variation in selective exposure outcomes. 
Levendusky (2013) argues that partisan media “triggers” partisan identity, by creating identity 
salience, exacerbating group contrast and conflict, and reinforcing partisan attitudes. He contends 
that partisan media is thus especially persuasive and found that partisans rate these sources as 
more credible. Interestingly, selecting like-minded media exposure had little impact on in-party 
attitudes (likely at an already too high threshold) but in contrast predicted lower levels of affect 
towards the opposing party group. The degree of strength of partisan identification may matter as 
well. Kim & Lu (2020)’s evidence of selective exposure is only present for strong identifiers, 
where weak identifiers and leaners showed little preference for pro-attitudinal sources over 
mainstream sources in mobile news consumption. 
Kim & Kim (2021) more directly consider SIT as a way to understand inconsistency in 
source-level selective exposure patterns among partisans. They find that even when general 
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media diets are relatively balanced, partisans vary their attentiveness and consumption in 
response to whether a news event is congenial to their party. This is not just an outlet-based 
phenomenon, then, but contingent on contexts that make identities salient (what they call 
temporal selective exposure). By applying SIT, Kim and Kim argue, “one overlooked way in 
which partisans might minimize cognitive dissonance: by choosing not to pay as much attention 
to politics when their party is losing…It is more plausible and much simpler for partisans to 
avoid cognitive dissonance by deciding when to consume news rather than by purposefully 
picking media sources that match their dispositions” (no page number, online only). Playing into 
the affective nature of social identity attachment, Song (2017) analyzes the 2012 American 
National Election Studies data and finds that fear, anger and enthusiasm all significantly 
increased pro-attitudinal news exposure and anger (alone) decreased counter-attitudinal news 
exposure. Finally, Peterson et al. (2021)’s show that politically congenial election-related 
coverage during the 2016 presidential election was strongly predicted by partisanship, but not 
driven by race, gender or education. Thus, it was the attachment to the political identity that truly 
drove the behavior.  
Existing work on selective exposure has significantly advanced, particularly within the 
context of political news consumption. It has not, however, completely resolved concerns over 
the diversity (or inconsistency) of effects. Ha et al. (2018), for example, find that 
conservatives/Republicans practiced more selective exposure behaviors while liberals/Democrats 
tended to have more balanced news diets (see also, Iyengar et al. 2008). Garrett & Stroud (2014) 
demonstrate that selective avoidance of counter-attitudinal information was only significant for 
Republicans. And Messing & Westwood (2014) show that information popularity (“likes”) can 
trump partisan media source cues. In all the work highlighted above, partisanship is 
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operationalized using the traditional categorical measure. Could partisanship measured as social 
identity attachment help better understand these differences?  
I believe so. While there are clearly variations in the conditions in which selective 
exposure behavior occurs and for whom (e.g., outlet vs. story, Republican vs. Democrat), 
strength of attachment to partisanship – as traditionally measured – or political issue appears to 
be the most consistent predictor of selective media consumption in the literature. Partisanship 
operationalized as strength of group identity attachment (PSIM) provides a richer (and arguably 
more accurate) measure of the nuances of partisan group identification directly rooted in SIT, 
thus potentially improving its potency and reliability in predicting selective exposure.  
Social Identity Theory suggests that people with strong social group identity attachment 
engage in information processing and behavior that aims at maintaining a positive perception of 
the group in contrast to the out-group. Using this framework, I expect partisans high in PSIM to 
be drawn to media messages that bolster positive feelings about the in-group, and conversely, 
information that reflects poorly on the out-group. I conduct a simple selective exposure 
experiment to test these assertions (explained in detail in the methodology) where respondents 
are asked to select between positive and negative news headlines about the two front-running 
presidential candidates in the 2020 election. I believe that: 
Hypothesis 2a: PSIM (and PID) will predict selection of positive news headlines about 
the in-party candidate.  
Hypothesis 2b: PSIM (and PID) will predict selection of negative news headlines about 
the out-party candidate.  




Motivated reasoning is a theory about the psychological process through which people 
reason or make sense of information. It is argued that people process information in different 
(often biased) ways depending on their motivation or goals. Kunda (1990) notes that “motivation 
may affect reasoning through reliance on a biased set of cognitive processes: strategies for 
assessing, constructing and evaluating beliefs” (480). She outlines two types of reasoning goals 
based on current evidence at the time and theories on cognitive dissonance: accuracy goals and 
directional goals.  
The motivation to arrive at an accurate conclusion when consuming information shapes 
the reasoning process whereby people “expend more cognitive effort on issue-related reasoning, 
attend to relevant information more carefully, and process it more deeply, often using more 
complex rules” (Kunda, 1990, 481). She argues that accuracy motivation leads to less 
stereotyping, less primacy effect, less anchoring and less attribution error. However, accuracy is 
most prevalent when primed to participants experimentally before an exposure – thus bringing 
into question whether the motivation to be accurate is a common or natural human process. 
 Directional motivation is argued to be more common in the sense that it is naturally 
prompted by information around us (rather needing to be primed by researchers). Directional 
motivation has a specific, desired outcome or intention. Kunda explains this process as: “people 
motivated to arrive at a particular conclusion attempt to be rational and to construct a 
justification of their desired conclusion that would persuade a dispassionate observer” (482-3). 
Thus, when exposed to information, people will be selective of what parts to consider, and their 
assessment of those parts will be determined by what best helps them reach the intended goal 
(Epley & Gilovich, 2016). This biased processing often occurs unconsciously and in fact, people 
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often perceive they are being accurate when directional is occurring – what scholars describe as 
“illusion of objectivity.”  
The discomfort brought about by cognitive dissonance is suggested to be a trigger of 
directional motivated reasoning (e.g., Festinger, 1957). Dissonance is a psychological reaction 
that can be activated by perceptions of contradiction or inconsistency within the self. A threat to 
positive feelings about the self is a potent way for dissonance to have a tangible effect on 
processing or attitudes (e.g., Stone & Cooper, 2001). Dissonance theorized in this way is an 
effort in self-preservation or “self-affirmation” (e.g., Steele & Liu, 1983). 
SIT is deeply connected to notions of cognitive dissonance (and motivated reasoning). 
Perception of threat to the group’s status, resources or reputation has the potential to reflect 
negatively on the individual strongly attached to that group, which subsequently creates 
discomfort. Cognitive dissonance likely shapes the individual’s reaction to the threat (e.g., 
Gawronski, 2012), motivating her or him to warp interpretations of the information or 
evaluations of its credibility (e.g., Kraft et al., 2015) towards positive self- and group-
preservation. Motivated reasoning of this kind involves biased processing from recall and 
construction of an individuals’ own traits, attitudes and behaviors to drumming up prior 
knowledge that constrains information processing and serves as an anchor for interpreting new 
information. An actual change in attitude as a result of dissonance, then, would only occur if 
there’s a desirable outcome to do so, that is in line with in-group cues (e.g., Bayes et al., 2020) or 
strong enough to counteract a self-preservation motivation (e.g., “affective tipping point,” 
Redlawsk et al., 2010). 
Furthermore, Kunda (1990) makes clear that “the evidence that counter attitudinal 
behaviors will create dissonance only [occurs] when they involve a threat to the self is 
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considerable and compelling” (484 – 485). Leeper & Slothuus (2014) also assert that particular 
individual predispositions influence behaviors or outcomes as a result of directional motivated 
reasoning if dissonance is provoked by a relevant context. Specifically, they argue that political 
partisan conflict is a necessary condition for dissonance and motivated reasoning to be predicted 
by partisanship, as “parties mobilize citizens and tell them how they should understand the 
political choices before them and, by implication, what political predispositions should be 
applied and how” (133).  
Motivated reasoning has often been studied and triggered experimentally by exposing 
participants to information that is contradictory to their currently held beliefs. However, much 
recent work uses political partisanship as the marker of pre-established attitude direction. Similar 
to research on HME and selective exposure, the traditional categorical measure of partisan 
identification is universally used as the operationalization of political social identity in this 
literature. Again, despite the limitations of the measure of partisanship, I believe there is ample 
indirect evidence to support the framing of information-induced motivated reasoning as a 
function of Social Identity Theory. 
Bolsen et al. (2014), for example, find that only under the condition where partisan 
identities are primed did participants engage in directional motivated processing of information. 
When subjects were asked to defend their party identity prior to exposure, they shifted their 
attitudes about the 2007 Energy Act toward the position endorsed by the party. The authors find 
no changes in attitudes when subjects were primed for accuracy motivations nor when 
endorsement of the act was described as supported across party lines. Finally, the data shows that 
partisans spent just as long processing partisan-endorsed information as the information 
presented in the other conditions, leading the authors to believe that partisanship cues are not 
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simply “shortcuts” in processing. When exposed to out-right misinformation, Peterson & Iyengar 
(2021) report “support [for] the motivated reasoning interpretation of misinformation; partisans 
seek out information with congenial slant and sincerely adopt inaccurate beliefs that cast their 
party in a favorable light” (133). There are many other examples of work that highlight the role 
of partisan identification in motivated reasoning across many topics, such information about 
climate change (e.g., Hart & Nisbet, 2012; Hameleers & van der Meer, 2020), economic trends 
(e.g., Bisgaard, 2019), conspiracy theories (e.g., Enders & Smallpage, 2019), and in response to 
presidential debates (e.g., Warner et al., 2020).  
That said, not all scholarship points to strength of partisan attachment as the singular 
driver of political motivated reasoning. Taber & Lodge (2006), for example, present compelling 
work about the role of “political sophistication” in motivated reasoning processes. They find that 
respondents who were more knowledgeable about politics (sophistication) and had strong prior 
attitudes about a given policy (gun control and affirmative action) were more likely to rate 
congruent arguments as stronger and incongruent arguments as weaker compared to those less 
sophisticated. Although strength of partisanship was not included in their models, it is likely 
related to Taber and Lodge’s conceptualization of political sophistication as we often find that 
partisanship is highly correlated with more interest in and knowledge about politics. In other 
words, identity may still be the central driver here, but sophistication is a useful tool in predicting 
motivated reasoning because sophisticates may be able to more effectively assess when the in-
group is being threatened by new information. 
Finally, further evidence of the connection between SIT and motivated reasoning can be 
found on a physiological level. Physiological research suggests that directional motivated 
reasoning is a product of affective information processing in political contexts (as one would 
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expect if group-identities were challenged, based on SIT). Westen et al. (2006) use neural 
imaging to study partisans during the 2004 U.S. presidential election and find that when 
participants were exposed to party-threatening information compared to exculpatory information 
about their party’s candidate, different parts of the brain were activated. The threatening 
information initially triggered negative affective processing. Interestingly, though, “when 
confronted with information about their candidate that would logically lead them to an 
emotionally adverse conclusion, partisans arrived at an alternative conclusion” (1955). They 
observe that participants made efforts to resolve the contradictory information, and that this 
secondary processing triggered positive affect in the brain. Not only did this demonstrate that 
threatening information elicited affective responses (in line with SIT), but it also shows that a 
process of “resolving” the negative feelings occurred and once that motivation was achieved, the 
brain, in a sense, rewarded the process with feelings of positivity. 
 The literature on directional motivated reasoning and partisanship is strongly suggestive 
of the importance of social identity attachment. However, most of the research in this field has 
focused on traditional measures of party identification (or other related measures such as 
sophistication). There are situations – such as a study targeting motivated reasoning in reactions 
to very specific policy issues – where these measures may be sufficient. In the context of 
political elections, however, when information is likely to provoke more of a threat to group 
identity status, power and reputation, I believe the measure of psychological attachment to 
political groups (PSIM) may better explain individual-level variation in directional motivated 
reasoning.   
 A common and relatively simple indicator of directional motivated reasoning in the 
literature is the perception of trustworthiness or assessment of credibility of counter-attitudinal 
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information. For example, Metzger et al. (2020) find that partisans judge attitude consistent and 
neutral information as more credible than attitude-challenging information (see also, Clayton et 
al., 2019). This pattern was replicated for credibility evaluations of sources as well (Robertson, 
2021). In this chapter, I test PSIM’s relationship to motivated reasoning compared to PID by 
exposing respondents to either a negative or neutral news story about the two front-running 
presidential candidates and asking them to evaluate the trustworthiness of the story. A motivated 
reasoning hypothesis predicts that in the face of information that reflects poorly on the in-group, 
the stronger the partisan attachment the more likely the respondent will distrust the information. 
Thus:  
Hypothesis 4: For respondents exposed to a negative story about their in-party candidate, 
PSIM (and PID) will predict less trust of the story.  
Hypothesis 5: PSIM will be a stronger predictor of motivated reasoning than PID.  
 
Methodology 
The analyses presented in this chapter will use data from both wave 1 (distributed August 
– September 2020) and wave 2 (distributed October – election day 2020) of the survey described 
in Chapter 3. Hostile media perceptions and selective exposure will focus on data from wave 1, 
while evaluations of story trust will use data collected post-exposure experiment from wave 2. 
The response rate for wave 2 was about 47%. The sample includes 524 Democrats and 515 
Republicans, and no Independents. Independents were not targeted for the second wave of the 
survey because there were so few to begin with, and because the experiment in the second wave 
was designed to elicit in-party versus out-party reaction (thus, having a party identity is a 
necessary prior). Overall, the distributions of demographics map well onto those from the first 
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wave. The returning respondents were roughly even in terms of gender for Democrats, with 
about 52% identifying as female, while Republicans identifying as female made up about 44% of 
the returning sample. The Democrat lean towards more female identifiers compared to 
Republicans is in line with the skew in wave 1. Distribution of political interest remained 
relatively the same with 80% of Democrats and 82% of Republicans reported as being 
somewhat, very or extremely interested in politics. The second wave similarly skews slightly 
educated with about 65% of the returning sample reporting some college education. In terms of 
race, the sample leans slightly more towards respondents who identify as white (e.g., 14% 
identified as Black in wave 1 and about 10% identify as Black in wave 2). Finally, age remained 
relatively normally distributed between the ages of 18 through 85 and older, with the largest 
group of respondents falling in the “45 – 55” category at 22% of the total sample. 
Independent Variables: PSIM and PID 
 As outlined in the previous chapter, PID is measured in wave 1 using the traditional 
categorical measure of partisanship where respondents are asked, “Generally speaking, do you 
usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?” followed by 
“Would you call yourself a strong [Democrat/Republican] or a not very strong 
[Democrat/Republican]?”. Independents were asked towards which party they lean and 
incorporated into a seven-point scale (strong/weak/lean/neither). For the purposes of comparing 
the PSIM measure to PID in identifying the impact of strength of political group attachment on 
media effects, PID was recoded to four categories where 0 represents Independents (thus, there 
are no respondents with 0 for PID in these analyses), 1 represents leaners, 2 represents weak 
identifiers and 3 represents strong identifiers (for both Democrats and Republicans combined). 
Figure 4-1 shows the distribution of this collapsed version of PID strength, with Democrats in 
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the left panel and Republicans in the right. The distribution of strength of PID leans significantly 
towards high identifiers for both Democrats and Republicans, similar to the wave 1 sample.  
The measure of partisan social identity attachment (PSIM) used in the following analyses 
is the battery of the top ten questions from the PSIM measure in Chapter 3 that most strongly 
load onto the first dimension. The index includes questions from the following theoretical 
constructs: importance/centrality (three questions), solidarity/connectedness (three questions), 
affect/attachment (one question), behavior (one question) and common fate (two questions). 
Recall that these top ten questions were correlated with all 37 questions used to measure PSIM at 
r = 0.949. The ten PSIM questions were measured using a five-point agree/disagree scale, with 
the scores originally added together resulting in a combined numeric scale where -20 is no 
psychological attachment to the group and 20 is extremely strong psychological attachment to 
the group. PSIM in this chapter was then re-scaled to match the same range of PID (0 – 3). Thus 
a 0 in PSIM indicates no psychological attachment to the group and 3 represents extremely 
strong psychological attachment, allowing for direct comparisons of the coefficients in the OLS 
models. Figure 4-2 shows the distribution of PSIM among second-wave respondents, with 







Figure 4-1: Distribution of re-coded PID in Wave 2 
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skewed towards strong attachment for both Democrats and Republicans, similar to the full wave 
1 sample, though with more variation in between.  
 
Dependent Variable: Hostile Media Effect, Wave 1  
 After answering the partisan social identity questions and general questions about media 
use, respondents in the first wave were asked to evaluate how biased they considered the media 
(in general) was against their political party’s candidate. Weeks et al. (2019) highlight that “there 
is little consistency in the literature on how to operationalize hostile media perceptions” (383). 
The authors present a novel measure designed to capture general feelings about the “lack of 
media neutrality and fairness” by mainstream outlets towards candidates during a presidential 
election. The context in which Weeks and authors deployed this measure (on a survey during the 
2016 U.S. presidential election) was identical to the context in which my survey was deployed, 
thus I adopt their method for measuring hostile media effect. The respondents were asked, “How 





Figure 4-2: Distribution of re-coded PSIM in Wave 2 
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[Democratic/Republican] candidates?” Partisans were asked only about their in-party, and the 
responses were along a five-point scale (0 = “not at all” to 4 = “extremely”).  
Dependent Variable: Selective Exposure Experiment, Wave 1 
 Wave 1 also included a selective exposure experiment. After being asked about hostile 
media perceptions, respondents were presented with four headlines and prompted to select one 
that they were most interested in reading about President Trump. Then asked to do the same with 
headlines about President Biden. The order of exposure to Biden versus Trump headlines was 
randomized across all respondents. Selection of headlines has proven to be a reliable measure of 
selective exposure behavior in recent political communication research (see e.g., Knobloch-
Westerwick et al., 2005; Kim et al., 2016; Powell et al., 2019; Kim & Lu, 2020). Bachleda et al. 
(2020) argue that a benefit of this approach lies in its (a) similarity to natural news consumption 
environments, particularly in online and mobile news and (b) because it is very easy to deploy in 
time and space-limited survey research.  
For the purposes of exploring the usefulness of an SIT-focused measure of partisanship, 
the experiment focused on respondents choosing between negative or positive headlines about 
the two candidates. Negative headlines about the respondents’ own party candidate present a 
potential threat to positive group identity perceptions while positive headlines, one would expect, 
could bolster those perceptions. Note that respondents were presented with four headlines in 
total, two positive and two negative. Including more than one positive and negative option 
attempted to account for any particular headline simply being more interesting (or uninteresting) 
than another. There was also careful consideration in making the Trump and Biden headlines as 
similar in topic as possible. The individual headline order was randomized. Table 4-1 lists the 
headline options along with the percent of respondents who selected those headlines. Note that 
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all headline selection proportions range from 32% at the highest to 19% at the lowest, indicating 
that no one single headline, nor one sentiment category, captured more than a third of 
respondents’ attention. Given this relatively even distribution, selective exposure was converted 
to a binary “selected positive Trump/Biden headline” variable where 1 indicates a positive 
headline was selected and 0 indicates a negative headline was selected. 
Table 4-1: Selective Exposure Headline Stimulus and Distributions 
Candidate Headline 
Sentiment 
Headline Topic Selection 
Rate 
Trump Negative Donald Trump Could be in Trouble with Youngest 
Generation of GOP 
Trouble in polls 32% 
Trump Negative Trump retweets quote from fascist dictator 
Mussolini in latest Twitter blunder 
Public blunder 19% 
Trump Positive Trump, in Mount Rushmore address, calls on 
Americans to Rise Up 
Inspiration 21% 
Trump Positive Trump Executive Order Improves Child Welfare 
System 
Positive policy 28% 
Biden Negative Biden Struggling in Polls with Young Black Voters Trouble in polls 27% 
Biden Negative Biden says ‘poor kids’ just as bright as ‘white kids’ 
in latest gaffe 
Public blunder 23% 
Biden Positive Biden to 2020 Graduates: Build America Better 
Tomorrow than it is Today 
Inspiration 29% 
Biden Positive How Biden's Informal Diplomacy Improves U.S. 
Foreign Relations 
Positive policy 21% 
 
 
Experimental Treatment: Negative Media Content Exposure, Wave 2 
 The second wave of the survey included an experiment designed to test partisan reactions 
to negative versus neutral media coverage of their in-party presidential candidate. This 
experiment was used as the manipulation for the test of motivated reasoning. The subjects were 
first randomly assigned to one of two negative stories or a neutral story about the in-party 
presidential candidate. Immediately following the exposure, respondents were asked to rate how 
they feel about the in-party candidate using the 0 – 100 scale feeling thermometer, to evaluate 
their trust of the information they just read and to report if this information was new to them or if 
they had read about it before. Next, respondents were randomly assigned to one of two negative 
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stories or a neutral story about the out-party candidate, immediately followed by the same three 
questions. 
 Note that the objective of this project is to test how partisan identity attachment affects 
responses to potential group threat. Thus, the stimulus only focuses on threat-provoking negative 
media coverage of the candidates compared to neutral coverage, with no “positive coverage” 
stimulus. Based on the theory and evidence I have reviewed, I believe that positive coverage of 
the in-party candidate would likely result in maintenance of current (already high) positive 
attitudes towards the in-party candidates (as was suggested in the results in Chapter 2, as well). 
While there could be interesting results to explore if partisans were exposed to positive stories 
about out-party candidates, I opted to leave this for future research given the space limitations of 
the survey and concern about breaking up an already small returning sample into additional 
conditions.  
 What constitutes a “negative” news story about a presidential candidate is open for 
debate and interpretation. In Chapter 2, for example, I used a relatively conservative and general 
bag-of-words count of negative tone in media coverage as my measure of “negative press” 
(Lexicoder Sentiment Dictionary created by Young & Soroka, 2012). This decision was 
motivated by needing a reliable tool that could be deployed on a large body of text spanning 
multiple decades. In this experiment, “negativity” in the news stories is defined as a potential 
group threat, as laid out in Social Identity Theory. Decisions about the stimulus were equally 
motivated by an interest in keeping the stimulus as simple, straightforward and realistic as 
possible. Thus, there is no policy mentioned in any of the stories (as not to conflict with strength 
of attitude about an issue/counter-attitudinal perceptions) nor is horse-race coverage nor polling 
(as not to conflict with potential particularities in attitudes about these types of stories). Because 
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the survey was conducted during the actual presidential election, I also selected stories that were 
true in an effort increase the believability of the content and to avoid spreading potential 
misinformation about real candidates. Two negative stories (compared to one neutral) were 
selected for each candidate to control, again, for any one particular story being especially 
interesting (or uninteresting) to respondents. 
 The literature reviewed on SIT and media effects above underscores the importance of 
the information eliciting a potentially negative or damaging perception of the in-group. It is in 
the face of information that could hurt the positive reputation or perception of the in-group that 
people with strong group attachment become uncomfortable and shift into self/group-
preservation processing. I selected four stories in which the presidential candidates made a public 
blunder that I believe had the potential to reflect poorly on their reputations (and that of the 
parties). All four stories report on what President Trump and then candidate Biden said 
themselves, rather than an external analysis of their policies or behaviors by a reporter, for 
example. By keeping all of them the same exact type (public blunder), I aimed for more control 
and consistency in the stimulus. Similarly, the neutral stories are as unemotional as possible, 
simply reporting on each candidate making a campaign visit with his family. Full stories used in 
the experimental stimulus are listed in Appendix C (Figures C1 – C3), below is a brief summary: 
Trump negative story 1: Trump quotes fascist dictator, Mussolini, on Twitter 
Trump negative story 2: Trump confuses 9/11 with 7 Eleven during campaign speech 
Trump neutral story: Trump heads to Michigan on the campaign trail  
Biden negative story 1: Biden says racial blunder during campaign speech in Iowa  
Biden negative story 2: Biden mistakes running for Senate instead of President  
Biden neutral story: Biden heads to Pennsylvania and Ohio on the campaign trail 
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Dependent Variable: In-party Story Trust (Motivated Reasoning), Wave 2  
 As mentioned above, respondents in wave 2 are first exposed to a negative or neutral 
story about their in-party candidate are tasked immediately following to rate how much they 
trusted the story they read. The question asked: “To what extent do you trust the news story you 
read above about [former Vice President Joe Biden/President Donald Trump]?” The responses 
are categorized as a five-point trust/distrust scale (strongly/somewhat/neither). The results for 
Democrats evaluating a story about Biden and Republicans evaluating a story about Trump were 
then collapsed into one variable: in-party trust. The five-point scale was made numeric where -2 
represents strongly distrust, 0 represents neither trust nor distrust and 2 represents strongly trust. 
In-party trust captures all respondents’ trust evaluations of the in-party story exposure and is 
used as the dependent variable representing motivated reasoning in the analyses. 
Control Variables 
 The models discussed below report OLS regression results without control variables. 
Each model, however, has been tested with a full battery of demographic and political- or media-
related control variables. As will be discussed below, introducing controls into the models do not 
change the significance, signs nor size of coefficients – thus the models are listed in Appendix C 
(Tables C1, and C5 – C7). The demographic variables used as controls were measured in the first 
wave and include gender identification as a binary (female/not female), some college attendance 
as binary (university/no university), age as a numeric conversion (0 – 8) of the nine age 
categories starting with under 18 to 85 and older at increments of about 10 years, and race as a 
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binary of identifying as Black or African America/not Black3. Political interest was also included 
as a control, which was measured as a numeric five-point scale ranging from 0 representing “not 
at all interested” to 4 representing “extremely interested.” The final control included in the 
models was general weekly news consumption. Respondents were asked, “Thinking about a 
typical week, about how many days of a week do you watch or read the news? This can be in 
newspapers, on television, on the radio, online, on social media, etc.” and prompted to select 
from 0 to 7. Next, if the respondents selected any number above 0, they were asked, “On days 
that you watch or read the news, about how much time do you spend doing this?” and prompted 
to select from four categories: “Less than 30 minutes,” “1 hour or less,” “1 – 2 hours,” or “3 
hours or more.” Finally, these two questions were combined into one media use measure where 
the days (0 – 7) were multiplied by the hours (0.5 – 3) to create one numeric scale with 0 being 
absolutely no news consumption to 21 representing three hours or more, seven days a week.  
 
Results 
Hostile Media Effect  
The first analysis will compare the effects of PSIM and PID on HME. Table 4-2 shows 
results from three OLS regression models, first regressing HME on PID alone, then PSIM alone, 
and finally PID and PSIM together. Results support hypothesis 1. The PSIM measure is indeed a 
stronger predictor of HME than is PID. On its own, PID significantly predicts hostile media 
 
 
3 I ran multiple variations of these models adjusting for different measures of race. From including all eight race 
categories to White/Black/Hispanic/Other. None of the adjustments affected the results. This, combined with the fact 
that this project does not focus on comparisons between PSIM and racial identity, the binary iteration was included 
in the final Appendix models for simplicity. Exploring the potential connections between PSIM and race would be 
an interesting pursuit in future work.  
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effects, accounting for about 2% of the variance. PSIM similarly predicts hostile media effects, 
although the PSIM coefficient is nearly double the magnitude of the PID coefficient. (Recall that 
they are scaled similarly, and although PSIM is a much more nuanced interval-level measure, the 
standard deviations are very similar: 0.65 for PID and 0.64 for PSIM.) PSIM also explains a far 
greater proportion of the variance than does PID.  
When both PID and PSIM are included in the same model, PID is entirely insignificant. 
PSIM remains highly significant, however. As PSIM increases, so does HME. This could be, in 
part, due to the fact that 10-item PSIM naturally has less random measurement error than a one-
item measure. That said, this model, again, accounts for about 10% of the variance HME, and all 
of that variance is explained by PSIM alone. These results hold in the context of several 
robustness checks: Appendix Table C1 replicates the results controlling for political interest, 
gender, education, race, age and weekly media consumption; Appendix Table C2 reveals similar 
predictive power of PSIM over PID when looking at Democrats and Republicans separately. 
Table 4-2: Hostile Media Effect, All Respondents, Wave 1 
 Dependent variable: 
 HME 
 (1) (2) (3) 
PID 0.304***  -0.041 
 (0.046)  (0.050) 
PSIM  0.599*** 0.616*** 
  (0.038) (0.044) 
Constant 1.733*** 1.316*** 1.388*** 
 (0.123) (0.082) (0.121) 
Observations 2,321 2,321 2,321 
R2 0.019 0.095 0.095 




There is, in sum, ample evidence in Table 4-2 that a measure of partisanship that is more 
closely aligned with partisan identity attachment offers better explanatory power for the hostile 
media effect than does the standard measure of PID. 
Selective Exposure 
Hypotheses 2a and 2b suggest that if SIT dynamics are at play, PSIM (and PID) will 
predict selection of more positive headlines about the in-group candidate and selection of more 
negative headlines about the outgroup. Selective exposure in these models is captured using a 
binary variable where 0 represents selecting a negative headline and 1 represents selecting a 
positive headline. Thus, positive coefficients thus represent increased selection of positive 
headlines.  
As an initial manipulation check, I find that 74% of strong Republicans selected a 
positive Trump headline, followed by 60% of moderate Republicans. Conversely, 74% of strong 
Democrats selected a negative Trump headline, followed by 62% of moderate Democrats. An 
identical pattern exists in the selection of Biden headlines, where 70% of strong Democrats 
selected positive, followed by 63% of moderate Democrats, and 72% of strong Republicans 
selected negative Biden headlines, followed by 64% of moderate Republicans. It is clear that 
partisans are more interested in reading positive stories about the in-group candidate and 
negative stories about the out-group candidate.  
More detailed tests of hypotheses 2a and 2b are offered in Tables 4-3 and 4-4. Table 4-3 
shows six models – three for Republican respondents and three for Democrat respondents – 
where PSIM and PID are used to predict selection of positive headlines about President Trump 
and President Biden. The first and third models look at the predictive power of PID alone; the 
second and fourth models test the predictive power of PSIM alone; and the third and sixth 
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models include PID and PSIM together. I use basic OLS regression for these models to enable 
meaningful interpretation of the R-squared coefficients. I ran the models in Tables 4-3 and 4-4 
using binomial logit regression as well, however, and the results are nearly identical to OLS (see 
Appendix Tables C3 and C4). The measures of model fit using logit regression (AIC) also mirror 
those revealed by the R-squared measures.  
Tables 4-3 and 4-4 provide evidence to support hypotheses 2a and 2b. The coefficients 
for PSIM and PID in predicting in-party headlines are all positive (2a), and the coefficients 
predicting out-party headline selection are all negative (2b). Furthermore, hypothesis 3 posits 
that PSIM will be a stronger predictor of selective exposure behavior than PID. This hypothesis 
is partially supported. Starting with in-party headline selection, for both Democrats and 
Republicans, PSIM and PID are highly significant in predicting positive headline selection – 
statistically speaking they are no different in magnitude of the effect – but PSIM accounts for 
about twice as much variance explained (although the R-squared sizes are rather small, where 
PID accounts for about 1% (R) or 0.5% (D) of variance and PSIM accounts for just over 2% of 
the variance). For Republicans, the sizes of the coefficients are also about the same, but for 
Democrats the coefficient for PSIM is slightly larger. When PID and PSIM are included together 
in the model, PID loses significance compared to PSIM which remains highly significant for 
Democrats. For Republicans, both PID and PSIM remain significant in the model, though PSIM 












Table 4-3: Selective Exposure of Trump Headlines by Party, Wave 1 
 Dependent variable: 
  Selecting Positive Trump Headline  
 Republicans Democrats 
PID 0.112***  0.064** -0.090***  -0.036 
 (0.024)  (0.028) (0.024)  (0.027) 
PSIM  0.110*** 0.082***  -0.118*** -0.103*** 
  (0.021) (0.024)  (0.021) (0.024) 
Constant 0.395*** 0.464*** 0.355*** 0.534*** 0.535*** 0.598*** 
 (0.064) (0.044) (0.065) (0.064) (0.044) (0.065) 
Observations 1,131 1,131 1,131 1,190 1,190 1,190 
R2 0.019 0.024 0.029 0.012 0.026 0.027 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Table 4-4: Selective Exposure of Biden Headlines by Party, Wave 1 
 Dependent variable: 
 Selecting Positive Biden Headline 
 Republicans Democrats 
PID -0.089***  -0.060** 0.058**  0.020 
 (0.024)  (0.028) (0.024)  (0.028) 
PSIM  -0.075*** -0.049**  0.081*** 0.073*** 
  (0.021) (0.024)  (0.022) (0.025) 
Constant 0.547*** 0.468*** 0.571*** 0.520*** 0.509*** 0.474*** 
 (0.065) (0.045) (0.066) (0.066) (0.046) (0.067) 
Observations 1,131 1,131 1,131 1,190 1,190 1,190 
R2 0.012 0.011 0.015 0.005 0.012 0.012 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
The results for selective exposure behavior when in exposed to out-party headlines is a 
bit more complex. The findings described above are replicated for Democrats. Both PSIM and 
PID are highly significant at predicting less positive headline selection in the Trump condition, 
though PSIM has a larger coefficient and accounts for about twice as much variance (again, 
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small overall, though: 1.2% compared to 2.6%). When put together, PID loses significance and 
PSIM remains highly significant. For Republicans selecting out-party headlines, PID and PSIM 
are both highly significant on their own, however, with PID’s coefficient slightly larger. I find 
the same result when they are modeled together – both remain highly significant with a slightly 
larger coefficient for PID. Although the results would be clearer in supporting hypothesis 3 if 
PID were to lose significance in both the combined model for Republicans, the fact that PSIM 
and PID remain significant still indicates they capture variance relatively independent of one 
another. Note, the results of the combined models hold up relatively well even when including 
the full battery of controls (see Appendix C, Tables C5 and C6). 
In-Party Trust of Negative vs. Neutral Story Exposure (Motivated Reasoning) 
 The next analyses will focus on the data collected in the second wave resulting from the 
experimental exposure to a negative or neutral news story about the front-running presidential 
candidates. After the exposure, respondents were asked to evaluate how much they trusted the 
story they had just read. Hypothesis 4 suggests that PSIM and PID will predict less trust of 
negative stories about the in-party candidate; and hypothesis 5 predicts that PSIM will explain 
more variation in trust than PID.  
Table 4-5 presents three models. First, in-party story trust is regressed on the exposure 
condition (binary negative exposure/neutral exposure), PID and the interaction of exposure and 
PID using basic OLS regression. The second model tests the same using PSIM instead of PID. 
The final model, in order to test the power of PSIM compared to PID includes both the 
interaction of PSIM and PID with exposure condition. 
It appears that the direct effect of the negative exposure condition on trust is not 
significant, all the work is being done by a combination of the partisanship variables and/or the 
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interaction effect. Both PID and PSIM are significant in predicting increased trust of the story 
about the in-party candidate (in the neutral story condition). As hypothesized, however, the 
interaction between the experimental condition and PSIM suggests lower levels of reported trust 
of negative stories amongst respondents who are high in PSIM compared to the neutral story 
condition. To be clear, high identifiers who were exposed to a negative (compared to a neutral) 
story about their own candidate rated that story as less trustworthy than the neutral story. 
The interaction is illustrated in Figure 4-3. The grey line represents those who were 
exposed to a neutral story about the in-party candidate, while the red line are the respondents 
exposed to a negative one. At very low levels of PSIM, the evaluation of trust in the story is 
about the same between the two conditions (slightly distrusting).  
Table 4-5: Trust of In-Party Story, Interaction of Exposure Condition and PSIM/PID 
 Dependent variable: 
 In-party Story Trust 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Negative exposure 0.217 0.196 0.369 
 (0.389) (0.268) (0.391) 
PID 0.418***  0.041 
 (0.119)  (0.138) 
Neg exp.*PID -0.346**  -0.100 
 (0.147)  (0.168) 
PSIM  0.660*** 0.641*** 
  (0.105) (0.124) 
Neg exp.*PSIM  -0.443*** -0.398*** 
  (0.129) (0.150) 
Constant -0.296 -0.522** -0.589* 
 (0.314) (0.218) (0.315) 
Observations 1,039 1,039 1,039 
R2 0.068 0.098 0.099 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Yet for the strongest identifiers (at high levels of PSIM), the grey and red lines diverge 
significantly. High identifiers trust a neutral story much more than they trust a negative story. 
This result is in line with Hypothesis 4. Overall, respondents’ trust of the negative story remains 
roughly the same across varying levels of PSIM. Yet, for stronger identifiers, there is a 
difference between trust of the neutral story compared to the negative story condition, where 
high identifiers are much less rusting of the negative story. There’s some indication of motivated 
processing here. Furthermore, the coefficient for PSIM is slightly larger than PID and accounts 
for about 3% more variance (see Table 4-5). And when the interactions are run in the same 
model, the direct and moderating effects of PID are insignificant while the direct and moderating 
effects of PSIM remain highly significant. Thus, hypothesis 5 – projecting that PSIM is a 
stronger predictor of motivated reasoning – is also supported. The results remain even when 
including the full battery of controls (See Appendix Table C7).  
 
Figure 4-3: Trust of In-party Story by Exposure Condition, PSIM 
 130 
Discussion 
Research on the hostile media effect, selective exposure and motivated reasoning has 
come to dominate the political media effects field. They are consistently predicted by (and/or 
moderated by) the traditional measure of partisanship and have important implications for 
political attitudes and behaviors. My selection of these three established topics in political 
communication was further motivated by the clear theoretical connections to Social Identity 
Theory. I believe previous scholarship has made a strong case for group-identity attachment 
playing a major role in the biased processing that underpins these behaviors, attitudes and 
reactions to information. Yet, I believe previous work only provided partial or indirect evidence 
to support those claims. Specifically, I argue that the traditional measure of partisanship used 
almost universally in this literature, PID, did not accurately capture the affective nature nor 
nuance of psychological attachment to political groups.  
 Thus, I hypothesized that in HME, selective exposure and motivated reasoning, the new 
measure proposed in Chapter 3 (PSIM) would better predict effects than PID, and that the 
direction of those effects would be in line with expectations of group-identity biased processing. 
I find full support for this hypothesis in HME, compelling support for this hypothesis in selective 
exposure behavior, and an initial indication that PSIM matters in predicting motivated reasoning. 
Thus, showcased with a few straightforward analyses on topics highly relevant to political media 
effects, I find that partisanship operationalized as social identity attachment is an improved 
measure over PID.  
 A clear limitation of the data comes from focusing solely on Republicans and Democrats 
in Chapters 3 and 4. This choice facilitated a narrowly focused comparison between PID and 
PSIM in group threat contexts. Additional testing of the PSIM measure should nevertheless 
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incorporate a fully representative sample (as in accounting for the more than 40% of Americans 
who report being Independent). As I mentioned in previous Chapters, this kind of investigation 
may highlight even further the usefulness of the measure by revealing more meaningful 
information about what it means to be Independent but lean towards one party or the other. Is it 
simply a variation along the continuum of psychological attachment to groups? Or is it a distinct 
political perspective, whereby there is no attachment to a group (or rejection of the groups), but 
instead a straightforward preference for certain policies? 
Further, the limited results of the motivated reasoning analysis (namely that there wasn’t 
a difference between low and high identifiers within the negative story condition) could be 
influenced by the nature of the experimental stimulus. The fact that these stories were real, and 
that the sample was targeted at established partisans who were likely interested in and following 
the campaign, it’s possible that they had already been exposed to the stories and pre-established 
an opinion of whether they found the story credible or not. This could be accounted for in future 
experimental work.  
And finally, None of the models in this project investigate the psychological mechanisms 
through which attachment to political groups has an impact on media effects outcomes. My 
theoretical argument rests on the idea that political elections are a context of group-identity threat 
opportunity, with political media as the potential vehicle of threat triggers. But I do not report 
whether threat, discomfort (i.e., cognitive dissonance), or affect are provoked during the process. 
This limitation was, in part, because I chose to highlight the PSIM/PID comparison. I believe it 
to be an essential precursor to investigation into the mechanisms. (Afterall, if PSIM proved to be 
a poor predictor of media effects compared to PID, testing its underlying mechanisms may be 
unnecessary.) That said, I believe the results of this chapter provide strong evidence to support 
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the exploration of the psychological mechanisms connected to partisan social identity attachment 
(and triggered by media) in future work, particularly using lab experiments.  
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Chapter 5 Conclusion 
 
A growing body of work in political science argues for the operationalization of political 
partisanship in the U.S. as a group-identity attachment (at least for some partisans), connecting to 
the expansive literature on Social Identity Theory (SIT) in psychology. Political communication 
research has demonstrated the importance of partisanship in predicting and moderating media 
effects as well, with many scholars leveraging SIT as a framework for understanding the 
underlying mechanisms of that relationship. The goal of this project was to bridge the study of 
group identity and partisanship from psychology and political science to communication studies 
more directly. I argued that if attachment to political parties is truly a psychological and affective 
condition: first, it should be measured as such; second, political elections would be a likely 
context for political groups to be threatened; third, it is likely that media is a vehicle for 
delivering group-threatening messages; and finally, thus partisanship, conceptualized in line with 
SIT, could help political communication researchers better understand heterogeneous media 
effects in politics.  
 In Chapter 2, I use survey data collected in real time during the past five U.S. presidential 
elections (2000 – 2016) alongside measures of daily fluctuations in media tone to explore the 
impact of media sentiment on feelings towards the presidential candidates. The chapter was 
designed to showcase how partisanship clearly moderates these effects. Using a traditional 
measure of partisanship, I find that positive feelings about the in-party candidate increased as 
negative coverage increased (for both Democrats and Republicans). Attitudes about the out-party 
candidates, in contrast, follow the tone of coverage. Furthermore, the in-party results of this 
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analysis were amplified for the strongest partisans. Although the measure of partisanship in this 
analysis was not conceptualized in line with my theoretical argument, I present it as both a 
demonstration of the concurrent validity of the general idea, and evidence that this dynamic 
occurs among real voters, during real presidential elections (not just experimentally provoked).  
 Chapter 3 addresses the measurement of partisanship as a social identity attachment. I 
review an overwhelming amount of literature in psychology that has explored the 
operationalization of group identities, finding more than 20 unique measures that cover about 13 
different theories about the dimensions underlying this attachment. This includes a small group 
of scholars who have applied SIT to the measure of partisanship directly. There appears to be no 
clear theoretical grounding for which of the many measures would be best suited for 
partisanship. Thus, I test 37 different questions drawing from this work using principal 
components analysis and find that nearly all fall onto one dimension, and that the top ten 
questions (even the top four) are highly correlated with the entire 37-item battery. Most 
importantly, I find that the top-ten measure of partisan social identity is only mildly correlated 
with the traditional measure of partisanship, indicating that they are, in fact, measuring distinct 
concepts. I present this novel measure of SIT-focused partisanship and hypothesize that it will 
out-perform the common existing measure in explaining political media effects.  
 Such is the focus of Chapter 4. Using a two-wave survey fielded during the 2020 
presidential election, I test the power of the new measure against the previous measure on three 
prominent areas of study in political communication: hostile media effect, selective exposure and 
motivated reasoning. Compared to the analysis in Chapter 2 which looks at aggregate trends, 
these results focus on individual reactions to experimental exposure to news about the candidates 
(but still during a real election context). Across the analyses, the SIT-focused measure is often an 
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improvement over the existing measure in predicting heterogeneous media effects. As outlined in 
the discussion section of this chapter, the results provide further evidence to support my 
argument and sufficient proof of concept to warrant continued and more rigorous testing. Below, 
I will highlight one final analysis as an example of how the new measure could be used to better 
understand the effect of media on political attitudes.  
 
The Moderating Role of PSIM in Media’s Effect on Attitudes 
The following analysis of media effects aims to revisit the models tested in Chapter 2 – 
where the impact of media coverage of in-party presidential candidates on attitudes was 
moderated by PID – using PSIM as well. The literature reviewed in that chapter presents 
evidence to suggest that media may actually affect partisans’ attitudes, not just the processes 
through which they consume or rationalize information. A key thread throughout this project is 
the idea that media coverage of political elections in the U.S. is a trigger of social identity for 
partisans, particularly since the U.S. news industry tends to be rewarded for more competitive-
focused, gamified, or “horse race” coverage between the political groups (see e.g., Searles & 
Banda, 2019). Thus, positive coverage of one’s party or party leadership/candidate should bolster 
positive feelings about the group while negative coverage should be threat provoking and bring 
about biased information processing.  
In terms of the effect on attitudes, many argue that partisan attitude thresholds are already 
too high or too low for media to fundamentally shift those attitudes. Although the effects 
reported in Chapter 2 were indeed relatively small, they still persist above and beyond a wealth 
of controls and the negative direction of the coefficient for in-party attitudes indicated some form 
of biased processing. The fact that variation in strength of PID also proves to be significant 
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motivates my prediction that PSIM will be a useful and potentially more potent tool to replicate 
these findings. I thus predict that the impact of exposure to negative information about the in-
party presidential candidate on feelings of warmth towards the in-party candidate will be 
moderated by PSIM and PID. But PSIM will be a stronger moderator of changes in attitudes 
post-exposure than PID. 
 In both the first and second waves of the survey (used in Chapters 3 and 4), respondents 
were asked to rate their favorability of the two 2020 presidential candidates using the 0 – 100 
numeric feeling thermometer scale. This measure is commonly used to measure attitudes by 
long-standing national political surveys such as the American National Election Studies. Beyond 
the measure’s established used in the field, I selected it to also enable easier comparisons of the 
results between this survey and the ANES data analyzed in Chapter 2. Respondents were asked: 
“Please rate how you feel about President Donald Trump using the feeling thermometer below. 
You can choose any number between 0 and 100. The higher the number, the warmer or more 
favorable you feel toward that person, the lower the number, the colder or less favorable. You 
would rate this person at the 50-degree mark if you feel neither warm nor cold toward them.” 
They were subsequently tasked with moving a cursor along a sliding 0 – 100 scale. In wave 1, 
this question is asked near the end of the survey, after the partisan social identity battery, media 
use, hostile media perception and selective exposure experiment. In wave 2, the feeling 
thermometer is tested immediately after the exposure to the negative or neutral story about the 
candidates (prior to perceptions of trust in the story).  
In the analysis that follows, the feeling thermometer scores from wave 2 are used as a 
dependent variable, predicted by the negative story exposure condition, PID and PSIM. The 
feeling thermometer scores from wave 1 are used as a control in the models, as is a binary 
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variable Republican/Democrat to control for baseline differences in in-party candidate support 
between parties. Similar to evaluations of trust of the in-party story exposure from Chapter 3, 
feeling thermometer scores from both waves were collapsed into one measure each: In-party 
feeling thermometer. Thus, this variable only captures Democrats attitudes towards Biden and 
Republicans attitudes towards Trump.  
Table 5-1 includes three OLS regression models. The first tests the direct effects of PID 
and PSIM without any interactions, followed by a model including interactions between the 
treatment and PID or PSIM. It is, first, evident that the negative exposure condition worked. 
Across almost all of the models, exposure to a negative story about the in-party candidate 
compared to a neutral story on its own predicted significantly less feelings of warmth towards 
that candidate (where PID and PSIM are zero, meaning this effect is for leaners in the second and 
third models that include interactions). In line with my expectations, PSIM is also a stronger 
predictor of changes in attitudes than PID post-exposure. In the first model, PSIM is highly 
significant at predicting greater feelings of warmth towards in-party candidates while PID is not.  
In models 2 and 3 in Table 5-1, the coefficient on the interaction of the negative story 
condition with PSIM (and PID) was not significant.4 It is worth noting that although the 
interaction fails to achieve significance, the coefficients are all in the expected direction, 
however. The absence of statistical significance is likely due to multicollinearity. Variance 
Inflation Factors indicate that the standard error for the interaction of PSIM and the exposure 
condition is more than three times what it might be in the (hypothetical) absence of collinearity 
between the variables: the VIF for the interaction coefficient is 12.6 (the square root of which is 
 
 
4 The results in Table 5-1 hold when controlling for demographics, weekly media consumption and political interest. 
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3.5, indicating the standard error is more than three-times greater what it might be in the absence 
of multicollinearity).    
There thus is reason to consider the interactive effects in Table 5-1, albeit cautiously. 
Looking at the third model (PSIM interaction), the coefficient for the impact of the negative 
treatment represents its effect when PSIM is equal to 0. This large negative coefficient is in line 
with what one would expect at low to no partisan identity attachment – the negative story 
significantly decreased feelings of warmth about the in-party candidate. PSIM on its own 
remains significant and positive in this model, as described above. And even as it does not reach 
traditional levels of statistical significance, the coefficient for the interaction of PSIM and story 
condition is positive, as expected. This indicates that as strength of identity attachment increases, 














Table 5-1: Impact of Exposure on In-party Attitudes, Moderated by PSIM and PID 
 Dependent variable: 
 In-party Feeling Therm. (wave2) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
In-party feeling therm. (wave 1) 0.632*** 0.685*** 0.638*** 
 (0.024) (0.021) (0.024) 
Negative exposure -4.252*** -10.849** -8.617** 
 (1.149) (5.337) (3.709) 
PID 1.352 1.459  
 (1.103) (1.686)  
PSIM 5.015***  3.982** 
 (1.093)  (1.583) 
Republican -3.361*** -3.306*** -3.499*** 
 (1.084) (1.094) (1.084) 
Negative Exp.*PID  2.568  
  (2.012)  
Negative Exp.*PSIM   2.224 
   (1.781) 
Constant 19.925*** 25.528*** 25.082*** 
 (2.762) (4.396) (3.139) 
Observations 1,039 1,039 1,039 
R2 0.573 0.565 0.573 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
 
Visualizing the effects is useful here. Figure 5-1 shows the impact of the negative (in red) 
compared to neutral (in grey) exposure on thermometer scores as PSIM increases. The negative 
treatment does lead to lower thermometer scores, ceteris paribus. But the difference in the 
negative versus neutral treatment slightly varies with PSIM. At low levels of PSIM, the negative 
treatment produces a sizeable downward shift in scores. At high levels of PSIM, the negative 
treatment appears to have almost no effect (compared to neutral). This suggests that identifiers 
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are not necessarily becoming more positive in response to the negative story as much as they 
appear to be nearly immune to the negative treatment.  
 
 
These are only moderate effects, of course. And in terms of the impact of PSIM 
compared to PID, PID appears to moderate the effects of the experiments as effectively and in 
the same direction as PSIM. This is not surprising given that the findings of Chapter 2 were 
based on an interaction between media tone and PID. Even so, these results suggest the relative 
advantage of PSIM, particularly given that direct effects of PID are not significant. PSIM helps 
explains second-wave thermometer scores and moderates the impact of the experiment 
treatment; PID only does the latter.  Even so, the relative advantages of PSIM are more evident 
in Chapter 4 results.    
 There are several reasons why the estimated moderating effect of PSIM may be muted in 
this analysis. First, using a partisan targeted sample may have limited the results. As in, the 
Figure 5-1: PSIM as a Moderator of the Experimental Treatment Effect on Attitudes 
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respondents in wave 2 were already so deeply partisan and held such strong prior attitudes that 
there wasn’t enough variation in the strength of attachment to see a significant moderating effect 
in the impact of the experiment. (The alternative was a relative lack of strong partisans, however, 
which would pose different difficulties.) Second, although the experiment on its own was 
successful at shifting attitudes about the candidates, one single exposure to one negative story 
may not be sufficient to demonstrate the moderating impact of PSIM on changes in attitudes. 
While there was clearly an attitude shift as a result of negative story exposure, increased quantity 
of exposure or repeated exposure may be necessary to highlight this relationship statistically. 
Imagine if exposure of this kind was multiplied everyday over the course of a campaign, these 
results might keep inching in the direction of what I find in Chapter 2, and what Redlawsk et al. 
(2010) find with fake political stories and candidates in an experiment.  
 I nevertheless regard these results as a valuable illustration of the dynamic that my 
research set out to explain. The analysis demonstrates, using a survey-based experimental study 
conducted during a real presidential election cycle, that those who identify more strongly with 
political parties respond differently to media content. Furthermore, it provides an additional 




Overall, the results of the analyses in Chapters 2, 4 and above tell us that partisan group 
identity attachment matters in predicting and moderating the impact of media on voters during 
political elections in the U.S. Granted, there may be some instances where the traditional 
measure of partisanship is just as useful of a moderator – particularly if there is no theoretical 
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expectation of provoked group identity salience or threat. Yet in the case of multiple 
predominant media effects outcomes – hostile media effect, selective exposure and motivated 
reasoning – the new SIT-focused measure of partisan attachment is clearly more powerful. I do 
not suggest abandoning PID altogether. My hope was to highlight research contexts in which the 
PSIM measure is more effective or appropriate given the theoretical assumptions. Furthermore, 
the results presented in this project taken together suggest PSIM-based heterogeneity in the 
impact of media coverage on voter attitudes; demonstrating its usefulness and relevance to the 
pressing questions faced by political communication scholars today.  
From the perspective of communication scholarship, it is clear that motivated processing 
of information is highly connected to identity attachment to the political parties. I focus my 
hypotheses and analyses on directional motivations in which that direction is dictated by group 
identity. From a theoretical standpoint, and as supported by previous research and the data 
presented here, I believe that directional motivation is the natural response to information in 
political election contexts given that it is an environment defined by competition between 
groups. Accuracy motivations have been relatively understudied, and the work that does exist 
indicates it can be useful in overcoming biases when prompted by the experimenter. Future work 
can, and should, dive deeper into the differences in outcomes as affected by these two 
motivations. For while directional appears to be a natural state for partisans during elections, it’s 
possible to find ways in which accuracy motivations could be called on or inspired in voters. 
 Recall that the motivation for this research was a concern that patterns of heterogenous 
reactions to negative or critical coverage of those in power may threaten the essential role of the 
fourth estate in our democracy. The results above suggest strong partisan identifiers are (at a 
minimum) inoculated from negative coverage of their in-party candidate. And evidence in 
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Chapter 2 suggest that more negative media coverage of the in-party candidate over the course of 
an entire campaign may spur strong partisans to like their candidate even more. Further testing of 
these heterogenous effects is needed and will likely provide fascinating insight into the role 
group-dynamics play in understanding the media’s influence on voters. In sum, I have provided 
evidence that the “watch-dog” role of media designed to keep those in power in check may have 
no impact on the voters most tied to those politicians, or even incite “boomerang” effects. This is 
worrisome, indeed, for if the central institution designed to aid the public in keeping leaders in 
check is no longer trusted, believed or effective, how will voters hold the government 
accountable?  
There is no simple or straightforward solution to curing humans of our natural 
inclinations towards self-preservation and bias. The best to hope for is that research, such as 
what I’ve presented here, can help scholars better predict these kinds of effects and increase 
citizens’ awareness of their biases. The former may help inspire the media to consider more 
careful, targeted messaging for diverse audiences, designed to improve their ability to serve as 
watch dogs of power. The latter is a responsibility that falls on the shoulders of citizens 
themselves. Arceneaux & vander Wielen (2017) find that internal reflection may be the only 
means by which partisans can recover from the deep divisions and prejudice permeating the 
U.S.’s current political climate. It requires voters to consciously work to overcome their biased 
nature in how they select information, interpret information and verify information from the 






Appendix A: Chapter 2 Tables 
 
Table A1: Interaction Model Using Panel, Cluster and OLS, Democratic Candidates 
 Dependent variable: 
 Dem. Cand. Feeling 
Thermometer 
 Panel OLS 
 Estimation  
Net Sent. Dem. Cand. -1.182 -1.182 
 (1.067) (1.152) 
Independents PID -21.608*** -21.608*** 
 (0.581) (0.580) 
Republicans PID -44.866*** -44.866*** 
 (0.637) (0.646) 
Female 2.622*** 2.622*** 
 (0.405) (0.406) 
Black 17.643*** 17.643*** 
 (0.548) (0.607) 
Hispanic 9.525*** 9.525*** 
 (0.647) (0.623) 
Some University 1.426*** 1.426*** 
 (0.448) (0.437) 
Daily News Consumption 0.335*** 0.335*** 
 (0.130) (0.129) 
Campaign Interest 1.498*** 1.498*** 
 (0.336) (0.321) 
2004 Election (as factor) -1.288 -1.288 
 (1.192) (1.243) 
2008 Election (as factor) -0.760 -0.760 
 (0.776) (0.821) 
2012 Election (as factor) -2.388*** -2.388*** 
 (0.706) (0.733) 
2016 Election (as factor) -14.327*** -14.327*** 
 (0.855) (0.869) 
Net Sent. Dem. x Ind. PID 6.372*** 6.372*** 
 (1.385) (1.443) 
Net Sent. Dem. x Rep. PID 6.602*** 6.602*** 
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 (1.493) (1.559) 
Constant 69.995*** 69.995*** 
 (0.893) (0.909) 
Observations 14,051 14,051 























Table A2: Interaction Model Using Panel, Cluster and OLS, Republican Candidates 
 Dependent variable: 
 Republican Candidate Feeling 
Thermometer 
 Panel OLS 
 Estimation  
Net Sent. Rep. Cand. 6.288*** 6.288*** 
 (1.008) (1.028) 
Independents PID 16.864*** 16.864*** 
 (0.667) (0.664) 
Republican PID 41.575*** 41.575*** 
 (0.649) (0.732) 
Female -1.114*** -1.114*** 
 (0.423) (0.421) 
Black -6.712*** -6.712*** 
 (0.619) (0.630) 
Hispanic -2.589*** -2.589*** 
 (0.655) (0.646) 
Some University -3.886*** -3.886*** 
 (0.461) (0.452) 
Daily News Consumption 0.558*** 0.558*** 
 (0.138) (0.133) 
Campaign Interest 1.483*** 1.483*** 
 (0.336) (0.333) 
2004 Election (as factor) -2.553** -2.553** 
 (1.154) (1.154) 
2008 Election (as factor) -3.489*** -3.489*** 
 (0.773) (0.861) 
2012 Election (as factor) -9.398*** -9.398*** 
 (0.689) (0.750) 
2016 Election (as factor) -20.926*** -20.926*** 
 (0.937) (0.942) 
Net Sent. Rep. x Ind. PID -6.775*** -6.775*** 
 (1.412) (1.340) 
Net Sent. Rep. x Rep. PID -10.905*** -10.905*** 
 (1.358) (1.425) 
Constant 39.265*** 39.265*** 
 (0.923) (0.951) 
Observations 14,023 14,023 






Table A3: Impact of Media Tone*PID on Candidates 
 Dependent variable: 
 Dem. Cand. Therm. Rep. Cand. Therm. 
Net Sent. Dem. Cand. 5.294***  
 (1.689)  
Net Sent. Rep. Cand.  2.657* 
  (1.520) 
PID (-3) 30.107*** -22.353*** 
 (0.791) (0.918) 
PID (-2) 16.656*** -10.690*** 
 (0.828) (0.971) 
PID (-1) 16.864*** -12.157*** 
 (0.834) (0.979) 
PID (1) -15.132*** 16.557*** 
 (0.894) (1.051) 
PID (2) -12.389*** 17.711*** 
 (0.907) (1.062) 
PID (3) -28.786*** 31.117*** 
 (0.889) (1.033) 
Female 2.328*** -0.622 
 (0.361) (0.380) 
Black 13.428*** -2.947*** 
 (0.551) (0.580) 
Hispanic 8.140*** -1.106* 
 (0.552) (0.582) 
Some University 0.708* -3.516*** 
 (0.389) (0.409) 
Daily News Consumption 0.407*** 0.527*** 
 (0.115) (0.121) 
Campaign Interest 1.352*** 1.455*** 
 (0.290) (0.306) 
2004 Election (as factor) -1.832* -1.547 
 (1.098) (1.035) 
2008 Election (as factor) -0.716 -2.838*** 
 (0.715) (0.763) 
2012 Election (as factor) -2.451*** -9.161*** 
 (0.639) (0.664) 
2016 Election (as factor) -14.520*** -20.657*** 
 (0.765) (0.842) 
Net Sent. Dem. x PID (-3) -7.162***  
 (2.023)  
Net Sent. Dem. x PID (-2) -5.467**  
 (2.163)  
Net Sent. Dem. x PID (-1) -4.825**  
 (2.110)  
Net Sent. Dem. x PID (1) 1.942  
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 (2.253)  
Net Sent. Dem. x PID (2) -1.071  
 (2.289)  
Net Sent. Dem. x PID (3) -0.821  
 (2.190)  
Net Sent. Rep. x PID (-3)  5.127*** 
  (1.828) 
Net Sent. Rep. x PID (-2)  1.512 
  (1.983) 
Net Sent. Rep. x PID (-1)  2.373 
  (2.016) 
Net Sent. Rep. x PID (1)  -6.032*** 
  (2.076) 
Net Sent. Rep. x PID (2)  -4.769** 
  (2.102) 
Net Sent. Rep. x PID (3)  -8.274*** 
  (1.994) 
Constant 47.301*** 54.981*** 
 (0.894) (0.987) 
Observations 14,927 14,888 
















Table A4: Impact of Media Tone*PID on Attitudes towards Democrats, by Media Consumption 
 Dependent variable: 
 Dem. Cand. Feeling Thermometer 
 (Low Media Consumption) (High Media Consumption) 
Net Sent. Dem. Cand. 3.579* 6.929* 
 (1.924) (3.751) 
PID (-3) 28.107*** 34.897*** 
 (0.891) (1.793) 
PID (-2) 15.592*** 20.238*** 
 (0.910) (2.018) 
PID (-1) 16.132*** 19.140*** 
 (0.917) (2.029) 
PID (1) -13.135*** -19.123*** 
 (1.013) (1.975) 
PID (2) -12.319*** -12.201*** 
 (1.009) (2.126) 
PID (3) -28.539*** -27.991*** 
 (1.020) (1.935) 
Female 2.215*** 2.386*** 
 (0.434) (0.647) 
Black 14.488*** 11.368*** 
 (0.638) (1.092) 
Hispanic 8.175*** 8.448*** 
 (0.630) (1.134) 
Some University 0.467 1.367* 
 (0.454) (0.750) 
Daily News Consumption 1.667*** 1.319** 
 (0.322) (0.550) 
Campaign Interest -1.965 -2.322 
 (1.224) (2.846) 
2004 Election (as factor) -0.217 -2.795 
 (0.784) (2.028) 
2008 Election (as factor) -1.746** -4.764*** 
 (0.721) (1.400) 
2012 Election (as factor) -15.039*** -14.878*** 
 (1.018) (1.347) 
Net Sent. Dem. x PID (-3) -3.301 -9.237** 
 (2.368) (4.276) 
Net Sent. Dem. x PID (-2) -3.659 -5.567 
 (2.466) (4.813) 
Net Sent. Dem. x PID (-1) -2.939 -6.736 
 (2.395) (4.767) 
Net Sent. Dem. x PID (1) 2.031 -1.944 
 (2.656) (4.641) 
Net Sent. Dem. x PID (2) 0.327 -3.469 
 (2.599) (5.109) 
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Net Sent. Dem. x PID (3) -1.023 0.095 
 (2.542) (4.618) 
Constant 48.010*** 48.906*** 
 (0.962) (1.988) 
Observations 10,226 4,701 























Table A5: Impact of Media Tone*PID on Attitudes towards Republicans, by Media Consumption 
 Dependent variable: 
 Rep. Cand. Feeling Thermometer 
 (Low Media Consumption) (High Media Consumption) 
Net Sent. Rep. Cand. 3.564* 6.325** 
 (1.891) (2.842) 
PID (-3) -20.481*** -29.493*** 
 (1.015) (2.098) 
PID (-2) -9.441*** -17.363*** 
 (1.047) (2.423) 
PID (-1) -10.098*** -22.018*** 
 (1.057) (2.400) 
PID (1) 16.291*** 15.614*** 
 (1.166) (2.358) 
PID (2) 18.944*** 11.023*** 
 (1.164) (2.496) 
PID (3) 30.308*** 30.462*** 
 (1.169) (2.238) 
Female -0.334 -1.373* 
 (0.448) (0.704) 
Black -2.715*** -4.060*** 
 (0.662) (1.188) 
Hispanic -0.485 -3.850*** 
 (0.653) (1.236) 
Some University -2.225*** -6.521*** 
 (0.469) (0.816) 
Daily News Consumption 1.481*** 2.818*** 
 (0.333) (0.600) 
Campaign Interest -1.153 -5.879** 
 (1.155) (2.818) 
2004 Election (as factor) -2.987*** -3.281 
 (0.829) (2.214) 
2008 Election (as factor) -9.456*** -8.471*** 
 (0.745) (1.489) 
2012 Election (as factor) -19.605*** -19.997*** 
 (1.127) (1.455) 
Net Sent. Rep. x PID (-3) 3.095 0.163 
 (2.338) (3.338) 
Net Sent. Rep. x PID (-2) -0.386 -2.589 
 (2.447) (3.840) 
Net Sent. Rep. x PID (-1) 1.417 -5.728 
 (2.469) (3.905) 
Net Sent. Rep. x PID (1) -6.779** -6.487* 
 (2.689) (3.712) 
Net Sent. Rep. x PID (2) -6.244** -9.433** 
 (2.698) (3.837) 
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Net Sent. Rep. x PID (3) -8.112*** -8.939** 
 (2.629) (3.511) 
Constant 54.456*** 63.123*** 
 (1.048) (2.243) 
Observations 10,193 4,695 























Appendix B: Chapter 3 Measures and Tables 
Table B1: Social Identity Measure Questions by Author 
Author(s) Theoretical Construct Question wording 
Mael and Tetrick (1992) Shared experience When someone criticizes () it feels like a personal insult.  
Greene (2004) 
 
I'm very interested in what others think about () 
  
When I talk about (), I usually say "we" rather than "they" 
  
()'s successes are my successes. 
  
When someone praises (), it feels like a personal compliment. 
  
I act like a () person to a great extent. 
   
 
Shared characteristics If a story in the media criticized (), I would feel embarrassed. 
  
I don't act like a typical () person. 
  
I have a number of qualities typical of () people. 
  
The limitation associated with () people apply to me also. 
Ashmore et al. (2004) theory Self-categorization Do you identify as a member of ()? 
Heere and James (2007),  
Heere et al. (2011) applied 
  
 
Private evaluation  I feel good about being a member of (). 
  
In general, I am glad to be a (). 
  
I'm proud to think of myself as a (). 
   
 
Public evaluation Overall, () are viewed positively by others. 
  
In general, others respect ().  
  
Overal, people hold a favorable opinion about (). 
   
 
Sense of interdependence What happens to () will influence what happens in my life. 
  
Changes affecting () will have an impact on my own life. 
  
What happens to () will impact my own life. 
   
 
Interconnection of self with 
group 
When someone criticizes () it feels like a personal insult. 
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In general, being associated with () is an important part of my 
self-image. 
  
When someone compliments (), it feels like a personal 
compliment.    
 
Behavioral involvement I participate in activities supporting (). 
  
I am actively involved in activities that related to (). 
  
I participate in activities with other (). 




I am aware of the tradition and history of (). 
  
I know the ins and outs of (). 
  
I have knowledge of the successes and failures of ().  
Huddy et al. (2015) Affective partisanship (a) How important is being () to you? 
  
How well does the term () describe you? 
  
When talking about (), how often do you use "we" instead of 
"they"?   
To what extent do you think of yourself as being a ()? 
   
Bankert, Huddy and Rosema 
(2017) 
Affective partisanship (b) I am interested in what other people think about this party. 
  
I have a lot in common with other supporters of this party. 
  
If this party does badly in opinion polls, my day is ruined. 
  
When I speak about this party, I usually say "we" instead of 
"they". 
  
When people criticize this party, it feels like a personal insult. 
  
When I meet someone who supports this party, I feel connected 
with this person.  
  
When I speak about this party, I refer to them as "my party". 
  
When people praise this party, it makes me feel good. 
   
Kelly (1988) Positive affect It is important to me that I support this party. 
Brown and Williams (1984) 
 
I identify with this party. 
  
I feel strong ties with other people who support this party. 
  
I am glad to support this party. 
  
I see myself as supporting this party. 
 
Negative affect I make excuses for supporting this party. 
  
I try to hide supporting this party. 
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I feel that it puts me at a disadvantage to support this party. 
  
I feel annoyed to say I support this party. 
  
I feel critical of this party. 
   
Martin et al. (1997) Social identity Most of my friends are (). 
applied to identification as 
an athlete 
 
Other people see me mainly as (). 
 
Self-identity I consider myself a (). 
  
I have many goals related to (). 
 
Negative affectivity I feel bad about myself when () does poorly. 
  
I would be very depressed if () failed. 
 
Exclusivity () is an important part of my life.  
  
I spend more time thinking about () than other things. 
   
Kashima et al. (2000) Group identification I am proud to belong to (). 
  
I feel strong ties with (). 
  
I am glad that I belong to (). 
  
Being a () is an important reflection of who I am.  
  
Being a () is an important part of my self-image. 
  
() is very important to me. 
 
Self-typicality Others would describe me as (). 
  
I feel I am a typical (). 
  
My background is similar to that of most (). 
  
Most () think and behave differently than me. 
  
I do not look like a typical (). 
  
My values are very different from those of most (). 
   
Cameron (2000) Ingroup ties I have a lot in common with other (). 
  
I feel strong ties to other (). 
  
I find it difficult to form a bond with other (). 
  
I don't feel a sense of being "connected" with other (). 
  
I really "fit in" with other (). 
  
In a group of (), I really feel that I belong. 
 
Centrality I often think about the fact that I am (). 
  
Overall, being () is an important part of my self-image. 
  
The fact that I am () rarely enters my mind. 
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I am not usually conscious of the fact that I am (). 
  
Being () is an important reflection of who I am.  
  
In my everday life, I often think about what it means to be (). 
 
Ingroup affect In general, I'm glad to be a (). 
  
I often regret that I am a (). 
  
I don’t feel good about being a (). 
  
Generally, I feel good when I think about myself as a (). 
  
Just thinking about the fact that I am a () sometimes gives me 
bad feelings.    
Sellers et al. (1998) Centrality  Overall, being () has very little to do with how I feel about 
myself.   
In general, being () is an imporant part of my self image.  
  
My destiny is tied to the destiny of other ().  
  
Being () is unimportant to my sense of what kind of a person I 
am.   
I have a strong sense of belonging to (). 
  
I have a strong attachment to other ()s. 
  
Being () is an important reflection of who I am. 
  
Being () is not a major factor in my social relationships. 
 
Private regard I feel good about (). 
  
I am happy that I am (). 
  
I feel that () have made major accomplishments and 
advancements.   
I often regret that I am (). 
  
I am proud to be (). 
  
I feel that the () community has made valuable contributions to 
this society.  
Public regard Overall, () are considered good by others. 
  
In general, others respect (). 
  
Most people consider (), on the average, to be more ineffective 
than other political groups. 
  
() are not respected by the broader society. 
  
In general, other people view () in a positive manner. 
  
Soceity views () as an asset. 
   
Leach et al. (2008) Self-investment   
 
Solidarity I feel a bond with (). 
  
I feel solidarity with (). 
  
I feel committed to (). 
 
Satisfaction I'm glad to be (). 
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I think that () have a lot to be proud of. 
  
It is pleasant to be (). 
  
Being () gives me a good feeling.  
 
Centrality I often think about the fact that I am (). 
  
The fact that I am () is an important part of my identity. 
  





Individual self-stereotyping I have a lot in common with the average () person. 
  
I am similar to the average (). 
 
In-group homogeneity () people have a lot in common with each other. 
  
() people are very similar to each other. 
   
Jackson (2002) Affective ties () can always count on each other. 
  
Most() would take a substantial risk to rescue me.  
  
If I were in trouble, a () member would help me. 
  
() is united. 
  
I would take substantial risk to rescue () member in trouble. 
  
In a time of personal need, I can rely on (). 
  
If a () were in trouble, I would help him or her. 
  
When I am with (), I usually feel like we are one unit. 
  
There is a feeling of unity among (). 
  
()'s successes are my successes. 
  
() need to stick together. 
  
() is more like a collection of separate individuals than a whole. 
  
Even if () is not doing well, it is important that we stick 
together.   
It is important for () to be loyal to individual members. 
  
When members of () do well, I feel good. 
  
It is important for individual members to be loyal to (). 
  
I enjoy working with other () to achieve success. 
  
Regarding (), it is accurate to say "United we stand, divided we 
fall."   
When I am with (), I feel like we are separate individuals. 
  
I feel a kinship of sorts with other (). 
  
When () fails, I feel depressed. 
  
When I talk about (), I say "we" rather than "they". 
  
When difficult problems arise, I can not count on (). 
  
If a story in the media criticized (), I would feel embarassed. 
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Attraction to ingroup 
(evaluative) 
I am glad I am (). 
  
I am proud to be a member of (). 
  
I feel () is not worthwhile. 
  
I attach great value to my () membership. 
  
It is good to be a (). 
  
I would not feel badly if I had to leave (). 
  
My image of the () is negative.  
  
I don't really feel like a part of ().  
  
I am a typical (). 
  
I support the (). 
  
I don't act like a typical (). 
  
I live my life as independently from ()s as possible. 
  
I regret being a member of (). 
  
It puts me at a disadvantage to be a (). 
  
My opinions are usually consistent with (). 
  
I feel uneasy with other (). 
  
Overall, I am proud of being (). 
  
I have a number of qualities typical of () people. 
  
I often exhibit my positive feelings about (). 
  




I am a (). 
  
Being () is an important part of my self-identity. 
  
My () membership is important to the way I view myself. 
  
Being a () is an important reflection of who I am. 
  
() have a number of things in common with each other. 
  
People in the (outgroup) are a lot alike in many respects. 
  
It is important to me that others identify me as (). 
  
I prefer to see (ingroup) as distinct from (outgroup). 
  
I am very interested in what others think about (). 
  
(outgroup) people are different from (ingroup) people. 
  
I act like a () to a great extent. 
  




Table B2:Social Identity Measure Theoretical Constructs, By Author 
Theoretical Construct Author (s) # authors 
Shared experience Mael and Tetrick (1992) 
Greene (2004) 
2 
Shared characteristics / self-typicality / self-stereotyping 
(Self-definition, Leach) 
Mael and Tetrick (1992) 
Greene (2004) 
Kashima et al. (2000) 
Leach et al. (2008) 
4 
Self-categorization Ashmore et al. (2004) 
Heere and James (2007) 
Heere et al. (2011) 
Martin et al. (1997) 
Jackson (2002) 
5 
Private evaluation Ashmore et al. (2004) 
Heere and James (2007) 
Heere et al. (2011) 
Sellers et al. (1998) 
Jackson (2002) 
5 
Public evaluation Ashmore et al. (2004) 
Heere and James (2007) 
Heere et al. (2011) 
Sellers et al. (1998) 
Jackson (2002) 
5 
Sense of interdependence Ashmore et al. (2004) 
Heere and James (2007) 
Heere et al. (2011) 
3 
Interconnection with group and self / intergroup ties Ashmore et al. (2004) 
Heere and James (2007) 
Heere et al. (2011) 
Cameron (2004) 
4 
Behavioral invovlement Ashmore et al. (2004) 
Heere and James (2007) 
Heere et al. (2011) 
3 
Cognitive awareness / meaning Ashmore et al. (2004) 
Heere and James (2007) 
Heere et al. (2011) 
3 
Positive affect Huddy et al. (2015) 





Negative affect Huddy et al. (2015) 
Bankert et al. (2017) 
Kelly (1988) 
Cameron (2004) 
Martin et al. (1997) 
Jackson (2002) 
6 
Exclusivity Martin et al. (1997) 1 
Group identification Kashima et al. (2000) 1 
Centrality (Self-investment, Leach) Cameron (2004) 
Sellers et al. (1998) 
Leach et al. (2008) 
3 
Solidarity  (Self-investment, Leach) Leach et al. (2008) 1 
Satisfaction  (Self-investment, Leach) Leach et al. (2008) 1 




Table B3: Proportion of Variance Explained, Various Number of Constrained Factors 
Non-Rotated Varimax Rotated 
# Factors Prop. Variance 
Explained (PVE) 
# Factors PVE Factor 1 PVE Factor 2 PVE Factor 3 
3 0.443 3 0.249 0.22  
4 0.443 4 0.192 0.162 0.159 
5 0.444 5 0.17 0.163 0.156 
6 0.445 6 0.16 0.155 0.125 
7 0.445 7 0.151 0.137 0.128 
13 0.447 13 0.142 0.136  
 
Most of the analyses conducted by the authors reviewed in this chapter use constrained 
factor analysis in order to test a pre-designed theoretical, multidimensional model of measuring 
social identity attachment. I focused on a data-driven approach, rather than theoretical and thus 
used unconstrained principal components analysis to examine the relationship among the 37 
questions fielded to measure partisan social identity. In the effort of comparison, I’ve also run 
the 37-item battery using constrained factor analysis. I ran this analysis multiple times using 
from three to seven, and then using 13 different constrained factors. The proportion of variance 
explained by the various number of factor models is reported in Table B3. For the non-rotated 
models, the results remain the same regardless of how many factors are considered. For the 
rotated models, there is at most three factors that cover about equal amount of variance 
regardless of how many other factors are forced. All other factors cover less than 10% of the 
variance. Thus, the results reported in Tables B4 and B5 are for a three-factor constrained 
analysis due to the similarity in results across any number of pre-selected factors. 
The first factor analysis reported in Table B4 is non-rotated. The results of this analysis 
are very similar to the results reported above using un-restricted PCA. Most of the survey 
questions load onto the first factor, which accounts for almost half of all variance. This replicates 
the one-factor solution. The second analysis reported in Table B5 is a varimax rotation with the 
three constrained factors. In this analysis, I find that the first and second factors explain about the 
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same amount of variance (about a quarter). If you look at the factor loadings more closely, it 
appears there’s much variation within theoretical constructs. For example, behavior 1 spreads 
almost evenly across the first two factors while behavior 2 loads more strongly on the second 
factor. Qualitatively, it appears the factors loading on the first versus second dimensions lack any 
kind of meaningful pattern or theoretical justification. This is also true across the models 
including an additional number of factors. Thus, I take this as further evidence that even when 















Table B4: Factor Analysis of Partisan Social Identity Measure Questions, Non-rotated 
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Affect1 0.761         -0.380           
Affect2 0.746         -0.429           
Affect3 0.761         -0.393           
Affect4  -0.685           
Behavior1 0.732             0.101 
Behavior2 0.671           0.261           
Importance1 0.823            -0.222 
Importance2 0.808    0.111  -0.285  
Importance3 0.796  -0.278 
Solidarity1 0.796   
Solidarity2 0.793   
Solidarity3 0.804   -0.150   -0.146 
Typicality1 0.699  0.247 
Typicality2 0.729   -0.135    0.223 
Typicality3 0.656             0.206 
Knowledge1 0.610             0.234 
Knowledge2 0.658    0.180    0.150 
Knowledge3 0.641    0.104    0.222 
CommonFate1 0.676    0.223   -0.134 
CommonFate2 0.762   
CommonFate3 0.732    0.166  
CommonFate4 0.492    0.482  
CommonFate5 0.608    0.152  
Homogeny1 0.700             0.116 
Homogeny2 0.662  0.128 
Cognitive1 0.661      0.327 -0.136 
Cognitive2  -0.235   -0.274 
Attitude1 0.581    0.371  
Attitude2 0.615    0.171    0.198 
Attitude3 0.594    0.172    0.222 
Attitude4 0.651   -0.259    0.177 
ExternalEvaluation1 0.681    0.124    0.129 
ExternalEvaluation2 0.745    0.202  
Distinction1 0.655   
Distinction2 0.552   
Social1 0.577             0.218 
Social2 -0.120           -0.334 
    
SS Loadings 16.396    1.995    0.998 
Proportion of Variance 0.443   0.054    0.027 






Table B5: Factor Analysis of Partisan Social Identity Measure Questions, Varimax Rotated 
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Affect1 0.822    0.225           
Affect2 0.839    0.193           
Affect3 0.825    0.232           
Affect4 0.373   -0.460   -0.365 
Behavior1 0.534    0.455    0.234 
Behavior2 0.334    0.585    0.257 
Importance1 0.534 0.455 0.234 
Importance2 0.334 0.585 0.257 
Importance3 0.637    0.566 -0.107 
Solidarity1 0.583    0.545           
Solidarity2 0.618    0.496           
Solidarity3 0.675    0.481           
Typicality1 0.592    0.314    0.322 
Typicality2 0.662    0.292    0.275 
Typicality3 0.460    0.396    0.335 
Knowledge1 0.432    0.353    0.351 
Knowledge2 0.393    0.479    0.322 
Knowledge3 0.441    0.390    0.354 
CommonFate1 0.338    0.635           
CommonFate2 0.512    0.556    0.129 
CommonFate3 0.426    0.610    0.127 
CommonFate4   0.648    0.233 
CommonFate5 0.353    0.490    0.167 
Homogeny1 0.544    0.398    0.223 
Homogeny2 0.422    0.474    0.246 
Cognitive1 0.259    0.693    0.122 
Cognitive2  -0.349  
Attitude1 0.189    0.617    0.243 
Attitude2 0.374    0.426    0.354 
Attitude3 0.361    0.403    0.372 
Attitude4 0.678    0.181    0.171 
ExternalEvaluation1 0.444    0.467    0.285 
ExternalEvaluation2 0.410    0.647    0.132 
Distinction1 0.513    0.376    0.176 
Distinction2 0.392    0.352    0.189 
Social1 0.423    0.321    0.320 
Social2   -0.355  
    
SS Loadings 9.214    8.122    2.053 
Proportion of Variance 0.249    0.220    0.055 





Appendix C: Chapter 4 Experimental Stimulus and Tables 
Figure C1: Negative Stories about President Trump 
Negative Story 1 
 
 




Please read the following news story:  
 
Trump Quotes Fascist Dictator in Latest Twitter Gaffe 
   
Washington, D.C. — Since entering the White House in 2017, President Donald Trump has been highly 
criticized for his repeated blunders and typos posted to his personal Twitter account, 
@realDonaldTrump. He’s now facing controversy again after he posted a quote originally spoken by 
fascist Italian dictator Benito Mussolini. President Trump re-tweeted a post from the account @ilduce2016 
with the following quote: “It is better to live one day as a lion than 100 years as a sheep.”  
  
Benito Mussolini took power in Italy in the early 1920’s and was allied with Germany's Adolf Hitler during 
WWII, until being toppled from power in 1943 as Allied forces fought their way up Italy. President Trump 
has come under scrutiny as he often has declined to distance himself or reject the support of extreme, far-
right leaders and ideas. It’s unclear whether this latest gaffe will have any negative implications for the 
President among voters.  
 
Please read the following news story: 
  
Trump's Latest Blunder, Confusing 9/11 with 7 Eleven  
  
 Buffalo, Ny. — Since the beginning of his run for office, President Donald Trump has been highly 
criticized for his repeated blunders, inappropriate comments and typos posted to his personal Twitter 
account, @realDonaldTrump. He’s now facing controversy again after he mistakenly referred to the 
terrorist attacks that took place on September 11 in New York City as "7/11" rather than "9/11."   
  
At a rally in Buffalo, New York, he said, "I was down there and I watched our police and our firemen down 
there on 7/11." The September 11 terror attack was an event that changed the course of history in America. 
Many in the crowd were surprised that President Trump so carelessly, and mistakenly, referred to the 
popular convenience store chain "7 Eleven" without correcting himself at the time. It’s unclear whether this 
latest gaffe will have any negative implications for the President among voters.  
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Figure C2: Negative Stories about (then candidate) President Biden 
Negative Story 1 
 







Please read the following news story: 
 
Biden’s Latest Racial Blunder Under Scrutiny    
  
Des Moines, Ia. — Former Vice President Joe Biden comes under scrutiny again in his latest blunder 
during a speech on the campaign trail in Iowa. Biden made the audience very uncomfortable when he said, 
“poor kids are just as bright and just as talented as white kids.” This isn’t the first time the Democratic 
presidential nominee has faced intense criticism for his record on race and for his verbal missteps. 
  
Mr. Biden was speaking on education and the need to challenge students at a town hall hosted by the Asian 
& Latino Coalition when he made the remark, and it has quickly circulated among social media and news 
television stations. This comes just days after facing controversy for having highlighted his ability to work 
with segregationist senators back in the 1970’s and 1980’s. In the past, Biden has been seen as a generally 
well-liked candidate among Black American voters. It’s unclear whether this gaffe will negatively affect 
that support.  
 
Please read the following news story: 
  
Biden’s Latest Gaffe, Running for Senate instead of President   
  
  
Toledo, Oh. — Former Vice President Joe Biden comes under scrutiny again in his latest blunder during a 
speech on the campaign trail in Ohio. Biden made the audience very uncomfortable when he said, “That's 
why I'm running. I'm running as a proud Democrat for the Senate,” instead of President. This isn’t the first 
time the Democratic presidential nominee has faced intense criticism for his verbal missteps, and what at 
times appears to be poor memory. 
  
Mr. Biden was speaking to a crowd of manufacturing workers about the loss of jobs in the region and 
suffering economy when he made the remark, and it has quickly circulated among social media and news 
television stations. Critics frame this latest careless mistake within the broader concerns young voters in 
particular have about whether he's "too old" to be running for office. It’s unclear whether this gaffe will 
negatively affect that support.  
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Figure C3: Neutral Stories about President Trump and President Biden 
President Trump 
 








Please read the following news story: 
  
Trump Campaign Headed to Michigan 
  
 Detroit, Mi. — President Donald Trump will be back in Michigan, starting a week-long tour of the 
midwest -- a key region where he mostly swept electoral votes in the 2016 election, and one that will be 
essential to secure in November. The kickoff event will be held at an airport hangar near Saginaw, followed 
by events in Detroit and Grand Rapids before heading to Ohio.  
 
Trump last made a stop in Michigan a few months ago, where he visited Ford Motor Co.'s Rawsonville 
Components Plant and spoke to union workers. On this trip, representatives from the Trump campaign said 
he plans to discuss job creation and protection of the manufacturing industry. First Lady Melania Trump 
will join the President, along with their son, Barron.  
 
Please read the following news story: 
  
Biden Campaign Headed to Pittsburg 
  
  
Latrobe, Pa. — The former vice president and Democratic presidential nominee, Joe Biden, who estimates 
he's logged more than 2.1 million miles riding the rails in his lifetime, added seven more hours to that total 
Wednesday as his campaign chartered a private train to tour parts of eastern Ohio and western 
Pennsylvania - key areas to pick up votes if he wants to flip the states from red to blue in November. 
  
Biden spent much of the trip inside a window-lined “conversation car" chatting with supporters he had 
picked up at stops along the way. He and his wife, Jill, also had their own all-glass space at the back of the 
train known as the “president's car.” The tour, which will be focused on the economy and working 




Table C1: Hostile Media Effect, PSIM vs. PID, with controls 
 Dependent variable: 
 HME, Wave 1 
 (1) (2) (3) 
PSIM  0.502*** 0.519*** 
  (0.042) (0.047) 
PID 0.196***  -0.041 
 (0.046)  (0.050) 
Political interest 0.248*** 0.171*** 0.172*** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Female -0.018 -0.031 -0.030 
 (0.052) (0.051) (0.051) 
University -0.036 -0.023 -0.025 
 (0.053) (0.051) (0.051) 
Black -0.329*** -0.362*** -0.361*** 
 (0.074) (0.072) (0.072) 
Age -0.065*** -0.051*** -0.051*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Weekly Media Consumption -0.006 -0.009* -0.009* 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Constant 1.757*** 1.430*** 1.500*** 
 (0.148) (0.118) (0.146) 
Observations 2,217 2,217 2,217 
R2 0.087 0.135 0.135 









Table C2: Predicting Hostile Media Effect by Party 
 Dependent variable: 
 Republican HME Democrat HME 
PID 0.467***  0.139** 0.172***  -0.149** 
 (0.058)  (0.065) (0.060)  (0.065) 
PSIM  0.617*** 0.556***  0.546*** 0.609*** 
  (0.048) (0.056)  (0.052) (0.058) 
Constant 1.810*** 1.773*** 1.535*** 1.600*** 0.953*** 1.220*** 
 (0.156) (0.103) (0.152) (0.162) (0.109) (0.160) 
Observations 1,131 1,131 1,131 1,190 1,190 1,190 
R2 0.054 0.127 0.131 0.007 0.086 0.090 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
 
Table C3: Predicting Selective Exposure of Trump Headlines, Binomial Logit Regression 
 Dependent variable: 
 Selecting Positive Trump Headline 
 Republicans Democrats 
PID 0.502***  0.281** -0.411***  -0.161 
 (0.110)  (0.128) (0.110)  (0.126) 
PSIM  0.511*** 0.385***  -0.558*** -0.490*** 
  (0.099) (0.114)  (0.102) (0.115) 
Constant -0.506* -0.229 -0.706** 0.216 0.243 0.530* 
 (0.289) (0.205) (0.297) (0.292) (0.209) (0.304) 
Observations 1,131 1,131 1,131 1,190 1,190 1,190 
Log Likelihood -690.965 -687.612 -685.213 -717.484 -709.206 -708.386 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,385.929 1,379.224 1,376.427 1,438.968 1,422.412 1,422.772 






Table C4: Predicting Selective Exposure of Biden Headlines, Binomial Logit Regression 
 Dependent variable: 
 Selecting Positive Biden Headlines 
 Republicans Democrats 
PID -0.397***  -0.265** 0.258**  0.086 
 (0.110)  (0.128) (0.109)  (0.124) 
PSIM  -0.346*** -0.227**  0.367*** 0.331*** 
  (0.097) (0.113)  (0.099) (0.112) 
Constant 0.252 -0.081 0.369 0.046 -0.010 -0.162 
 (0.290) (0.204) (0.296) (0.291) (0.205) (0.300) 
Observations 1,131 1,131 1,131 1,190 1,190 1,190 
Log Likelihood -697.982 -698.092 -695.953 -749.243 -745.096 -744.858 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,399.963 1,400.184 1,397.906 1,502.487 1,494.193 1,495.715 
















Table C5: Predicting Selective Exposure of Trump Headlines, PSIM vs. PID, with controls 
 Dependent variable: 
 Selecting Positive Trump Headline 
 Republicans Democrats 
PSIM 0.105*** -0.093*** 
 (0.026) (0.026) 
PID 0.068** -0.040 
 (0.029) (0.027) 
Political interest -0.013 -0.001 
 (0.014) (0.014) 
Female 0.128*** 0.037 
 (0.030) (0.027) 
University -0.060** -0.031 
 (0.029) (0.028) 
Black -0.164*** 0.052 
 (0.061) (0.034) 
Age 0.019* -0.030*** 
 (0.010) (0.008) 
Weekly Media Consumption -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Constant 0.256*** 0.699*** 
 (0.088) (0.077) 
Observations 1,075 1,142 
R2 0.068 0.043 









Table C6: Predicting Selective Exposure of Biden Headlines, PSIM vs. PID, with controls 
 Dependent variable: 
 Selective Positive Biden Headline 
 Republicans Democrats 
PSIM -0.073*** 0.083*** 
 (0.026) (0.027) 
PID -0.049* 0.023 
 (0.029) (0.028) 
Political interest -0.006 -0.003 
 (0.014) (0.014) 
Female -0.074** -0.005 
 (0.031) (0.028) 
University -0.014 -0.017 
 (0.029) (0.029) 
Black 0.061 -0.135*** 
 (0.062) (0.035) 
Age -0.048*** 0.012 
 (0.010) (0.009) 
Weekly Media Consumption 0.003 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Constant 0.805*** 0.453*** 
 (0.089) (0.079) 
Observations 1,075 1,142 
R2 0.039 0.027 









Table C7: Predicting Trust of In-party Story, Moderated by PSIM/PID, with controls 
 Dependent variable: 
 Trust of In-party Story  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Negative exposure 0.074 0.096 0.242 
 (0.393) (0.274) (0.395) 
PID 0.377***  0.040 
 (0.122)  (0.141) 
PSIM  0.638*** 0.619*** 
  (0.110) (0.129) 
Political interest 0.056 0.009 0.009 
 (0.040) (0.041) (0.041) 
Female 0.161* 0.154* 0.153* 
 (0.085) (0.083) (0.084) 
University 0.003 0.011 0.010 
 (0.085) (0.084) (0.084) 
Black 0.299** 0.264** 0.266** 
 (0.131) (0.130) (0.130) 
Age -0.136*** -0.132*** -0.132*** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Weekly Media Consumption -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Neg exp.*PID -0.315**  -0.086 
 (0.148)  (0.171) 
Neg exp.*PSIM  -0.425*** -0.386** 
  (0.131) (0.154) 
Constant 0.173 -0.010 -0.074 
 (0.344) (0.265) (0.344) 
Observations 994 994 994 
R2 0.111 0.136 0.137 





Abramowitz, A. (2014, January 8). The Partisans in the Closet. Politico. 
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/01/independent-voters-partisans-in-the-
closet-101931 
Achen, C. H. (1992). Social psychology, demographic variables, and linear regression: Breaking 
the iron triangle in voting research. Political Behavior, 14(3). 
https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00991978 
Arceneaux, K., Johnson, M., & Murphy, C. (2012). Polarized Political Communication, 
Oppositional Media Hostility, and Selective Exposure. The Journal of Politics, 74(1). 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S002238161100123X 
Arceneaux, K., & vander Wielen, R. J. (2017). Taming intuition: how reflection minimizes 
partisan reasoning and promotes democratic accountability. Cambridge University Press. 
Arieli, S., Amit, A., & Mentser, S. (2019). Identity-motivated reasoning: Biased judgments 
regarding political leaders and their actions. Cognition, 188. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2018.12.009 
Aron, A., Aron, E. N., & Smollan, D. (1992). Inclusion of Other in the Self Scale and the 
structure of interpersonal closeness. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63(4). 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.63.4.596 
Arpan, L. M., & Nabi, R. L. (2011). Exploring Anger in the Hostile Media Process: Effects on 
News Preferences and Source Evaluation. Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 
88(1). https://doi.org/10.1177/107769901108800101 
Ashmore, R. D., Deaux, K., & McLaughlin-Volpe, T. (2004). An Organizing Framework for 
Collective Identity: Articulation and Significance of Multidimensionality. Psychological 
Bulletin, 130(1). https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.130.1.80 
Bachleda, S., Neuner, F. G., Soroka, S., Guggenheim, L., Fournier, P., & Naurin, E. (2020). 
Individual-level differences in negativity biases in news selection. Personality and 
Individual Differences, 155. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2019.109675 
Bankert, A., Huddy, L., & Rosema, M. (2017). Measuring Partisanship as a Social Identity in 
Multi-Party Systems. Political Behavior, 39(1). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-016-9349-5 
Barber, M., & Pope, J. C. (2019). Does Party Trump Ideology? Disentangling Party and Ideology 
in America. American Political Science Review, 113(1). 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000795 
Barnidge, M., Gunther, A. C., Kim, J., Hong, Y., Perryman, M., Tay, S. K., & Knisely, S. 
(2020). Politically Motivated Selective Exposure and Perceived Media Bias. 
Communication Research, 47(1). https://doi.org/10.1177/0093650217713066 
Bayes, R., Druckman, J. N., Goods, A., & Molden, D. C. (2020). When and How Different 
Motives Can Drive Motivated Political Reasoning. Political Psychology, 41(5). 
https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12663 
Bisgaard, M. (2019). How Getting the Facts Right Can Fuel Partisan‐Motivated Reasoning. 
American Journal of Political Science, 63(4). https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12432 
 174 
Bode, L., Traugott, M. W., Soroka, S. N., Singh, L. O., Pasek, J., Newport, F., Ladd, J. M., & 
Budak, C. (2020). Words That Matter: How the News and Social Media Shaped the 2016 
Presidential Campaign. Brookings Institute Press. 
Bollen, K. A., & Hoyle, R. H. (1990). Perceived Cohesion: A Conceptual and Empirical 
Examination. Social Forces, 69(2). https://doi.org/10.2307/2579670 
Bolsen, T., Druckman, J. N., & Cook, F. L. (2014). The Influence of Partisan Motivated 
Reasoning on Public Opinion. Political Behavior, 36(2). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-
013-9238-0 
Brenan, M. (2020). Americans Remain Distrustful of Mass Media. 
https://news.gallup.com/poll/321116/americans-remain-distrustful-mass-media.aspx 
Brown, R., Condor, S., Mathews, A., Wade, G., & Wiliams, J. (1986). Explaining intergroup 
differentiation in an industrial organization. Journal of Occupational Psychology, 59(4). 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2044-8325.1986.tb00230.x 
Brown, R., & Williams, J. (1984). Group Identification: The Same Thing to All People? Human 
Relations, 37(7). https://doi.org/10.1177/001872678403700704 
Cameron, J. E. (2004). A Three-Factor Model of Social Identity. Self and Identity, 3(3). 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13576500444000047 
Campbell, A., Converse, P., Miller, W., & Stokes, D. (1960). The American Voter. University of 
Chicago Press. 
Clayton, K., Davis, J., Hinckley, K., & Horiuchi, Y. (2019). Partisan motivated reasoning and 
misinformation in the media: Is news from ideologically uncongenial sources more 
suspicious? Japanese Journal of Political Science, 20(3). 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S1468109919000082 
Clifford, S. (2017). Individual Differences in Group Loyalty Predict Partisan Strength. Political 
Behavior, 39(3). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-016-9367-3 
Coe, K., Tewksbury, D., Bond, B. J., Drogos, K. L., Porter, R. W., Yahn, A., & Zhang, Y. 
(2008). Hostile News: Partisan Use and Perceptions of Cable News Programming. Journal 
of Communication, 58(2). https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.2008.00381.x 
Cooper, J., & Stone, J. (1999). Cognitive Dissonance and the Social Group. In Attitudes, 
Behavior, and Social Context. Psychology Press. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781410603210-
12 
Cross, W. E., & Vandiver, B. J. (2001). Nigrescence theory and measurement: Introducing the 
Cross Racial Identity Scale (CRIS). In J. G. Ponterotto, J. M. Casas, Suzukim L. A., & C. 
M. Alexander (Eds.), Handbook of multicultural counseling (pp. 371–393). Sage 
Publications, Inc. . 
Devine, C. J. (2015). Ideological Social Identity: Psychological Attachment to Ideological In-
Groups as a Political Phenomenon and a Behavioral Influence. Political Behavior, 37(3). 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-014-9280-6 
Domke, D., Watts, M. D., Shah, D. v., & Fan, D. P. (1999). The Politics of Conservative Elites 
and the “Liberal Media” Argument. Journal of Communication, 49(4). 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.1999.tb02816.x 
Downs, A. (1957). An economic theory of democracy. Harper. 
Ellemers, N., Spears, R., & Doosje, B. (2002). Self and Social Identity. Annual Review of 
Psychology, 53(1). https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.53.100901.135228 
 175 
Enders, A. M., & Smallpage, S. M. (2019). Informational Cues, Partisan-Motivated Reasoning, 
and the Manipulation of Conspiracy Beliefs. Political Communication, 36(1). 
https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2018.1493006 
Epley, N., & Gilovich, T. (2016). The Mechanics of Motivated Reasoning. Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 30(3). https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.30.3.133 
Eveland, W. P., & Shah, D. v. (2003). The Impact of Individual and Interpersonal Factors on 
Perceived News Media Bias. Political Psychology, 24(1). https://doi.org/10.1111/0162-
895X.00318 
Feldman, L. (2014). The Hostile Media Effect (K. Kenski & K. H. Jamieson, Eds.; Vol. 1). 
Oxford University Press. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199793471.013.011_update_001 
Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance. Row, Peterson. 
Fiorina, M. (1981). Retrospective voting in American national elections. Yale University Press. 
Fournier, P., Cutler, F., Soroka, S., Stolle, D., & Bélanger, É. (2013). Riding the Orange Wave: 
Leadership, Values, Issues, and the 2011 Canadian Election. Canadian Journal of Political 
Science, 46(4). https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008423913000875 
Frimer, J. A., Skitka, L. J., & Motyl, M. (2017). Liberals and conservatives are similarly 
motivated to avoid exposure to one another’s opinions. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 72. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2017.04.003 
Garrett, R. K. (2009). Politically Motivated Reinforcement Seeking: Reframing the Selective 
Exposure Debate. Journal of Communication, 59(4). https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-
2466.2009.01452.x 
Garrett, R. K., & Stroud, N. J. (2014). Partisan Paths to Exposure Diversity: Differences in Pro- 
and Counterattitudinal News Consumption. Journal of Communication, 64(4). 
https://doi.org/10.1111/jcom.12105 
Gawronski, B. (2012). Back to the Future of Dissonance Theory: Cognitive Consistency as a 
Core Motive. Social Cognition, 30(6). https://doi.org/10.1521/soco.2012.30.6.652 
Geer, J. G. (2012). The News Media and the Rise of Negativity in Presidential Campaigns. PS: 
Political Science & Politics, 45(03). https://doi.org/10.1017/S1049096512000492 
Gómez, Á., Brooks, M. L., Buhrmester, M. D., Vázquez, A., Jetten, J., & Swann, W. B. (2011). 
On the nature of identity fusion: Insights into the construct and a new measure. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 100(5). https://doi.org/10.1037/a0022642 
Green, D. P., Palmquist, B., & Schickler, E. (2002). Partisan hearts and minds: Political parties 
and the social identities of voters. Yale University Press. 
Greene, S. (2004). Social Identity Theory and Party Identification. Social Science Quarterly, 
85(1). https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0038-4941.2004.08501010.x 
Groenendyk, E. (2012). Justifying Party Identification: A Case of Identifying with the “Lesser of 
Two Evils.” Political Behavior, 34(3). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-011-9170-0 
Grossmann, M., & Hopkins, D. A. (2016). Asymmetric politics: Ideological Republicans and 
group interest Democrats. Oxford University Press. 
Gunther, A. C., & Schmitt, K. (2004). Mapping Boundaries of the Hostile Media Effect. Journal 
of Communication, 54(1). https://doi.org/10.1093/joc/54.1.55 
Gunther, Albert C. (2017). Hostile Media Effect. In The International Encyclopedia of Media 
Effects. Wiley. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118783764.wbieme0068 
 176 
Gunther, Albert C., Christen, C. T., Liebhart, J. L., & Chia, S. C.-Y. (2001). Congenial Public, 
Contrary Press, and Biased Estimates of the Climate of Opinion. Public Opinion Quarterly, 
65(3). https://doi.org/10.1086/322846 
Gunther, Albert C., & Liebhart, J. L. (2006). Broad Reach or Biased Source? Decomposing the 
Hostile Media Effect. Journal of Communication, 56(3). https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-
2466.2006.00295.x 
Gunther, Albert C., McLaughlin, B., Gotlieb, M. R., & Wise, D. (2016). Who Says What to 
Whom: Content Versus Source in the Hostile Media Effect. International Journal of Public 
Opinion Research. https://doi.org/10.1093/ijpor/edw009 
Gurevitch, M., & Blumler, J. G. (1990). Political communication systems and democratic values. 
In J. Lichtenberg (Ed.), Democracy and the Mass Media (pp. 269–289). Cambridge 
University Press. 
Ha, J. S., Ji, S. W., & Shin, D. H. (2018). Selective exposure to partisan media: Moderating 
factors in evaluations of the president. Social Science Journal, 55(1), 62–74. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.soscij.2017.05.003 
Hameleers, M., & van der Meer, T. (2020). Fight or flight? Attributing responsibility in response 
to mixed congruent and incongruent partisan news in selective exposure media 
environments. Information, Communication & Society, 23(9). 
https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2019.1566394 
Hansen, G. J., & Kim, H. (2011). Is the Media Biased Against Me? A Meta-Analysis of the 
Hostile Media Effect Research. Communication Research Reports, 28(2). 
https://doi.org/10.1080/08824096.2011.565280 
Hart, P. S., & Nisbet, E. C. (2012). Boomerang Effects in Science Communication. 
Communication Research, 39(6). https://doi.org/10.1177/0093650211416646 
Hartmann, T., & Tanis, M. (2013). Examining the Hostile Media Effect as an Intergroup 
Phenomenon: The Role of Ingroup Identification and Status. Journal of Communication, 
63(3). https://doi.org/10.1111/jcom.12031 
Hawkins, C. B., & Nosek, B. A. (2012). Motivated Independence? Implicit Party Identity 
Predicts Political Judgments Among Self-Proclaimed Independents. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 38(11). https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167212452313 
Heere, B., & James, J. D. (2007). Stepping Outside the Lines: Developing a Multi-dimensional 
Team Identity Scale Based on Social Identity Theory. Sport Management Review, 10(1). 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S1441-3523(07)70004-9 
Heere, B., James, J., Yoshida, M., & Scremin, G. (2011). The Effect of Associated Group 
Identities on Team Identity. Journal of Sport Management, 25(6). 
https://doi.org/10.1123/jsm.25.6.606 
Heere, B., Walker, M., Yoshida, M., Ko, Y. J., Jordan, J. S., & James, J. D. (2011). Brand 
Community Development Through Associated Communities: Grounding Community 
Measurement Within Social Identity Theory. Journal of Marketing Theory and Practice, 
19(4). https://doi.org/10.2753/MTP1069-6679190404 
Herrmann, R. K. (2017). How Attachments to the Nation Shape Beliefs About the World: A 
Theory of Motivated Reasoning. International Organization, 71(S1). 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818316000382 
Hopmann, D. N., Vliegenthart, R., de Vreese, C., & Albæk, E. (2010). Effects of Election News 
Coverage: How Visibility and Tone Influence Party Choice. Political Communication, 
27(4). https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2010.516798 
 177 
Huddy, L., & Bankert, A. (2017). Political Partisanship as a Social Identity. In Oxford Research 
Encyclopedia of Politics. Oxford University Press. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.250 
Huddy, L., Davies, C., & Sandor, J. (2020). Measuring the direction and strength of partisan 
identity. In H. Oscarsson & S. Holmberg (Eds.), Research Handbook on Political 
Partisanship. Edward Elgar Publishing. https://doi.org/10.4337/9781788111997.00014 
Huddy, L., & Khatib, N. (2007). American Patriotism, National Identity, and Political 
Involvement. American Journal of Political Science, 51(1). https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-
5907.2007.00237.x 
Huddy, L., Mason, L., & Aarøe, L. (2015). Expressive Partisanship: Campaign Involvement, 
Political Emotion, and Partisan Identity. American Political Science Review, 109(1). 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055414000604 
Huddy, L., Mason, L., & Aaroe, L. (2015). Expressive Partisanship: Campaign Involvement, 
Political Emotion, and Partisan Identity. American Political Science Review, 109(1). 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055414000604 
Iyengar, S., & Hahn, K. S. (2009). Red media, blue media: Evidence of ideological selectivity in 
media use. Journal of Communication, 59(1), 19–39. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-
2466.2008.01402.x 
Iyengar, S., Hahn, K. S., Krosnick, J. A., & Walker, J. (2008). Selective Exposure to Campaign 
Communication: The Role of Anticipated Agreement and Issue Public Membership. The 
Journal of Politics, 70(1). https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022381607080139 
Iyengar, S., Sood, G., & Lelkes, Y. (2012). Affect, Not Ideology. Public Opinion Quarterly, 
76(3). https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfs038 
Jackson, J. W. (2002). Intergroup Attitudes as a Function of Different Dimensions of Group 
Identification and Perceived Intergroup Conflict. Self and Identity, 1(1). 
https://doi.org/10.1080/152988602317232777 
Jennings, M. K., Stoker, L., & Bowers, J. (2009). Politics across Generations: Family 
Transmission Reexamined. The Journal of Politics, 71(3). 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022381609090719 
Jones, J. M. (2021, April 7). Quarterly Gap in Party Affiliation Largest Since 2012. Gallup. 
https://news.gallup.com/poll/343976/quarterly-gap-party-affiliation-largest-2012.aspx 
Kashima, E. S., Kashima, Y., & Hardie, E. A. (2000). Self-Typicality and Group Identification: 
Evidence for their Separateness. Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 3(1). 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430200031006 
Keith, B. E., Magleby, D. B., Nelson, C. J., Orr, E. A., Westlye, M. C., & Wolfinger, R. E. 
(1992). The Myth of the Independent voter. University of California Press. 
Kelly, C. (1988). Intergroup differentiation in a political context. British Journal of Social 
Psychology, 27(4). https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2044-8309.1988.tb00835.x 
Kelly, D. (2019). Evaluating the News: (Mis)Perceptions of Objectivity and Credibility. Political 
Behavior, 41(2). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-018-9458-4 
Kepplinger, H. M., Donsbach, W., Brosius, H.-B., & Staab, J. F. (1989). MEDIA TONE AND 
PUBLIC OPINION: A LONGITUDINAL STUDY OF MEDIA COVERAGE AND 
PUBLIC OPINION ON CHANCELLOR KOHL. International Journal of Public Opinion 
Research, 1(4). https://doi.org/10.1093/ijpor/1.4.326 
 178 
Kim, H. S., Forquer, H., Rusko, J., Hornik, R. C., & Cappella, J. N. (2016). Selective Exposure 
to Health Information: The Role of Headline Features in the Choice of Health Newsletter 
Articles. Media Psychology, 19(4). https://doi.org/10.1080/15213269.2015.1090907 
Kim, J. W., & Kim, E. (2021). Temporal Selective Exposure: How Partisans Choose When to 
Follow Politics. Political Behavior. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-021-09690-1 
Kim, M., & Lu, Y. (2020). Testing Partisan Selective Exposure in a Multidimensional Choice 
Context: Evidence from a Conjoint Experiment. Mass Communication and Society, 23(1), 
107–127. https://doi.org/10.1080/15205436.2019.1636283 
Kinder, D. R. (2003). Communication and politics in the age of information. In D. O. Sears, L. 
Huddy, & R. Jervis (Eds.), Oxford handbook of political psychology (pp. 357–393). Oxford 
University Press. 
Klar, S., & Krupnikov, Y. (2016). Independent politics: How American disdain for parties leads 
to political inaction. Cambridge University Press. 
Klayman, J. (1995). Varieties of Confirmation Bias. In J. Busemeyer, R. Hastie, & D. L. Medin 
(Eds.), Psychology of Learning and Motivation (C, Vol. 32). Elsevier Science & 
Technology. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0079-7421(08)60315-1 
Knobloch-Westerwick, S., Carpentier, F. D., Blumhoff, A., & Nickel, N. (2005). Selective 
Exposure Effects for Positive and Negative News: Testing the Robustness of the 
Informational Utility Model. Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 82(1). 
https://doi.org/10.1177/107769900508200112 
Kraft, P. W., Lodge, M., & Taber, C. S. (2015). Why People “Don’t Trust the Evidence.” The 
ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 658(1). 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716214554758 
Kunda, Z. (1990). The case for motivated reasoning. Psychological Bulletin, 108(3). 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.108.3.480 
Ladd, J. M. (2010). The Neglected Power of Elite Opinion Leadership to Produce Antipathy 
Toward the News Media: Evidence from a Survey Experiment. Political Behavior, 32(1). 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-009-9097-x 
Lamberson, P. J., & Soroka, S. (2018). A Model of Attentiveness to Outlying News. Journal of 
Communication, 68(5). https://doi.org/10.1093/joc/jqy040 
Lau, R. R., Sigelman, L., & Rovner, I. B. (2007). The Effects of Negative Political Campaigns: 
A Meta-Analytic Reassessment. The Journal of Politics, 69(4). 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2007.00618.x 
Leach, C. W., van Zomeren, M., Zebel, S., Vliek, M. L. W., Pennekamp, S. F., Doosje, B., 
Ouwerkerk, J. W., & Spears, R. (2008). Group-level self-definition and self-investment: A 
hierarchical (multicomponent) model of in-group identification. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 95(1). https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.95.1.144 
Leeper, T. J., & Slothuus, R. (2014). Political Parties, Motivated Reasoning, and Public Opinion 
Formation. Political Psychology, 35. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12164 
Levendusky, M. (2013). Partisan Media Exposure and Attitudes Toward the Opposition. 
Political Communication, 30(4), 565–581. https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2012.737435 
Lin, M.-C., Haridakis, P. M., & Hanson, G. (2016). The Role of Political Identity and Media 
Selection on Perceptions of Hostile Media Bias During the 2012 Presidential Campaign. 
Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 60(3). 
https://doi.org/10.1080/08838151.2016.1203316 
Lodge, M., & Taber, C. S. (2013). The Rationalizing Voter. Cambridge University Press. 
 179 
Luhtanen, R., & Crocker, J. (1992). A Collective Self-Esteem Scale: Self-Evaluation of One’s 
Social Identity. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 18(3). 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167292183006 
Mael, F. A., & Tetrick, L. E. (1992). Identifying Organizational Identification. Educational and 
Psychological Measurement, 52(4). https://doi.org/10.1177/0013164492052004002 
Martin, J. J., Eklund, R. C., & Mushett, C. A. (1997). Factor Structure of the Athletic Identity 
Measurement Scale with Athletes with Disabilities. Adapted Physical Activity Quarterly, 
14(1). https://doi.org/10.1123/apaq.14.1.74 
Mason, L. (2018). Uncivil Agreement: How politics became our identity. The University of 
Chicago Press. 
Matthes, J. (2013). The Affective Underpinnings of Hostile Media Perceptions. Communication 
Research, 40(3). https://doi.org/10.1177/0093650211420255 
McChesney, R. W. (2004). Understanding U.S. Journalism II: Right-wing criticism and political 
coverage. In The Problem of the Media: U.S. communication politics in the twenty-first 
century (pp. 98–137). Month Review Press. 
Messing, S., & Westwood, S. J. (2014). Selective Exposure in the Age of Social Media. 
Communication Research, 41(8). https://doi.org/10.1177/0093650212466406 
Metzger, M. J., Hartsell, E. H., & Flanagin, A. J. (2020a). Cognitive Dissonance or Credibility? 
A Comparison of Two Theoretical Explanations for Selective Exposure to Partisan News. 
Communication Research, 47(1), 3–28. https://doi.org/10.1177/0093650215613136 
Metzger, M. J., Hartsell, E. H., & Flanagin, A. J. (2020b). Cognitive Dissonance or Credibility? 
A Comparison of Two Theoretical Explanations for Selective Exposure to Partisan News. 
Communication Research, 47(1). https://doi.org/10.1177/0093650215613136 
Nelson, J. L., & Webster, J. G. (2017). The Myth of Partisan Selective Exposure: A Portrait of 
the Online Political News Audience. Social Media + Society, 3(3). 
https://doi.org/10.1177/2056305117729314 
Newport, F., Singh, L., Soroka, S., Traugott, M., & Dugan, A. (2016, September 16). “Email” 
Dominates What Americans Have Heard About Clinton. Gallup. 
https://news.gallup.com/poll/195596/email-dominates-americans-heard-clinton.aspx 
Norris, P., Curtice, J., Sanders, D., Scammell, M., & Semetko, H. A. (1999). On Message: 
Communicating the Campaign . SAGE Publications. 
Perloff, R. M. (2015). A Three-Decade Retrospective on the Hostile Media Effect. Mass 
Communication and Society, 18(6). https://doi.org/10.1080/15205436.2015.1051234 
Peterson, E., Goel, S., & Iyengar, S. (2021). Partisan selective exposure in online news 
consumption: Evidence from the 2016 presidential campaign. Political Science Research 
and Methods, 9(2), 242–258. https://doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2019.55 
Peterson, E., & Iyengar, S. (2021). Partisan Gaps in Political Information and Information‐
Seeking Behavior: Motivated Reasoning or Cheerleading? American Journal of Political 
Science, 65(1). https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12535 
Phillips, J. M., Urbany, J. E., & Reynolds, T. J. (2008). Confirmation and the Effects of 
Valenced Political Advertising: A Field Experiment. Journal of Consumer Research, 34(6). 
https://doi.org/10.1086/523287 
Phinney, J. S. (1992). The Multigroup Ethnic Identity Measure. Journal of Adolescent Research, 
7(2). https://doi.org/10.1177/074355489272003 
 180 
Powell, T. E., van der Meer, T. G. L. A., & Peralta, C. B. (2019). Picture Power? The 
Contribution of Visuals and Text to Partisan Selective Exposure. Media and 
Communication, 7(3). https://doi.org/10.17645/mac.v7i3.1991 
Prior, M. (2007). Post-broadcast democracy: How media choice increases inequality in political 
involvement and polarizes elections. Cambridge University Press. 
Redlawsk, D. P. (2002). Hot Cognition or Cool Consideration? Testing the Effects of Motivated 
Reasoning on Political Decision Making. The Journal of Politics, 64(4). 
https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2508.00161 
Redlawsk, D. P., Civettini, A. J. W., & Emmerson, K. M. (2010). The Affective Tipping Point: 
Do Motivated Reasoners Ever “Get It”? Political Psychology, 31(4). 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2010.00772.x 
Reid, S. A. (2012). A Self-Categorization Explanation for the Hostile Media Effect. Journal of 
Communication, 62(3). https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.2012.01647.x 
Riggle, E. D. B., Mohr, J. J., Rostosky, S. S., Fingerhut, A. W., & Balsam, K. F. (2014). A 
multifactor Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Positive Identity Measure (LGB-PIM). Psychology 
of Sexual Orientation and Gender Diversity, 1(4). https://doi.org/10.1037/sgd0000057 
Robertson, C. T. (2021). Trust in Congruent Sources, Absolutely: The Moderating Effects of 
Ideological and Epistemological Beliefs on the Relationship between Perceived Source 
Congruency and News Credibility. Journalism Studies. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/1461670X.2021.1904273 
Rodriguez, C. G., Moskowitz, J. P., Salem, R. M., & Ditto, P. H. (2017). Partisan selective 
exposure: The role of party, ideology and ideological extremity over time. Translational 
Issues in Psychological Science, 3(3). https://doi.org/10.1037/tps0000121 
Schubert, T. W., & Otten, S. (2002). Overlap of Self, Ingroup, and Outgroup: Pictorial Measures 
of Self-Categorization. Self and Identity, 1(4). 
https://doi.org/10.1080/152988602760328012 
Schwartz, S. J., Park, I. J. K., Huynh, Q.-L., Zamboanga, B. L., Umaña-Taylor, A. J., Lee, R. M., 
Rodriguez, L., Kim, S. Y., Whitbourne, S. K., Castillo, L. G., Weisskirch, R. S., Vazsonyi, 
A. T., Williams, M. K., & Agocha, V. B. (2012). The American Identity Measure: 
Development and Validation across Ethnic Group and Immigrant Generation. Identity, 
12(2). https://doi.org/10.1080/15283488.2012.668730 
Searles, K., & Banda, K. K. (2019). But her emails! How journalistic preferences shaped election 
coverage in 2016. Journalism, 20(8). https://doi.org/10.1177/1464884919845459 
Sears, D. O., & Valentino, N. A. (1997). Politics Matters: Political Events as Catalysts for 
Preadult Socialization. American Political Science Review, 91(1). 
https://doi.org/10.2307/2952258 
Sellers, R. M., Smith, M. A., Shelton, J. N., Rowley, S. A. J., & Chavous, T. M. (1998). 
Multidimensional Model of Racial Identity: A Reconceptualization of African American 
Racial Identity. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 2(1). 
https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327957pspr0201_2 
Skelley, G. (2021, April 15). Few Americans Who Identify As Independent Are Actually 




Slater, M. D. (2015). Reinforcing Spirals Model: Conceptualizing the Relationship Between 
Media Content Exposure and the Development and Maintenance of Attitudes. Media 
Psychology, 18(3). https://doi.org/10.1080/15213269.2014.897236 
Slothuus, R., & de Vreese, C. H. (2010). Political Parties, Motivated Reasoning, and Issue 
Framing Effects. The Journal of Politics, 72(3). 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S002238161000006X 
Smith, E. R., Murphy, J., & Coats, S. (1999). Attachment to groups: Theory and management. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77(1). https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-
3514.77.1.94 
Song, H. (2017). Why Do People (Sometimes) Become Selective About News? The Role of 
Emotions and Partisan Differences in Selective Approach and Avoidance. Mass 
Communication and Society, 20(1). https://doi.org/10.1080/15205436.2016.1187755 
Soroka, S., & McAdams, S. (2015). News, Politics, and Negativity. Political Communication, 
32(1). https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2014.881942 
Soroka, S. N. (2006). Good News and Bad News: Asymmetric Responses to Economic 
Information. The Journal of Politics, 68(2). https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-
2508.2006.00413.x 
Spears, R., Doosje, B., & Ellemers, N. (1997). Self-Stereotyping in the Face of Threats to Group 
Status and Distinctiveness: The Role of Group Identification. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 23(5). https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167297235009 
Steele, C. M., & Liu, T. J. (1983). Dissonance processes as self-affirmation. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 45(1). https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.45.1.5 
Stone, J., & Cooper, J. (2001). A Self-Standards Model of Cognitive Dissonance. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 37(3). https://doi.org/10.1006/jesp.2000.1446 
Stroud, Natalie J. (2008). Media Use and Political Predispositions: Revisiting the Concept of 
Selective Exposure. Political Behavior, 30(3). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-007-9050-9 
Stroud, Natalie Jomini. (2008). Media Use and Political Predispositions: Revisiting the Concept 
of Selective Exposure. 30(3), 341–366. https://doi.org/10.1007/sl 
Stroud, Natalie Jomini. (2010). Polarization and partisan selective exposure. Journal of 
Communication, 60(3), 556–576. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.2010.01497.x 
Taber, C. S., & Lodge, M. (2006). Motivated Skepticism in the Evaluation of Political Beliefs. 
American Journal of Political Science, 50(3). https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-
5907.2006.00214.x 
Tajfel, H. (1978). Social Categorization, social identity, and social comparisons. In 
Differentiation between social groups: Studies in the social psychology of intergroup 
relations. European Association of Experimental Social Psychology by Academic Press. 
Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1979). An integrative theory of inter-group conflict. In W. G. Austin 
& S. Worchel (Eds.), The social psychology of inter-group relations (pp. 33–47). 
Brooks/Cole. 
Thorson, Emily. (2016). Belief Echoes: The Persistent Effects of Corrected Misinformation. 
Political Communication, 33(3). https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2015.1102187 
Thorson, Esther, McKinney, M. S., & Shah, D. (2016). Political Socialization in a Media-
Saturated World. Peter Lang US. https://doi.org/10.3726/978-1-4539-1763-3 
Trussler, M., & Soroka, S. (2014). Consumer Demand for Cynical and Negative News Frames. 
The International Journal of Press/Politics, 19(3). 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1940161214524832 
 182 
Turner, J. C., & Giles, H. (1981). Intergroup Behavior. Basil Blackwell. 
Vinney, C., Dill-Shackleford, K. E., Plante, C. N., & Bartsch, A. (2019). Development and 
validation of a measure of popular media fan identity and its relationship to well-being. 
Psychology of Popular Media Culture, 8(3). https://doi.org/10.1037/ppm0000188 
Warner, B. R., McKinney, M. S., Bramlett, J. C., Jennings, F. J., & Funk, M. E. (2020). 
Reconsidering partisanship as a constraint on the persuasive effects of debates. 
Communication Monographs, 87(2). https://doi.org/10.1080/03637751.2019.1641731 
Weeks, B. E., Kim, D. H., Hahn, L. B., Diehl, T. H., & Kwak, N. (2019). Hostile Media 
Perceptions in the Age of Social Media: Following Politicians, Emotions, and Perceptions 
of Media Bias. Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 63(3). 
https://doi.org/10.1080/08838151.2019.1653069 
Westen, D., Blagov, P. S., Harenski, K., Kilts, C., & Hamann, S. (2006). Neural Bases of 
Motivated Reasoning: An fMRI Study of Emotional Constraints on Partisan Political 
Judgment in the 2004 U.S. Presidential Election. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 
18(11). https://doi.org/10.1162/jocn.2006.18.11.1947 
Westwood, S. J., Iyengar, S., Walgrave, S., Leonisio, R., Miller, L., & Strijbis, O. (2018). The tie 
that divides: Cross-national evidence of the primacy of partyism. European Journal of 
Political Research, 57(2). https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12228 
Wlezien, C., & Soroka, S. (2019). Mass Media and Electoral Preferences During the 2016 US 
Presidential Race. Political Behavior, 41(4). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-018-9478-0 
Young, L., & Soroka, S. (2012). Affective News: The Automated Coding of Sentiment in 
Political Texts. Political Communication, 29(2). 
https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2012.671234 
Zaller, J. R. (1992). The nature and origins of mass opinion. Cambridge University Press. 
  
 
